International Association for Cryptologic Research

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One-Message Zero Knowledge and Non-malleable Commitments

Authors:
Nir Bitansky
Huijia Lin
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-03807-6_8
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Conference: TCC 2018
Abstract: We introduce a new notion of one-message zero-knowledge (1ZK) arguments that satisfy a weak soundness guarantee—the number of false statements that a polynomial-time non-uniform adversary can convince the verifier to accept is not much larger than the size of its non-uniform advice. The zero-knowledge guarantee is given by a simulator that runs in (mildly) super-polynomial time. We construct such 1ZK arguments based on the notion of multi-collision-resistant keyless hash functions, recently introduced by Bitansky, Kalai, and Paneth (STOC 2018). Relying on the constructed 1ZK arguments, subexponentially-secure time-lock puzzles, and other standard assumptions, we construct one-message fully-concurrent non-malleable commitments. This is the first construction that is based on assumptions that do not already incorporate non-malleability, as well as the first based on (subexponentially) falsifiable assumptions.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{tcc-2018-29009,
  title={One-Message Zero Knowledge and Non-malleable Commitments},
  booktitle={Theory of Cryptography},
  series={Theory of Cryptography},
  publisher={Springer},
  volume={11239},
  pages={209-234},
  doi={10.1007/978-3-030-03807-6_8},
  author={Nir Bitansky and Huijia Lin},
  year=2018
}