## CryptoDB

### Ilya Kizhvatov

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2018
TCHES
2015
EPRINT
2010
EPRINT
In this paper we present two attacks that exploit cache events, which are visible in some side channel, to derive a secret key used in an implementation of AES. The first is an improvement of an adaptive chosen plaintext attack presented at ACISP 2006. The second is a new known plaintext attack that can recover a 128-bit key with approximately 30 measurements to reduce the number of key hypotheses to $2^{28}$. This is comparable to classical Differential Power Analysis; however, our attacks are able to overcome certain masking techniques. We also show how to deal with unreliable cache event detection in the real-life measurement scenario and present practical explorations on a 32-bit ARM microprocessor.
2010
CHES
2009
CHES
2009
CHES

CHES 2015
CHES 2014
CHES 2013