## CryptoDB

### Jeroen van de Graaf

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2014
EPRINT
2010
EPRINT
We propose the first protocol for securely computing the inner product modulo an integer $m$ between two distrustful parties based on a trusted initializer, i.e. a trusted party that interacts with the players solely during a setup phase. We obtain a very simple protocol with universally composable security. As an application of our protocol, we obtain a solution for securely computing linear equations.
2008
EPRINT
We implement one-out-of-two bit oblivious transfer (OT) based on the assumptions used in the McEliece cryptosystem: the hardness of decoding random binary linear codes, and the difficulty of distinguishing a permuted generating matrix of Goppa codes from a random matrix. To our knowledge this is the first OT reduction to these problems only.
2007
EPRINT
Farnel is a voting system proposed in 2001 in which each voter signs a ballot. It uses two ballot boxes to avoid the association between a voter and a vote. In this paper we first point out a flaw in the ThreeBallot system proposed by Rivest that seems to have gone unnoticed so far: it reveals statistical information about who is winning the election. Then, trying to resolve this and other flaws, we present a new, voter-verifiable version of the Farnel voting system in which voters retain copies of ballot IDs as receipts.
2007
EPRINT
We describe a variation of the Pret-a-Voter voting protocol that keeps the same ballot layout but borrows and slightly modifies the underlying cryptographic primitives from Punchscan, which is based on bit commitments. By using unconditionally hiding bit commitments, our protocol obtains unconditional privacy. We suggest a way to make cheating on the computational binding bit commitments impossible under assumptions that seem plausible for large-scale elections. Also we show ways to have several races on the Pret-a-Voter ballot, showing that with respect to ballot layout the protocols are almost identical.
2007
EPRINT
This paper describes in detail a voting scheme which allows voters to be sure that whatever they see in the booth will be included correctly in the outcome. It presents a rigorous and understandable model of requirements for election systems, states formally the properties of the system, and proves them. As a step towards understanding the full 2D voting system, it also presents a simpler 1D system.
1995
CRYPTO
1987
CRYPTO
1987
CRYPTO
1987
CRYPTO
1987
EUROCRYPT
1986
CRYPTO
1986
EUROCRYPT