## CryptoDB

### Juan Manuel González Nieto

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2010
EPRINT
Constructing a one round group key exchange (GKE) protocol that provides forward secrecy is an open problem in the literature. In this paper, we investigate whether or not the security of one round GKE protocols can be enhanced with any form of forward secrecy without increasing the number of rounds. We apply the {\em key evolving} approach used for forward secure encryption/signature schemes and then model the notion of forward security for the first time for key exchange protocols. This notion is slightly weaker than forward secrecy, considered traditionally for key exchange protocols. We then revise an existing one round GKE protocol to propose a GKE protocol with forward security. In the security proof of the revised protocol we completely avoid reliance on the random oracle assumption that was needed for the proof of the base protocol. Our security proof can be directly applied to the base protocol, making it the most efficient one round GKE protocol secure in the standard model. Our one round GKE protocol is generically constructed from the primitive of forward secure encryption. We also propose a concrete forward secure encryption scheme with constant size ciphertext that can be used to efficiently instantiate our protocol.
2010
EPRINT
Miller's algorithm for computing pairings involves performing multiplications between elements that belong to different finite fields. Namely, elements in the full extension field $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ are multiplied by elements contained in proper subfields $\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/d}}$, and by elements in the base field $\mathbb{F}_{p}$. We show that significant speedups in pairing computations can be achieved by delaying these mismatched'' multiplications for an optimal number of iterations. Importantly, we show that our technique can be easily integrated into traditional pairing algorithms; implementers can exploit the computational savings herein by applying only minor changes to existing pairing code.
2010
EPRINT
We introduce the concept of attribute-based authenticated key exchange (AB-AKE) within the framework of ciphertext policy attribute-based systems. A notion of AKE-security for AB-AKE is presented based on the security models for group key exchange protocols and also taking into account the security requirements generally considered in the ciphertext policy attribute-based setting. We also extend the paradigm of hybrid encryption to the ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption schemes. A new primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism (EP-AB-KEM) is introduced and a notion of chosen ciphertext security is defined for EP-AB-KEMs. We propose an EP-AB-KEM from an existing attribute-based encryption scheme and show that it achieves chosen ciphertext security in the generic group and random oracle models. We present a generic one-round AB-AKE protocol that satisfies our AKE-security notion. The protocol is generically constructed from any EP-AB-KEM that satisfies chosen ciphertext security. Instantiating the generic AB-AKE protocol with our EP-AB-KEM will result in a concrete one-round AB-AKE protocol also secure in the generic group and random oracle models.
2010
EPRINT
The most costly operations encountered in pairing computations are those that take place in the full extension field $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$. At high levels of security, the complexity of operations in $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ dominates the complexity of the operations that occur in the lower degree subfields. Consequently, full extension field operations have the greatest effect on the runtime of Miller's algorithm. Many recent optimizations in the literature have focussed on improving the overall operation count by presenting new explicit formulas that reduce the number of subfield operations encountered throughout an iteration of Miller's algorithm. Unfortunately, almost all of these operations far outweigh the operations in the smaller subfields. In this paper, we propose a new way of carrying out Miller's algorithm that involves new explicit formulas which reduce the number of full extension field operations that occur in an iteration of the Miller loop, resulting in significant speed ups in most practical situations of between 5 and 30 percent.
2009
PKC
2008
EPRINT
We consider one-round identity-based key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random oracle model.
2006
PKC
2005
EPRINT
We propose a new cryptographic construction called 3C, which works as a pseudorandom function (PRF), message authentication code (MAC) and cryptographic hash function. The 3C-construction is obtained by modifying the Merkle-Damgard iterated construction used to construct iterated hash functions. We assume that the compression functions of Merkle-Damgard iterated construction realize a family of fixed-length-input pseudorandom functions (FI-PRFs). A concrete security analysis for the family of 3C- variable-length-input pseudorandom functions (VI-PRFs) is provided in a precise and quantitative manner. The 3C- VI-PRF is then used to realize the 3C- MAC construction called one-key NMAC (O-NMAC). O-NMAC is a more efficient variant of NMAC and HMAC in the applications where key changes frequently and the key cannot be cached. The 3C-construction works as a new mode of hash function operation for the hash functions based on Merkle-Damgard construction such as MD5 and SHA-1. The generic 3C- hash function is more resistant against the recent differential multi-block collision attacks than the Merkle-Damgard hash functions and the extension attacks do not work on the 3C- hash function. The 3C-X hash function is the simplest and efficient variant of the generic 3C hash function and it is the simplest modification to the Merkle-Damgard hash function that one can achieve. We provide the security analysis for the functions 3C and 3C-X against multi-block collision attacks and generic attacks on hash functions. We combine the wide-pipe hash function with the 3C hash function for even better security against some generic attacks and differential attacks. The 3C-construction has all these features at the expense of one extra iteration of the compression function over the Merkle-Damgard construction.
2005
EPRINT
The design principle of Merkle-Damg{\aa}rd construction is collision resistance of the compression function implies collision resistance of the hash function. Recently multi-block collisions have been found on the hash functions MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1 using differential cryptanalysis. These multi-block collisions raise several questions on some definitions and properties used in the hash function literature. In this report, we take a closer look at some of the literature in cryptographic hash functions and give our insights on them. We bring out some important differences between the 1989's Damg{\aa}rd's hash function and the hash functions that followed it. We conclude that these hash functions did not consider the pseudo-collision attack in their design criteria. We also doubt whether these hash functions achieve the design principle of Merkle-Damg{\aa}rd's construction. We formalise some definitions on the properties of hash functions in the literature.
2003
PKC
2000
PKC