International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Bodo Möller

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2007
EPRINT
Faster Multi-Exponentiation through Caching: Accelerating (EC)DSA Signature Verification
Bodo M?ller Andy Rupp
We consider the task of computing power products $\prod_{1 \leq i \leq k} g_i^{e_i}$ ("multi-exponentiation") where base elements $g_2, ..., g_k$ are fixed while $g_1$ is variable between multi-exponentiations but may repeat, and where the exponents are bounded (e.g., in a finite group). We present a new technique that entails two different ways of computing such a result. The first way applies to the first occurrence of any $g_1$ where, besides obtaining the actual result, we create a cache entry based on $g_1$, investing very little memory or time overhead. The second way applies to any multi-exponentiation once such a cache entry exists for the $g_1$ in question: the cache entry provides for a significant speed-up. Our technique is useful for ECDSA or DSA signature verification with common domain parameters and recurring signers.
2002
EPRINT
Provably Secure Public-Key Encryption for Length-Preserving Chaumian Mixes
Bodo M\"oller
Mix chains as proposed by Chaum allow sending untraceable electronic e-mail without requiring trust in a single authority: messages are recursively public-key encrypted to multiple intermediates (mixes), each of which forwards the message after removing one layer of encryption. To conceal as much information as possible when using variable (source routed) chains, all messages passed to mixes should be of the same length; thus, message length should not decrease when a mix transforms an input message into the corresponding output message directed at the next mix in the chain. Chaum described an implementation for such length-preserving mixes, but it is not secure against active attacks. We show how to build practical cryptographically secure length-preserving mixes. The conventional definition of security against chosen ciphertext attacks is not applicable to length-preserving mixes; we give an appropriate definition and show that our construction achieves provable security.
2000
ASIACRYPT

Coauthors

Safuat Hamdy (1)
Andy Rupp (1)