International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Shota Yamada

Affiliation: AIST

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2019
PKC
Non-zero Inner Product Encryption Schemes from Various Assumptions: LWE, DDH and DCR
Shuichi Katsumata Shota Yamada
In non-zero inner product encryption (NIPE) schemes, ciphertexts and secret keys are associated with vectors and decryption is possible whenever the inner product of these vectors does not equal zero. So far, much effort on constructing bilinear map-based NIPE schemes have been made and this has lead to many efficient schemes. However, the constructions of NIPE schemes without bilinear maps are much less investigated. The only known other NIPE constructions are based on lattices, however, they are all highly inefficient due to the need of converting inner product operations into circuits or branching programs.To remedy our rather poor understanding regarding NIPE schemes without bilinear maps, we provide two methods for constructing NIPE schemes: a direct construction from lattices and a generic construction from schemes for inner products (LinFE). For our first direct construction, it highly departs from the traditional lattice-based constructions and we rely heavily on new tools concerning Gaussian measures over multi-dimensional lattices to prove security. For our second generic construction, using the recent constructions of LinFE schemes as building blocks, we obtain the first NIPE constructions based on the DDH and DCR assumptions. In particular, we obtain the first NIPE schemes without bilinear maps or lattices.
2019
PKC
Adaptively Single-Key Secure Constrained PRFs for $\mathrm {NC}^1$
We present a construction of an adaptively single-key secure constrained PRF (CPRF) for $$\mathbf {NC}^1$$ assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) and the subgroup hiding assumption over a (pairing-free) composite order group. This is the first construction of such a CPRF in the standard model without relying on a complexity leveraging argument.To achieve this, we first introduce the notion of partitionable CPRF, which is a CPRF accommodated with partitioning techniques and combine it with shadow copy techniques often used in the dual system encryption methodology. We present a construction of partitionable CPRF for $$\mathbf {NC}^1$$ based on IO and the subgroup hiding assumption over a (pairing-free) group. We finally prove that an adaptively single-key secure CPRF for $$\mathbf {NC}^1$$ can be obtained from a partitionable CPRF for $$\mathbf {NC}^1$$ and IO.
2019
EUROCRYPT
Designated Verifier/Prover and Preprocessing NIZKs from Diffie-Hellman Assumptions 📺
In a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof, a prover can non-interactively convince a verifier of a statement without revealing any additional information. Thus far, numerous constructions of NIZKs have been provided in the common reference string (CRS) model (CRS-NIZK) from various assumptions, however, it still remains a long standing open problem to construct them from tools such as pairing-free groups or lattices. Recently, Kim and Wu (CRYPTO’18) made great progress regarding this problem and constructed the first lattice-based NIZK in a relaxed model called NIZKs in the preprocessing model (PP-NIZKs). In this model, there is a trusted statement-independent preprocessing phase where secret information are generated for the prover and verifier. Depending on whether those secret information can be made public, PP-NIZK captures CRS-NIZK, designated-verifier NIZK (DV-NIZK), and designated-prover NIZK (DP-NIZK) as special cases. It was left as an open problem by Kim and Wu whether we can construct such NIZKs from weak paring-free group assumptions such as DDH. As a further matter, all constructions of NIZKs from Diffie-Hellman (DH) type assumptions (regardless of whether it is over a paring-free or paring group) require the proof size to have a multiplicative-overhead $$|C| \cdot \mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$|C|·poly(κ), where |C| is the size of the circuit that computes the $$\mathbf {NP}$$NP relation.In this work, we make progress of constructing (DV, DP, PP)-NIZKs with varying flavors from DH-type assumptions. Our results are summarized as follows:DV-NIZKs for $$\mathbf {NP}$$NP from the CDH assumption over pairing-free groups. This is the first construction of such NIZKs on pairing-free groups and resolves the open problem posed by Kim and Wu (CRYPTO’18).DP-NIZKs for $$\mathbf {NP}$$NP with short proof size from a DH-type assumption over pairing groups. Here, the proof size has an additive-overhead $$|C|+\mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$|C|+poly(κ) rather then an multiplicative-overhead $$|C| \cdot \mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$|C|·poly(κ). This is the first construction of such NIZKs (including CRS-NIZKs) that does not rely on the LWE assumption, fully-homomorphic encryption, indistinguishability obfuscation, or non-falsifiable assumptions.PP-NIZK for $$\mathbf {NP}$$NP with short proof size from the DDH assumption over pairing-free groups. This is the first PP-NIZK that achieves a short proof size from a weak and static DH-type assumption such as DDH. Similarly to the above DP-NIZK, the proof size is $$|C|+\mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$|C|+poly(κ). This too serves as a solution to the open problem posed by Kim and Wu (CRYPTO’18). Along the way, we construct two new homomorphic authentication (HomAuth) schemes which may be of independent interest.
2019
EUROCRYPT
Group Signatures Without NIZK: From Lattices in the Standard Model
Shuichi Katsumata Shota Yamada
In a group signature scheme, users can anonymously sign messages on behalf of the group they belong to, yet it is possible to trace the signer when needed. Since the first proposal of lattice-based group signatures in the random oracle model by Gordon, Katz, and Vaikuntanathan (ASIACRYPT 2010), the realization of them in the standard model from lattices has attracted much research interest, however, it has remained unsolved. In this paper, we make progress on this problem by giving the first such construction. Our schemes satisfy CCA-selfless anonymity and full traceability, which are the standard security requirements for group signatures proposed by Bellare, Micciancio, and Warinschi (EUROCRYPT 2003) with a slight relaxation in the anonymity requirement suggested by Camenisch and Groth (SCN 2004). We emphasize that even with this relaxed anonymity requirement, all previous group signature constructions rely on random oracles or NIZKs, where currently NIZKs are not known to be implied from lattice-based assumptions. We propose two constructions that provide tradeoffs regarding the security assumption and efficiency:Our first construction is proven secure assuming the standard LWE and the SIS assumption. The sizes of the public parameters and the signatures grow linearly in the number of users in the system.Our second construction is proven secure assuming the standard LWE and the subexponential hardness of the SIS problem. The sizes of the public parameters and the signatures are independent of the number of users in the system. Technically, we obtain the above schemes by combining a secret key encryption scheme with additional properties and a special type of attribute-based signature (ABS) scheme, thus bypassing the utilization of NIZKs. More specifically, we introduce the notion of indexed ABS, which is a relaxation of standard ABS. The above two schemes are obtained by instantiating the indexed ABS with different constructions. One is a direct construction we propose and the other is based on previous work.
2019
CRYPTO
Attribute Based Encryption (and more) for Nondeterministic Finite Automata from LWE 📺
Constructing Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) [56] for uniform models of computation from standard assumptions, is an important problem, about which very little is known. The only known ABE schemes in this setting that (i) avoid reliance on multilinear maps or indistinguishability obfuscation, (ii) support unbounded length inputs and (iii) permit unbounded key requests to the adversary in the security game, are by Waters from Crypto, 2012 [57] and its variants. Waters provided the first ABE for Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) satisfying the above properties, from a parametrized or “q-type” assumption over bilinear maps. Generalizing this construction to Nondeterministic Finite Automata (NFA) was left as an explicit open problem in the same work, and has seen no progress to date. Constructions from other assumptions such as more standard pairing based assumptions, or lattice based assumptions has also proved elusive.In this work, we construct the first symmetric key attribute based encryption scheme for nondeterministic finite automata (NFA) from the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. Our scheme supports unbounded length inputs as well as unbounded length machines. In more detail, secret keys in our construction are associated with an NFA M of unbounded length, ciphertexts are associated with a tuple $$(\mathbf {x}, m)$$ where $$\mathbf {x}$$ is a public attribute of unbounded length and m is a secret message bit, and decryption recovers m if and only if $$M(\mathbf {x})=1$$.Further, we leverage our ABE to achieve (restricted notions of) attribute hiding analogous to the circuit setting, obtaining the first predicate encryption and bounded key functional encryption schemes for NFA from LWE. We achieve machine hiding in the single/bounded key setting to obtain the first reusable garbled NFA from standard assumptions. In terms of lower bounds, we show that secret key functional encryption even for DFAs, with security against unbounded key requests implies indistinguishability obfuscation ($$\mathsf {iO}$$) for circuits; this suggests a barrier in achieving full fledged functional encryption for NFA.
2019
CRYPTO
Exploring Constructions of Compact NIZKs from Various Assumptions 📺
A non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) protocol allows a prover to non-interactively convince a verifier of the truth of the statement without leaking any other information. In this study, we explore shorter NIZK proofs for all $$\mathbf{NP }$$ languages. Our primary interest is NIZK proofs from falsifiable pairing/pairing-free group-based assumptions. Thus far, NIZKs in the common reference string model (CRS-NIZKs) for $$\mathbf{NP }$$ based on falsifiable pairing-based assumptions all require a proof size at least as large as $$O(|C| \kappa )$$, where C is a circuit computing the $$\mathbf{NP }$$ relation and $$\kappa $$ is the security parameter. This holds true even for the weaker designated-verifier NIZKs (DV-NIZKs). Notably, constructing a (CRS, DV)-NIZK with proof size achieving an additive-overhead $$O(|C|) + \mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$, rather than a multiplicative-overhead $$|C| \cdot \mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$, based on any falsifiable pairing-based assumptions is an open problem.In this work, we present various techniques for constructing NIZKs with compact proofs, i.e., proofs smaller than $$O(|C|) + \mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$, and make progress regarding the above situation. Our result is summarized below. We construct CRS-NIZK for all $$\mathbf{NP }$$ with proof size $$|C| +\mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$ from a (non-static) falsifiable Diffie-Hellman (DH) type assumption over pairing groups. This is the first CRS-NIZK to achieve a compact proof without relying on either lattice-based assumptions or non-falsifiable assumptions. Moreover, a variant of our CRS-NIZK satisfies universal composability (UC) in the erasure-free adaptive setting. Although it is limited to $$\mathbf{NP }$$ relations in $$\mathbf{NC }^1$$, the proof size is $$|w| \cdot \mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$ where w is the witness, and in particular, it matches the state-of-the-art UC-NIZK proposed by Cohen, shelat, and Wichs (CRYPTO’19) based on lattices.We construct (multi-theorem) DV-NIZKs for $$\mathbf{NP }$$ with proof size $$|C|+\mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$ from the computational DH assumption over pairing-free groups. This is the first DV-NIZK that achieves a compact proof from a standard DH type assumption. Moreover, if we further assume the $$\mathbf{NP }$$ relation to be computable in $$\mathbf{NC }^1$$ and assume hardness of a (non-static) falsifiable DH type assumption over pairing-free groups, the proof size can be made as small as $$|w| + \mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$. Another related but independent issue is that all (CRS, DV)-NIZKs require the running time of the prover to be at least $$|C|\cdot \mathsf {poly}(\kappa )$$. Considering that there exists NIZKs with efficient verifiers whose running time is strictly smaller than |C|, it is an interesting problem whether we can construct prover-efficient NIZKs. To this end, we construct prover-efficient CRS-NIZKs for $$\mathbf{NP }$$ with compact proof through a generic construction using laconic functional evaluation schemes (Quach, Wee, and Wichs (FOCS’18)). This is the first NIZK in any model where the running time of the prover is strictly smaller than the time it takes to compute the circuit C computing the $$\mathbf{NP }$$ relation.Finally, perhaps of an independent interest, we formalize the notion of homomorphic equivocal commitments, which we use as building blocks to obtain the first result, and show how to construct them from pairing-based assumptions.
2018
CRYPTO
Constrained PRFs for $\mathrm{NC}^1$ in Traditional Groups 📺
We propose new constrained pseudorandom functions (CPRFs) in traditional groups. Traditional groups mean cyclic and multiplicative groups of prime order that were widely used in the 1980s and 1990s (sometimes called “pairing free” groups). Our main constructions are as follows. We propose a selectively single-key secure CPRF for circuits with depth$$O(\log n)$$(that is,NC$$^1$$circuits) in traditional groups where n is the input size. It is secure under the L-decisional Diffie-Hellman inversion (L-DDHI) assumption in the group of quadratic residues $$\mathbb {QR}_q$$ and the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in a traditional group of order qin the standard model.We propose a selectively single-key private bit-fixing CPRF in traditional groups. It is secure under the DDH assumption in any prime-order cyclic group in the standard model.We propose adaptively single-key secure CPRF for NC$$^1$$ and private bit-fixing CPRF in the random oracle model. To achieve the security in the standard model, we develop a new technique using correlated-input secure hash functions.
2018
ASIACRYPT
Tighter Security Proofs for GPV-IBE in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
In (STOC, 2008), Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan proposed the first identity-based encryption (GPV-IBE) scheme based on a post-quantum assumption, namely, the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. Since their proof was only made in the random oracle model (ROM) instead of the quantum random oracle model (QROM), it remained unclear whether the scheme was truly post-quantum or not. In (CRYPTO, 2012), Zhandry developed new techniques to be used in the QROM and proved security of GPV-IBE in the QROM, hence answering in the affirmative that GPV-IBE is indeed post-quantum. However, since the general technique developed by Zhandry incurred a large reduction loss, there was a wide gap between the concrete efficiency and security level provided by GPV-IBE in the ROM and QROM. Furthermore, regardless of being in the ROM or QROM, GPV-IBE is not known to have a tight reduction in the multi-challenge setting. Considering that in the real-world an adversary can obtain many ciphertexts, it is desirable to have a security proof that does not degrade with the number of challenge ciphertext.In this paper, we provide a much tighter proof for the GPV-IBE in the QROM in the single-challenge setting. In addition, we also show that a slight variant of the GPV-IBE has an almost tight reduction in the multi-challenge setting both in the ROM and QROM, where the reduction loss is independent of the number of challenge ciphertext. Our proof departs from the traditional partitioning technique and resembles the approach used in the public key encryption scheme of Cramer and Shoup (CRYPTO, 1998). Our proof strategy allows the reduction algorithm to program the random oracle the same way for all identities and naturally fits the QROM setting where an adversary may query a superposition of all identities in one random oracle query. Notably, our proofs are much simpler than the one by Zhandry and conceptually much easier to follow for cryptographers not familiar with quantum computation. Although at a high level, the techniques used for the single and multi-challenge setting are similar, the technical details are quite different. For the multi-challenge setting, we rely on the Katz-Wang technique (CCS, 2003) to overcome some obstacles regarding the leftover hash lemma.
2017
CRYPTO
2016
EUROCRYPT
2016
CRYPTO
2016
ASIACRYPT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
ASIACRYPT
2015
ASIACRYPT
2014
CRYPTO
2014
PKC
2014
EPRINT
2013
PKC
2012
PKC
2012
PKC
2011
PKC