International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Michael Rosenberg


LATKE: A Framework for Constructing Identity-Binding PAKEs
Jonathan Katz Michael Rosenberg
Motivated by applications to the internet of things (IoT), Cremers, Naor, Paz, and Ronen (CRYPTO '22) recently considered a setting in which multiple parties share a common password and want to be able to pairwise authenticate. They observed that using standard password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols in this setting allows for catastrophic impersonation attacks whereby compromise of a single party allows an attacker to impersonate any party to any other. To address this, they proposed the notion of identity-binding PAKE (iPAKE) and showed constructions of iPAKE protocol CHIP. We present LATKE, a framework for iPAKE that allows us to construct protocols with features beyond what CHIP achieves. In particular, we can instantiate the components of our framework to yield an iPAKE protocol with post-quantum security and identity concealment, where one party hides its identity until it has authenticated the other. This is the first iPAKE protocol with either property. To demonstrate the concrete efficiency of our framework, we implement various instantiations and compare the resulting protocols to CHIP when run on commodity hardware. The performance of our schemes is very close to that of CHIP, while offering stronger security properties.
Boosting the Security of Blind Signature Schemes 📺
Jonathan Katz Julian Loss Michael Rosenberg
Existing blind signature schemes that are secure for polynomially many concurrent executions of the signing protocol are either inefficient or rely on non-standard assumptions (even in the random-oracle model). We show the first efficient blind signature schemes achieving this level of security based on the RSA, quadratic residuosity, and discrete logarithm assumptions (in the random-oracle model). Our core technique involves an extension and generalization of a transform due to Pointcheval (Eurocrypt~'98) that allows us to convert certain blind signature schemes that are secure for (concurrently) issuing logarithmically many signatures into ones secure for (concurrently) issuing polynomially many signatures.


Jonathan Katz (2)
Julian Loss (1)