## CryptoDB

### Chaoyun Li

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2022
TCHES
Despite the growing demand for software implementations of ECDSA secure against attackers with full control of the execution environment, scientific literature on ECDSA white-box design is scarce. The CHES 2021 WhibOx contest was thus held to assess the state-of-the-art and encourage relevant practical research, inviting developers to submit ECDSA white-box implementations and attackers to break the corresponding submissions. In this work, we describe several attack techniques and designs used during this contest. We explain the attack methods used by the team TheRealIdefix, which broke the most challenges, and we show the efficiency of each of these methods against all the submitted implementations. Moreover, we describe the designs of the two winning challenges submitted by the team zerokey; these designs represent the ECDSA signature algorithm by a sequence of systems of low-degree equations, which are obfuscated with affine encodings and extra random variables and equations. The WhibOx contest has shown that securing ECDSA in the white-box model is an open and challenging problem, as no implementation survived more than two days. In this context, our designs provide a starting methodology for further research, and our attacks highlight the weak points future work should address.
2022
TCHES
Despite the growing demand for software implementations of ECDSA secure against attackers with full control of the execution environment, scientific literature on ECDSA white-box design is scarce. The CHES 2021 WhibOx contest was thus held to assess the state-of-the-art and encourage relevant practical research, inviting developers to submit ECDSA white-box implementations and attackers to break the corresponding submissions.In this work, attackers (team TheRealIdefix) and designers (team zerokey) join to describe several attack techniques and designs used during this contest. We explain the methods used by the team TheRealIdefix, which broke the most challenges, and we show the efficiency of each of these methods against all the submitted implementations. Moreover, we describe the designs of the two winning challenges submitted by the team zerokey; these designs represent the ECDSA signature algorithm by a sequence of systems of low-degree equations, which are obfuscated with affine encodings and extra random variables and equations.The WhibOx contest has shown that securing ECDSA in the white-box model is an open and challenging problem, as no implementation survived more than two days. In this context, our designs provide a starting methodology for further research, and our attacks highlight the weak points future work should address.
2020
TOSC
As perfect building blocks for the diffusion layers of many symmetric-key primitives, the construction of MDS matrices with lightweight circuits has received much attention from the symmetric-key community. One promising way of realizing low-cost MDS matrices is based on the iterative construction: a low-cost matrix becomes MDS after rising it to a certain power. To be more specific, if At is MDS, then one can implement A instead of At to achieve the MDS property at the expense of an increased latency with t clock cycles. In this work, we identify the exact lower bound of the number of nonzero blocks for a 4 × 4 block matrix to be potentially iterative-MDS. Subsequently, we show that the theoretically lightest 4 × 4 iterative MDS block matrix (whose entries or blocks are 4 × 4 binary matrices) with minimal nonzero blocks costs at least 3 XOR gates, and a concrete example achieving the 3-XOR bound is provided. Moreover, we prove that there is no hope for previous constructions (GFS, LFS, DSI, and spares DSI) to beat this bound. Since the circuit latency is another important factor, we also consider the lower bound of the number of iterations for certain iterative MDS matrices. Guided by these bounds and based on the ideas employed to identify them, we explore the design space of lightweight iterative MDS matrices with other dimensions and report on improved results. Whenever we are unable to find better results, we try to determine the bound of the optimal solution. As a result, the optimality of some previous results is proved.
2020
TOSC
A theoretically reliable key-recovery attack should evaluate not only the non-randomness for the correct key guess but also the randomness for the wrong ones as well. The former has always been the main focus but the absence of the latter can also cause self-contradicted results. In fact, the theoretic discussion of wrong key guesses is overlooked in quite some existing key-recovery attacks, especially the previous cube attack variants based on pure experiments. In this paper, we draw links between the division property and several variants of the cube attack. In addition to the zero-sum property, we further prove that the bias phenomenon, the non-randomness widely utilized in dynamic cube attacks and cube testers, can also be reflected by the division property. Based on such links, we are able to provide several results: Firstly, we give a dynamic cube key-recovery attack on full Grain-128. Compared with Dinur et al.’s original one, this attack is supported by a theoretical analysis of the bias based on a more elaborate assumption. Our attack can recover 3 key bits with a complexity 297.86 and evaluated success probability 99.83%. Thus, the overall complexity for recovering full 128 key bits is 2125. Secondly, now that the bias phenomenon can be efficiently and elaborately evaluated, we further derive new secure bounds for Grain-like primitives (namely Grain-128, Grain-128a, Grain-V1, Plantlet) against both the zero-sum and bias cube testers. Our secure bounds indicate that 256 initialization rounds are not able to guarantee Grain-128 to resist bias-based cube testers. This is an efficient tool for newly designed stream ciphers for determining the number of initialization rounds. Thirdly, we improve Wang et al.’s relaxed term enumeration technique proposed in CRYPTO 2018 and extend their results on Kreyvium and ACORN by 1 and 13 rounds (reaching 892 and 763 rounds) with complexities 2121.19 and 2125.54 respectively. To our knowledge, our results are the current best key-recovery attacks on these two primitives.
2019
TOSC
MDS matrices are important building blocks providing diffusion functionality for the design of many symmetric-key primitives. In recent years, continuous efforts are made on the construction of MDS matrices with small area footprints in the context of lightweight cryptography. Just recently, Duval and Leurent (ToSC 2018/FSE 2019) reported some 32 × 32 binary MDS matrices with branch number 5, which can be implemented with only 67 XOR gates, whereas the previously known lightest ones of the same size cost 72 XOR gates.In this article, we focus on the construction of lightweight involutory MDS matrices, which are even more desirable than ordinary MDS matrices, since the same circuit can be reused when the inverse is required. In particular, we identify some involutory MDS matrices which can be realized with only 78 XOR gates with depth 4, whereas the previously known lightest involutory MDS matrices cost 84 XOR gates with the same depth. Notably, the involutory MDS matrix we find is much smaller than the AES MixColumns operation, which requires 97 XOR gates with depth 8 when implemented as a block of combinatorial logic that can be computed in one clock cycle. However, with respect to latency, the AES MixColumns operation is superior to our 78-XOR involutory matrices, since the AES MixColumns can be implemented with depth 3 by using more XOR gates.We prove that the depth of a 32 × 32 MDS matrix with branch number 5 (e.g., the AES MixColumns operation) is at least 3. Then, we enhance Boyar’s SLP-heuristic algorithm with circuit depth awareness, such that the depth of its output circuit is limited. Along the way, we give a formula for computing the minimum achievable depth of a circuit implementing the summation of a set of signals with given depths, which is of independent interest. We apply the new SLP heuristic to a large set of lightweight involutory MDS matrices, and we identify a depth 3 involutory MDS matrix whose implementation costs 88 XOR gates, which is superior to the AES MixColumns operation with respect to both lightweightness and latency, and enjoys the extra involution property.
2019
CRYPTO
We show that the correlation of any quadratic Boolean function can be read out from its so-called disjoint quadratic form. We further propose a polynomial-time algorithm that can transform an arbitrary quadratic Boolean function into its disjoint quadratic form. With this algorithm, the exact correlation of quadratic Boolean functions can be computed efficiently.We apply this method to analyze the linear trails of $\mathsf {MORUS}$ (one of the seven finalists of the CAESAR competition), which are found with the help of a generic model for linear trails of $\mathsf {MORUS}$-like key-stream generators. In our model, any tool for finding linear trails of block ciphers can be used to search for trails of $\mathsf {MORUS}$-like key-stream generators. As a result, a set of trails with correlation $2^{-38}$ is identified for all versions of full $\mathsf {MORUS}$, while the correlations of previously published best trails for $\mathsf {MORUS}$-640 and $\mathsf {MORUS}$-1280 are $2^{-73}$ and $2^{-76}$ respectively (ASIACRYPT 2018). This significantly improves the complexity of the attack on $\mathsf {MORUS}$-1280-256 from $2^{152}$ to $2^{76}$. These new trails also lead to the first distinguishing and message-recovery attacks on $\mathsf {MORUS}$-640-128 and $\mathsf {MORUS}$-1280-128 with surprisingly low complexities around $2^{76}$.Moreover, we observe that the condition for exploiting these trails in an attack can be more relaxed than previously thought, which shows that the new trails are superior to previously published ones in terms of both correlation and the number of ciphertext blocks involved.
2018
CRYPTO
The cube attack is an important technique for the cryptanalysis of symmetric key primitives, especially for stream ciphers. Aiming at recovering some secret key bits, the adversary reconstructs a superpoly with the secret key bits involved, by summing over a set of the plaintexts/IV which is called a cube. Traditional cube attack only exploits linear/quadratic superpolies. Moreover, for a long time after its proposal, the size of the cubes has been largely confined to an experimental range, e.g., typically 40. These limits were first overcome by the division property based cube attacks proposed by Todo et al. at CRYPTO 2017. Based on MILP modelled division property, for a cube (index set) I, they identify the small (index) subset J of the secret key bits involved in the resultant superpoly. During the precomputation phase which dominates the complexity of the cube attacks, $2^{|I|+|J|}$2|I|+|J| encryptions are required to recover the superpoly. Therefore, their attacks can only be available when the restriction $|I|+|J|<n$|I|+|J|<n is met.In this paper, we introduced several techniques to improve the division property based cube attacks by exploiting various algebraic properties of the superpoly. 1.We propose the “flag” technique to enhance the preciseness of MILP models so that the proper non-cube IV assignments can be identified to obtain a non-constant superpoly.2.A degree evaluation algorithm is presented to upper bound the degree of the superpoly. With the knowledge of its degree, the superpoly can be recovered without constructing its whole truth table. This enables us to explore larger cubes I’s even if $|I|+|J|\ge n$|I|+|J|≥n.3.We provide a term enumeration algorithm for finding the monomials of the superpoly, so that the complexity of many attacks can be further reduced. As an illustration, we apply our techniques to attack the initialization of several ciphers. To be specific, our key recovery attacks have mounted to 839-round Trivium, 891-round Kreyvium, 184-round Grain-128a and 750-round Acornrespectively.
2017
TOSC
Near-MDS matrices provide better trade-offs between security and efficiency compared to constructions based on MDS matrices, which are favored for hardwareoriented designs. We present new designs of lightweight linear diffusion layers by constructing lightweight near-MDS matrices. Firstly generic n×n near-MDS circulant matrices are found for 5 ≤ n ≤9. Secondly, the implementation cost of instantiations of the generic near-MDS matrices is examined. Surprisingly, for n = 7, 8, it turns out that some proposed near-MDS circulant matrices of order n have the lowest XOR count among all near-MDS matrices of the same order. Further, for n = 5, 6, we present near-MDS matrices of order n having the lowest XOR count as well. The proposed matrices, together with previous construction of order less than five, lead to solutions of n×n near-MDS matrices with the lowest XOR count over finite fields F2m for 2 ≤ n ≤ 8 and 4 ≤ m ≤ 2048. Moreover, we present some involutory near-MDS matrices of order 8 constructed from Hadamard matrices. Lastly, the security of the proposed linear layers is studied by calculating lower bounds on the number of active S-boxes. It is shown that our linear layers with a well-chosen nonlinear layer can provide sufficient security against differential and linear cryptanalysis.