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Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption
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Abstract: | The game-playing technique is a powerful tool for analyzing cryptographic constructions. We illustrate this by using games as the central tool for proving security of three-key triple-encryption, a long-standing open problem. Our result, which is in the ideal-cipher model, demonstrates that for DES parameters (56-bit keys and 64-bit plaintexts) an adversary's maximal advantage is small until it asks about $2^{78}$ queries. Beyond this application, we develop the foundations for game playing, formalizing a general framework for game-playing proofs and discussing techniques used within such proofs. To further exercise the game-playing framework we show how to use games to get simple proofs for the PRP/PRF Switching Lemma, the security of the basic CBC MAC, and the chosen-plaintext-attack security of OAEP. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2004-12295, title={Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={Cryptographic analysis techniques,}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/331}, note={ mihir@cs.ucsd.edu 13498 received 30 Nov 2004, last revised 16 Dec 2006}, author={Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway}, year=2004 }