CryptoDB
On Modeling IND-CCA Security in Cryptographic Protocols
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Abstract: | Two common notions of security for public key encryption schemes are shown to be equivalent: we prove that indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) is in fact polynomially equivalent to (yet "slightly" weaker than) securely realizing the ideal functionality F_PKE in the general modeling of cryptographic protocols of [http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067]. This disproves in particular the claim that security in the sense of IND-CCA strictly implies security in the sense of realizing F_PKE (see [http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067]). Moreover, we give concrete reductions among such security notions and show that these relations hold for both uniform and non-uniform adversarial entities. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2003-11742, title={On Modeling IND-CCA Security in Cryptographic Protocols}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols / formal cryptography, cryptographic protocols, probabilistic encryption}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/024}, note={ hofheinz@ira.uka.de 12088 received 5 Feb 2003}, author={Dennis Hofheinz and Jörn Müller-Quade and Rainer Steinwandt}, year=2003 }