International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


YongBin ZHOU


Revealing the Weakness of Addition Chain Based Masked SBox Implementations 📺
Addition chain is a well-known approach for implementing higher-order masked SBoxes. However, this approach induces more computations of intermediate monomials over F2n, which in turn leak more information related to the sensitive variables and may decrease its side-channel resistance consequently. In this paper, we introduce a new notion named polygon degree to measure the resistance of monomial computations. With the help of this notion, we select several typical addition chain implementations with the strongest or the weakest resistance. In practical experiments based on an ARM Cortex-M4 architecture, we collect power and electromagnetic traces in consideration of different noise levels. The results show that the resistance of the weakest masked SBox implementation is close to that of an unprotected implementation, while the strongest one can also be broken with fewer than 1,500 traces due to extra leakages. Moreover, we study the resistance of addition chain implementations against profiled attacks. We find that some monomials with smaller output size leak more information than the SBox output. The work by Duc et al. at JOC 2019 showed that for a balanced function, the smaller the output size is, the less information is leaked. Thus, our attacks demonstrate that this property of balanced functions does not apply to unbalanced functions.
Side-Channel Attacks: Ten Years After Its Publication and the Impacts on Cryptographic Module Security Testing
YongBin Zhou DengGuo Feng
Side-channel attacks are easy-to-implement whilst powerful attacks against cryptographic implementations, and their targets range from primitives, protocols, modules, and devices to even systems. These attacks pose a serious threat to the security of cryptographic modules. In consequence, cryptographic implementations have to be evaluated for their resistivity against such attacks and the incorporation of different countermeasures has to be considered. This paper surveys the methods and techniques employed in these attacks, the destructive effects of such attacks, the countermeasures against such attacks and evaluation of their feasibility and applicability. Finally, the necessity and feasibility of adopting this kind of physical security testing and evaluation in the development of FIPS 140-3 standard are explored. This paper is not only a survey paper, but also more a position paper.
Efficient and Optimistic Fair Exchanges Based on Standard RSA with Provable Security
In this paper, we introduce a new and natural paradigm for fair exchange protocols, called verifiable probabilistic signature scheme. A security model with precise and formal definitions is presented, and an RSA-based efficient and provably secure verifiable probabilistic signature scheme is proposed. Our scheme works well with standard RSA signature schemes, and the proposed optimistic fair exchange protocol is much concise and efficient, and suitable for practical applications.