International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Jean-Pierre Seifert

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2024
TCHES
Through the Looking-Glass: Sensitive Data Extraction by Optical Probing of Scan Chains
There is an imminent trade-off between an Integrated Circuit (IC)’s testability and its physical security. While Design for Test (DfT) techniques, such as scan chains make the circuit’s physical behavior at runtime observable and easy to control, these techniques form a lucrative class of attack vectors with the potential to compromise the entire security architecture of the Device under Test (DuT). Moreover, with the rapid development of more complex technologies, the need for integration of DfT techniques even intensifies due to the requirement for faster time-to-market of cutting-edge ICs. In this work, we demonstrate that sensitive data can be extracted from the registers once their locations on the chip are identified by exploiting DfT structures and optically probing them — in this case, scan chains, even after the access to test mode is restricted. Furthermore, we show that also an obfuscated scan chain architecture can be fully reconstructed by using tools and techniques encountered in the Failure Analysis (FA) domain.
2023
TCHES
Loop Aborts Strike Back: Defeating Fault Countermeasures in Lattice Signatures with ILP
At SAC 2016, Espitau et al. presented a loop-abort fault attack against lattice-based signature schemes following the Fiat–Shamir with aborts paradigm. Their attack recovered the signing key by injecting faults in the sampling of the commitment vector (also called masking vector) y, leaving its coefficients at their initial zero value. As possible countermeasures, they proposed to carry out the sampling of the coefficients of y in shuffled order, or to ensure that the masking polynomials in y are not of low degree. In this paper, we show that both of these countermeasures are insufficient. We demonstrate a new loop-abort fault injection attack against Fiat–Shamir with aborts lattice-based signatures that can recover the secret key from faulty signatures even when the proposed countermeasures are implemented. The key idea of our attack is that faulted signatures give rise to a noisy linear system of equations, which can be solved using integer linear programming. We present an integer linear program that recovers the secret key efficiently in practice, and validate the efficacy of our attack by conducting a practical end-to-end attack against a shuffled version of the Dilithium reference implementation, mounted on an ARM Cortex M4. We achieve a full (equivalent) key recovery in under 3 minutes total execution time (including signature generation), using only 5 faulted signatures. In addition, we conduct extensive theoretical simulations of the attack against Dilithium. We find that our method can achieve key recovery in under 5 minutes given a (sufficiently large) set of signatures where just one of the coefficients of y is zeroed out (or left at its initial value of zero). Furthermore, we find that our attack works against all security levels of Dilithium. Our attack shows that protecting Fiat–Shamir with aborts lattice-based signatures against fault injection attacks cannot be achieved using the simple countermeasures proposed by Espitau et al. and likely requires significantly more expensive countermeasures.
2020
TCHES
Splitting the Interpose PUF: A Novel Modeling Attack Strategy 📺
We demonstrate that the Interpose PUF proposed at CHES 2019, an Arbiter PUF-based design for so-called Strong Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), can be modeled by novel machine learning strategies up to very substantial sizes and complexities. Our attacks require in the most difficult cases considerable, but realistic, numbers of CRPs, while consuming only moderate computation times, ranging from few seconds to few days. The attacks build on a new divide-and-conquer approach that allows us to model the two building blocks of the Interpose PUF separately. For non-reliability based Machine Learning (ML) attacks, this eventually leads to attack times on (kup, kdown)-Interpose PUFs that are comparable to the ones against max{kup, kdown}-XOR Arbiter PUFs, refuting the original claim that Interpose PUFs could provide security similar to (kdown + kup/2)-XOR Arbiter PUFs (CHES 2019). On the technical side, our novel divide-and-conquer technique might also be useful in analyzing other designs, where XOR Arbiter PUF challenge bits are unknown to the attacker.
2018
TCHES
Key Extraction Using Thermal Laser Stimulation A Case Study on Xilinx Ultrascale FPGAs
Thermal laser stimulation (TLS) is a failure analysis technique, which can be deployed by an adversary to localize and read out stored secrets in the SRAM of a chip. To this date, a few proof-of-concept experiments based on TLS or similar approaches have been reported in the literature, which do not reflect a real attack scenario. Therefore, it is still questionable whether this attack technique is applicable to modern ICs equipped with side-channel countermeasures. The primary aim of this work is to assess the feasibility of launching a TLS attack against a device with robust security features. To this end, we select a modern FPGA, and more specifically, its key memory, the so-called battery-backed SRAM (BBRAM), as a target. We demonstrate that an attacker is able to extract the stored 256-bit AES key used for the decryption of the FPGA’s bitstream, by conducting just a single non-invasive measurement. Moreover, it becomes evident that conventional countermeasures are incapable of preventing our attack since the FPGA is turned off during key recovery. Based on our time measurements, the required effort to develop the attack is shown to be less than 7 hours. To avert this powerful attack, we propose a low-cost and CMOS compatible countermeasure circuit, which is capable of protecting the BBRAM from TLS attempts even when the FPGA is powered off. Using a proof-of-concept prototype of our countermeasure, we demonstrate its effectiveness against TLS key extraction attempts.
2017
JOFC
2016
CHES
2016
CHES
2014
CHES
2012
CHES
2002
CHES
2002
CHES

Program Committees

CHES 2019
CHES 2008
CHES 2007
CHES 2005
CHES 2004
CHES 2003