## CryptoDB

### Paper: Practical Key-Recovery Attack on MANTIS5

Authors: Christoph Dobraunig , Graz University of Technology Maria Eichlseder , Graz University of Technology Daniel Kales , Graz University of Technology, Austria Florian Mendel , IAIK, Graz University of Technology DOI: 10.13154/tosc.v2016.i2.248-260 URL: http://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/573 Search ePrint Search Google MANTIS is a lightweight tweakable block cipher published at CRYPTO 2016. In addition to the full 14-round version, MANTIS7, the designers also propose an aggressive 10-round version, MANTIS5. The security claim for MANTIS5 is resistance against “practical attacks”, defined as related-tweak attacks with data complexity 2d less than 230 chosen plaintexts (or 240 known plaintexts), and computational complexity at most 2126−d. We present a key-recovery attack against MANTIS5 with 228 chosen plaintexts and a computational complexity of about 238 block cipher calls, which violates this claim. Our attack is based on a family of differential characteristics and exploits several properties of the lightweight round function and tweakey schedule. To verify the validity of the attack, we also provide a practical implementation which recovers the full key in about 1 core hour using 230 chosen plaintexts.
##### BibTeX
@article{tosc-2016-28120,
title={Practical Key-Recovery Attack on MANTIS5},
journal={IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol.},
publisher={Ruhr-Universität Bochum},
volume={2016, Issue 2},
pages={248-260},
url={http://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/573},
doi={10.13154/tosc.v2016.i2.248-260},
author={Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Daniel Kales and Florian Mendel},
year=2016
}