## CryptoDB

### Paper: On Modeling IND-CCA Security in Cryptographic Protocols

Authors: Dennis Hofheinz Jörn Müller-Quade Rainer Steinwandt URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/024 Search ePrint Search Google Two common notions of security for public key encryption schemes are shown to be equivalent: we prove that indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) is in fact polynomially equivalent to (yet "slightly" weaker than) securely realizing the ideal functionality F_PKE in the general modeling of cryptographic protocols of [http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067]. This disproves in particular the claim that security in the sense of IND-CCA strictly implies security in the sense of realizing F_PKE (see [http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067]). Moreover, we give concrete reductions among such security notions and show that these relations hold for both uniform and non-uniform adversarial entities.
##### BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2003-11742,
title={On Modeling IND-CCA Security in Cryptographic Protocols},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={cryptographic protocols / formal cryptography, cryptographic protocols, probabilistic encryption},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/024},
note={ hofheinz@ira.uka.de 12088 received 5 Feb 2003},
author={Dennis Hofheinz and Jörn Müller-Quade and Rainer Steinwandt},
year=2003
}