## CryptoDB

### Huijia Lin

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2024

EUROCRYPT

A General Framework for Lattice-Based ABE Using Evasive Inner-Product Functional Encryption
Abstract

We present a general framework for constructing attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes for arbitrary function class based on lattices from two ingredients, i) a noisy linear secret sharing scheme for the class and ii) a new type of inner-product functional encryption (IPFE) scheme, termed *evasive* IPFE, which we introduce in this work. We propose lattice-based evasive IPFE schemes and establish their security under simple conditions based on variants of evasive learning with errors (LWE) assumption recently proposed by Wee [EUROCRYPT '22] and Tsabary [CRYPTO '22].
Our general framework is modular and conceptually simple, reducing the task of constructing ABE to that of constructing noisy linear secret sharing schemes, a more lightweight primitive. The versatility of our framework is demonstrated by three new ABE schemes based on variants of the evasive LWE assumption.
- We obtain two ciphertext-policy ABE schemes for all polynomial-size circuits with a predetermined depth bound. One of these schemes has *succinct* ciphertexts and secret keys, of size polynomial in the depth bound, rather than the circuit size. This eliminates the need for tensor LWE, another new assumption, from the previous state-of-the-art construction by Wee [EUROCRYPT '22].
- We develop ciphertext-policy and key-policy ABE schemes for deterministic finite automata (DFA) and logspace Turing machines (L). They are the first lattice-based public-key ABE schemes supporting uniform models of computation. Previous lattice-based schemes for uniform computation were limited to the secret-key setting or offered only weaker security against bounded collusion.
Lastly, the new primitive of evasive IPFE serves as the lattice-based counterpart of pairing-based IPFE, enabling the application of techniques developed in pairing-based ABE constructions to lattice-based constructions. We believe it is of independent interest and may find other applications.

2023

EUROCRYPT

Polynomial-Time Cryptanalysis of the Subspace Flooding Assumption for Post-Quantum iO
Abstract

Indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO) is a highly versatile primitive implying a myriad advanced cryptographic applications. Up until recently, the state of feasibility of iO was unclear, which changed with works (Jain-Lin-Sahai STOC 2021, Jain-Lin-Sahai Eurocrypt 2022) showing that iO can be finally based upon well-studied hardness assumptions. Unfortunately, one of these assumptions is broken in quantum polynomial time.
Luckily, the line work of Brakerski et al. Eurocrypt 2020, Gay-Pass STOC 2021, Wichs-Wee Eurocrypt 2021, Brakerski et al. ePrint 2021, Devadas et al. TCC 2021 simultaneously created new pathways to construct iO with plausible post-quantum security from new assumptions, namely a new form of circular security of LWE in the presence of leakages.
At the same time, effective cryptanalysis of this line of work has also begun to emerge (Hopkins et al. Crypto 2021).
It is important to identify the simplest possible conjectures that yield post-quantum iO and can be understood through known cryptanalytic tools. In that spirit, and in light of the cryptanalysis of Hopkins et al., recently Devadas et al. gave an elegant construction of iO from a fully-specified and simple-to-state assumption along with a thorough initial cryptanalysis.
Our work gives a polynomial-time distinguisher on their "final assumption" for their scheme. Our algorithm is extremely simple to describe: Solve a carefully designed linear system arising out of the assumption. The argument of correctness of our algorithm, however, is nontrivial.
We also analyze the "T-sum" version of the same assumption described by Devadas et. al. and under a reasonable conjecture rule out the assumption for any value of T that implies iO.

2023

EUROCRYPT

On the Optimal Succinctness and Efficiency of Functional Encryption and Attribute-Based Encryption
Abstract

We investigate the best-possible (asymptotic) efficiency of functional encryption (FE) and attribute-based encryption (ABE) by proving inherent space-time trade-offs and constructing nearly optimal schemes. We consider the general notion of partially hiding functional encryption (PHFE), capturing both FE and ABE, and the most efficient computation model of random-access machine (RAM). In PHFE, a secret key sk_f is associated with a function f, whereas a ciphertext ct_x(y) is tied to a public input x and encrypts a private input y. Decryption reveals f(x,y) and nothing else about y.
We present the first PHFE for RAM solely based on the necessary assumption of FE for circuits. Significantly improving upon the efficiency of prior schemes, our construction achieves nearly optimal succinctness and computation time:
- Its secret key sk_f is of *constant size* (optimal), independent of the function description length |f|, i.e., |sk_f| = poly(lambda).
- Its ciphertext ct_x(y) is *rate-2* in the private input length |y| (nearly optimal) and *independent* of the public input length |x| (optimal), i.e., |ct_x(y)| = 2|y| + poly(lambda).
- Decryption time is *linear* in the *instance* running time T of the RAM computation, plus the function and public/private input lengths, i.e., T_Dec = (T + |f| + |x| + |y|)poly(lambda).
As a corollary, we obtain the first ABE with both keys and ciphertexts being constant-size, while enjoying the best-possible decryption time matching the lower bound by Luo [ePrint '22]. We also separately achieve several other optimal ABE subject to the known lower bound.
We study the barriers to further efficiency improvements. We prove the first unconditional space-time trade-offs for (PH-)FE:
- *No* secure (PH-)FE can have |sk_f| and T_Dec *both* sublinear in |f|.
- *No* secure PHFE can have |ct_x(y)| and T_Dec *both* sublinear in |x|.
Our lower bounds apply even to the weakest secret-key 1-key 1-ciphertext selective schemes. Furthermore, we show a conditional barrier towards the optimal decryption time T_Dec = T poly(lambda) while keeping linear size dependency --- any such (PH-)FE scheme implies doubly efficient private information retrieval (DE-PIR) with linear-size preprocessed database, for which so far there is no candidate.

2023

EUROCRYPT

New Ways to Garble Arithmetic Circuits
Abstract

The beautiful work of Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushileviz [FOCS’11]
initiated the study of arithmetic variants of Yao’s garbled
circuits. An arithmetic garbling scheme is an efficient transformation
that converts an arithmetic circuit C : Rn → Rm over a ring R into a
garbled circuit \widehat{C} and n affine functions Li for i ∈ [n],
such that \widehat{C} and Li(xi) reveals only the output C(x) and no
other information of x. AIK presented the first arithmetic garbling
scheme supporting computation over integers from a bounded (possibly
exponentially large) range, based on Learning With Errors (LWE). In
contrast, converting C into a Boolean circuit and applying Yao’s
garbled circuit treat the inputs as bit strings instead of ring
elements, and hence is not “arithmetic”.
In this work, we present new ways to garble arithmetic circuits, which
improve the state-of-the-art on efficiency, modularity, and
functionality. To measure efficiency, we define the rate of a garbling
scheme as the maximal ratio between the bit-length of the garbled
circuit |\widehat{C}| and that of the computation tableau |C|ℓ in the
clear, where ℓ is the bit length of wire values (e.g., Yao’s garbled
circuit has rate O(λ)).
– We present the first constant-rate arithmetic garbled circuit for
computation over large integers based on the Decisional Composite
Residuosity (DCR) assumption, significantly improving the efficiency
of the schemes of Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz.
– We construct an arithmetic garbling scheme for modular computation
over R = Zp for any integer modulus p, based on either DCR or LWE. The
DCR-based instantiation achieves rate O(λ) for large p. Furthermore,
our construction is modular and makes black-box use of the underlying
ring and a simple key extension gadget.
– We describe a variant of the first scheme supporting arithmetic
circuits over bounded integers that are augmented with Boolean
computation (e.g., truncation of an integer value, and comparison
between two values), while keeping the constant rate when garbling the
arithmetic part.
To the best of our knowledge, constant-rate (Boolean or arithmetic)
garbling were only achieved before using the powerful primitive of
indistinguishability obfuscation, or for restricted circuits with
small depth.

2023

CRYPTO

Multi-Party Homomorphic Secret Sharing and Sublinear MPC from Sparse LPN
Abstract

Over the past few years, we have seen the powerful emergence of homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) as a compelling alternative to fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), due to its efficiency benefits and its feasibility from an array of standard assumptions. However, all previously known HSS schemes, with the exception of schemes built from FHE or indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), can only support two parties.
In this work, we give the first construction of a \emph{multi-party} HSS scheme for a non-trivial function class, from an assumption not known to imply FHE. In particular, we construct an HSS scheme for an \emph{arbitrary} number of parties with an \emph{arbitrary} corruption threshold, supporting evaluations of $\log / \log \log$-degree polynomials, containing a polynomial number of monomials, over arbitrary finite fields. As a consequence, we obtain an MPC protocol for any number of parties, with (slightly) \emph{sub-linear} communication per party of roughly $O(S / \log \log S)$ bits when evaluating a layered Boolean circuit of size $S$.
Our HSS scheme relies on the \emph{sparse} Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption, a standard variant of LPN with a sparse public matrix that has been studied and used in prior works. Thanks to this assumption, our construction enjoys several unique benefits. In particular, it can be built on top of \emph{any} linear secret sharing scheme, producing noisy output shares that can be error-corrected by the decoder. This yields HSS for low-degree polynomials with optimal download rate. Unlike prior works, our scheme also has a low computation overhead in that the per-party computation of a constant degree polynomial takes $O(M)$ work, where $M$ is the number of monomials.

2023

CRYPTO

The Pseudorandom Oracle Model and Ideal Obfuscation
Abstract

We introduce a new idealized model of hash functions, which we refer to as the *pseudorandom oracle* (PrO) model. Intuitively, it allows us to model cryptosystems that use the code of an ideal hash function in a non-black-box way. Formally, we model hash functions via a combination of a pseudorandom function (PRF) family and an ideal oracle. A user can initialize the hash function by choosing a PRF key $k$ and mapping it to a public handle $h$ using the oracle. Given the handle $h$ and some input $x$, the oracle can also be called to evaluate the PRF at $x$ with the corresponding key $k$. A user who chooses the PRF key $k$ therefore has a complete description of the hash function and can use its code in non-black-box constructions, while an adversary, who just gets the handle $h$, only has black-box access to the hash function via the oracle.
As our main result, we show how to construct ideal obfuscation in the PrO model, starting from functional encryption (FE), which in turn can be based on well-studied polynomial hardness assumptions. In contrast, we know that ideal obfuscation cannot be instantiated in the basic random oracle model under any assumptions. We believe our result provides heuristic justification for the following: (1) most natural security goals implied by ideal obfuscation can be achieved in the real world; (2) obfuscation can be constructed from FE at polynomial security loss.
We also discuss how to interpret our result in the PrO model as a construction of ideal obfuscation using simple hardware tokens or as a way to bootstrap ideal obfuscation for PRFs to that for all functions.

2023

ASIACRYPT

LERNA: Secure Single-Server Aggregation via Key-Homomorphic Masking
Abstract

This paper introduces LERNA, a new framework for single-server secure aggregation. Our protocols are tailored to the setting where multiple consecutive aggregation phases are performed with the same set of clients, a fraction of which can drop out in some of the phases. We rely on an initial secret sharing setup among the clients which is generated once-and-for-all, and reused in all following aggregation phases. Compared to prior works [Bonawitz et al. CCS’17, Bell et al. CCS’20], the reusable setup eliminates one round of communication between the server and clients per aggregation—i.e., we need two rounds for semi-honest security (instead of three), and three rounds (instead of four) in the malicious model. Our approach also significantly reduces the server’s computational costs by only requiring the reconstruction of a single secret-shared value (per aggregation). Prior work required reconstructing a secret-shared value for each client involved in the computation.
We provide instantiations of LERNA based on both the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) and (Ring) Learning with Rounding ((R)LWR) assumptions respectively and evaluate a version based on the latter assumption. In addition to savings in round-complexity (which result in reduced latency), our experiments show that the server computational costs are reduced by two orders of magnitude in comparison to the state-of-the-art. In settings with a large number of clients, we also reduce the computational costs up to twenty-fold for most clients, while a small set of “heavy clients” is subject to a workload that is still smaller than that of prior work.

2022

EUROCRYPT

Indistinguishability Obfuscation from LPN over F_p, DLIN, and PRGs in NC^0
📺
Abstract

In this work, we study what minimal sets of assumptions suffice for constructing indistinguishability obfuscation ($\iO$). We prove:
{\bf Theorem}(Informal): {\em Assume sub-exponential security of the following assumptions:
- the Learning Parity with Noise ($\mathsf{LPN}$) assumption over general prime fields $\mathbb{F}_p$ with
polynomially many $\mathsf{LPN}$ samples and error rate $1/k^\delta$, where $k$ is the dimension of the $\mathsf{LPN}$ secret, and $\delta>0$ is any constant;
- the existence of a Boolean Pseudo-Random Generator ($\mathsf{PRG}$) in $\mathsf{NC}^0$ with
stretch $n^{1+\tau}$, where $n$ is the length of the $\mathsf{PRG}$ seed, and $\tau>0$ is any constant;
- the Decision Linear ($\mathsf{DLIN}$) assumption on symmetric bilinear groups of prime order.
Then, (subexponentially secure) indistinguishability obfuscation for all polynomial-size circuits exists. Further, assuming only polynomial security of the aforementioned assumptions, there exists collusion resistant public-key functional encryption for all polynomial-size circuits.
This removes the reliance on the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption from the recent work of [Jain, Lin, Sahai STOC'21]. As a consequence, we obtain the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme that does not rely on any lattice-based hardness assumption.
Our techniques feature a new notion of randomized encoding called Preprocessing Randomized Encoding (PRE), that essentially can be computed in the exponent of pairing groups. When combined with other new techniques, PRE gives a much more streamlined construction of $\iO$ while still maintaining reliance only on well-studied assumptions.

2022

EUROCRYPT

Non-malleable Commitments Against Quantum Attacks
📺
Abstract

We construct, under standard hardness assumptions, the first non-malleable commitments secure against quantum attacks. Our commitments are statistically binding and satisfy the standard notion of {\em non-malleability with respect to commitment}. We obtain a $\log^\star(\lambda)$-round classical protocol, assuming the existence of post-quantum one-way functions.
Previously, non-malleable commitments with quantum security were only known against a restricted class of adversaries known as {\em synchronizing adversaries.} At the heart of our results is a new general technique that allows to modularly obtain non-malleable commitments from any extractable commitment protocol, obliviously of the underlying extraction strategy (black-box or non-black-box) or round complexity. The transformation may also be of interest in the classical setting.

2022

CRYPTO

Two-Round MPC without Round Collapsing Revisited -- Towards Efficient Malicious Protocols
Abstract

Recent works have made exciting progress on the construction of round optimal, {\em two-round}, Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols. However, most proposals so far are still complex and inefficient.
In this work, we improve the simplicity and efficiency of two-round MPC in the setting with dishonest majority and malicious security. Our protocols make use of the Random Oracle (RO) and a generalization of the Oblivious Linear Evaluation (OLE) correlated randomness, called tensor OLE, over a finite field $\mathbb{F}$, and achieve the following:
- {\em MPC for Boolean Circuits:} Our two-round, maliciously secure MPC protocols for computing Boolean circuits, has overall (asymptotic) computational cost $O(S\cdot n^3 \cdot \log |\mathbb{F}|)$, where $S$ is the size of the circuit computed, $n$ the number of parties, and $\mathbb{F}$ a field of characteristic two. The protocols also make black-box calls to a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF).
- {\em MPC for Arithmetic Branching Programs (ABPs):} Our two-round, information theoretically and maliciously secure protocols for computing ABPs over a general field $\field$ has overall computational cost $O(S^{1.5}\cdot n^3\cdot \log |\mathbb{F}|)$, where $S$ is the size of ABP computed.
Both protocols achieve security levels inverse proportional to the size of the field $|\mathbb{F}|$.
Our construction is built upon the simple two-round MPC protocols of [Lin-Liu-Wee TCC'20], which are only semi-honest secure. Our main technical contribution lies in ensuring malicious security using simple and lightweight checks, which incur only a constant overhead over the complexity of the protocols by Lin, Liu, and Wee. In particular, in the case of computing Boolean circuits, our malicious MPC protocols have the same complexity (up to a constant overhead) as (insecurely) computing Yao's garbled circuits in a distributed fashion.
Finally, as an additional contribution, we show how to efficiently generate tensor OLE correlation in fields of characteristic two using OT.

2022

TCC

ABE for Circuits with Constant-Size Secret Keys and Adaptive Security
Abstract

An important theme in the research on attribute-based encryption (ABE) is minimizing the sizes of secret keys and ciphertexts. In this work, we present two new ABE schemes with *constant-size* secret keys, i.e., the key size is independent of the sizes of policies or attributes and dependent only on the security parameter $\lambda$.
- We construct the first key-policy ABE scheme for circuits with constant-size secret keys, ${|\mathsf{sk}_f|=\mathrm{poly}(\lambda)}$, which concretely consist of only three group elements. The previous state-of-the-art scheme by [Boneh et al., Eurocrypt '14] has key size polynomial in the maximum depth $d$ of the policy circuits, ${|\mathsf{sk}_f|=\mathrm{poly}(d,\lambda)}$. Our new scheme removes this dependency of key size on $d$ while keeping the ciphertext size the same, which grows linearly in the attribute length and polynomially in the maximal depth, ${|\mathsf{ct}_{\mathbf{x}}|=|\mathbf{x}|\mathrm{poly}(d,\lambda)}$.
- We present the first ciphertext-policy ABE scheme for Boolean formulae that simultaneously has constant-size keys and succinct ciphertexts of size independent of the policy formulae, namely, ${|\mathsf{sk}_f|=\mathrm{poly}(\lambda)}$ and ${|\mathsf{ct}_{\mathbf{x}}|=\mathrm{poly}(|\mathbf{x}|,\lambda)}$. Concretely, each secret key consists of only two group elements. Previous ciphertext-policy ABE schemes either have succinct ciphertexts but non-constant-size keys [Agrawal--Yamada, Eurocrypt '20, Agrawal--Wichs--Yamada, TCC '20], or constant-size keys but large ciphertexts that grow with the policy size as well as the attribute length. Our second construction is the first ABE scheme achieving *double succinctness*, where both keys and ciphertexts are smaller than the corresponding attributes and policies tied to them.
Our constructions feature new ways of combining lattices with pairing groups for building ABE and are proven selectively secure based on LWE and in the generic (pairing) group model. We further show that when replacing the LWE assumption with its adaptive variant introduced in [Quach--Wee--Wichs FOCS '18], the constructions become adaptively secure.

2021

EUROCRYPT

Oblivious Transfer is in MiniQCrypt
📺
Abstract

MiniQCrypt is a world where quantum-secure one-way functions exist, and quantum communication is possible. We construct an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in MiniQCrypt that achieves simulation-security against malicious quantum polynomial-time adversaries, building on the foundational work of Bennett, Brassard, Crepeau and Skubiszewska (CRYPTO 1991). Combining the OT protocol with prior works, we obtain secure two-party and multi-party computation protocols also in MiniQCrypt. This is in contrast to the classical world, where it is widely believed that OT does not exist in MiniCrypt.

2021

EUROCRYPT

Multi-Party Reusable Non-Interactive Secure Computation from LWE
📺
Abstract

Motivated by the goal of designing versatile and flexible secure computation protocols that at the same time require as little interaction as possible, we present new multiparty reusable Non-Interactive Secure Computation (mrNISC) protocols. This notion, recently introduced by Benhamouda and Lin (TCC 2020), is essentially two-round Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols where the first round of messages serves as a reusable commitment to the private inputs of participating parties. Using these commitments, any subset of parties can later compute any function of their choice on their respective inputs by just sending a single message to a stateless evaluator, conveying the result of the computation but nothing else. Importantly, the input commitments can be computed without knowing anything about other participating parties (neither their identities nor their number) and they are reusable across any number of desired computations.
We give a construction of mrNISC that achieves standard simulation security, as classical multi-round MPC protocols achieve. Our construction relies on the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption with polynomial modulus, and on the existence of a pseudorandom function (PRF) in $\mathsf{NC}^1$. We achieve semi-malicious security in the plain model and malicious security by further relying on trusted setup (which is unavoidable for mrNISC). In comparison, the only previously known constructions of mrNISC were either using bilinear maps or using strong primitives such as program obfuscation.
We use our mrNISC to obtain new Multi-Key FHE (MKFHE) schemes with threshold decryption:
- In the CRS model, we obtain threshold MKFHE for $\mathsf{NC}^1$ based on LWE with only {\em polynomial} modulus and PRFs in $\mathsf{NC}^1$, whereas all previous constructions rely on LWE with super-polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio.
- In the plain model, we obtain threshold levelled MKFHE for $\mathsf{P}$ based on LWE with {\em polynomial} modulus, PRF in $\mathsf{NC}^1$, and NTRU, and another scheme for constant number of parties from LWE with sub-exponential modulus-to-noise ratio. The only known prior construction of threshold MKFHE (Ananth et al., TCC 2020) in the plain model restricts the set of parties who can compute together at the onset.

2021

EUROCRYPT

Indistinguishability Obfuscation from Simple-to-State Hard Problems: New Assumptions, New Techniques, and Simplification
📺
Abstract

In this work, we study the question of what set of simple-to-state assumptions suffice for constructing functional encryption and indistinguishability obfuscation ($i\mathcal{O}$), supporting all functions describable by polynomial-size circuits. Our work improves over the state-of-the-art work of Jain, Lin, Matt, and Sahai (Eurocrypt 2019) in multiple dimensions.
New Assumption: Previous to our work, all constructions of $i\mathcal{O}$ from simple assumptions required novel pseudorandomness generators involving LWE samples and constant-degree polynomials over the integers, evaluated on the error of the LWE samples. In contrast, Boolean pseudorandom generators (PRGs) computable by constant-degree polynomials have been extensively studied since the work of Goldreich (2000). We show how to replace the novel pseudorandom objects over the integers used in previous works, with appropriate Boolean pseudorandom generators with sufficient stretch, when combined with LWE with binary error over suitable parameters. Both binary error LWE and constant degree Goldreich PRGs have been a subject of extensive cryptanalysis since much before our work and thus we back the plausibility of our assumption with security against algorithms studied in context of cryptanalysis of these objects.
New Techniques:
we introduce a number of new techniques:
- We show how to build partially-hiding public-key functional encryption, supporting degree-2 functions in the secret part of the message, and arithmetic $\mathsf{NC}^1$ functions over the public part of the message, assuming only standard assumptions over asymmetric pairing groups.
- We construct single-ciphertext secret-key functional encryption for all circuits with {\em linear} key generation, assuming only the LWE assumption.
Simplification: Unlike prior works, our new techniques furthermore let us construct public-key functional encryption for polynomial-sized circuits directly (without invoking any bootstrapping theorem, nor transformation from secret-key to public key FE), and based only on the polynomial hardness of underlying assumptions. The functional encryption scheme satisfies a strong notion of efficiency where the size of the ciphertext grows only sublinearly in the output size of the circuit and not its size. Finally, assuming that the underlying assumptions are subexponentially hard, we can bootstrap this construction to achieve $i\mathcal{O}$.

2021

CRYPTO

Counterexamples to New Circular Security Assumptions Underlying iO
📺
Abstract

We study several strengthening of classical circular security assumptions which were recently introduced in four new lattice-based constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation: Brakerski-D\"ottling-Garg-Malavolta (Eurocrypt 2020), Gay-Pass (STOC 2021), Brakerski-D\"ottling-Garg-Malavolta (Eprint 2020) and Wee-Wichs (Eprint 2020).
We provide explicit counterexamples to the {\em $2$-circular shielded randomness leakage} assumption w.r.t.\ the Gentry-Sahai-Waters fully homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Gay-Pass, and the {\em homomorphic pseudorandom LWE samples} conjecture proposed by Wee-Wichs.
Our work suggests a separation between classical circular security of the kind underlying un-levelled fully-homomorphic encryption from the strengthened versions underlying recent iO constructions, showing that they are not (yet) on the same footing.
Our counterexamples exploit the flexibility to choose specific implementations of circuits, which is explicitly allowed in the Gay-Pass assumption and unspecified in the Wee-Wichs assumption. Their indistinguishabilty obfuscation schemes are still unbroken. Our work shows that the assumptions, at least, need refinement. In particular, generic leakage-resilient circular security assumptions are delicate, and their security is sensitive to the specific structure of the leakages involved.

2020

EUROCRYPT

Compact Adaptively Secure ABE from k-Lin: Beyond NC1 and towards NL
📺
Abstract

We present a new general framework for constructing compact and
adaptively secure attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes from
k-Lin in asymmetric bilinear pairing groups. Previously, the only
construction [Kowalczyk and Wee, Eurocrypt '19] that simultaneously
achieves compactness and adaptive security from static assumptions supports
policies represented by Boolean formulae. Our framework enables
supporting more expressive policies represented by arithmetic
branching programs.
Our framework extends to ABE for policies represented by uniform models
of computation such as Turing machines. Such policies enjoy the feature
of being applicable to attributes of arbitrary lengths. We obtain the first
compact adaptively secure ABE for deterministic and non-deterministic finite
automata (DFA and NFA) from k-Lin, previously unknown from any static
assumptions. Beyond finite automata, we obtain the first ABE for large
classes of uniform computation, captured by deterministic and
non-deterministic logspace Turing machines (the complexity classes
L and NL) based on k-Lin. Our ABE scheme has compact
secret keys of size linear in the description size of the Turing machine M.
The ciphertext size grows linearly in the input length, but also linearly in
the time complexity, and exponentially in the space complexity.
Irrespective of compactness, we stress that our scheme is the first
that supports large classes of Turing machines based solely on standard
assumptions. In comparison, previous ABE for general Turing machines all
rely on strong primitives related to indistinguishability obfuscation.

2020

TCC

Mr NISC: Multiparty Reusable Non-Interactive Secure Computation
📺
Abstract

Reducing interaction in Multiparty Computation (MPC) is a highly desirable goal in cryptography. It is known that 2-round MPC can be based on the minimal assumption of 2-round Oblivious Transfer (OT) [Benhamouda and Lin, Garg and Srinivasan, EC 2018], and 1-round MPC is impossible in general. In this work, we propose a natural ``hybrid'' model, called \emph{multiparty reusable Non-Interactive Secure Computation (mrNISC)}. In this model, parties publish encodings of their private inputs $x_i$ on a public bulletin board, once and for all. Later, any subset $I$ of them can compute \emph{on-the-fly} a function $f$ on their inputs $\vec x_I = {\{x_i\}}_{i \in I}$ by just sending a single message to a stateless evaluator, conveying the result $f(\vec x_I)$ and nothing else. Importantly, the input encodings can be \emph{reused} in any number of on-the-fly computations, and the same classical simulation security guaranteed by multi-round MPC, is achieved. In short, mrNISC has a minimal yet ``tractable'' interaction pattern.
We initiate the study of mrNISC on several fronts. First, we formalize the model of mrNISC protocols, and present both a UC security definition and a game-based security definition. Second, we construct mrNISC protocols in the plain model with semi-honest and semi-malicious security based on pairing groups. Third, we demonstrate the power of mrNISC by showing two applications: non-interactive MPC (NIMPC) with reusable setup and a distributed version of program obfuscation.
At the core of our construction of mrNISC is a witness encryption scheme for a special language that verifies Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) proofs of the validity of computations over committed values, which is of independent interest.

2020

TCC

Information-Theoretic 2-Round MPC without Round Collapsing: Adaptive Security, and More
📺
Abstract

We present simpler and improved constructions of 2-round protocols for secure multi-party computation (MPC) in the semi-honest setting. Our main results are new information-theoretically secure protocols for arithmetic NC1 in two settings:
(i) the plain model tolerating up to $t < n/2$ corruptions; and
(ii) in the OLE-correlation model tolerating any number of corruptions.
Our protocols achieve adaptive security and require only black-box access to the underlying field, whereas previous results only achieve static security and require non-black-box field access. Moreover, both results extend to polynomial-size circuits with computational and adaptive security, while relying on black-box access to a pseudorandom generator. In the OLE correlation model, the extended protocols for circuits tolerate up to $n-1$ corruptions.
Along the way, we introduce a conceptually novel framework for 2-round MPC that does not rely on the round collapsing framework underlying all of the recent advances in 2-round MPC.

2020

ASIACRYPT

Succinct and Adaptively Secure ABE for Arithmetic Branching Programs from k-Lin
📺
Abstract

We present succinct and adaptively secure attribute-based encryption (ABE)
schemes for arithmetic branching programs, based on k-Lin in pairing groups.
Our key-policy ABE scheme have ciphertexts of constant size, independent of
the length of the attributes, and our ciphertext-policy ABE scheme have
secret keys of constant size. Our schemes improve upon the recent succinct
ABE schemes in [Tomida and Attrapadung, ePrint '20], which only handles
Boolean formulae. All other prior succinct ABE schemes either achieve
only selective security or rely on q-type assumptions.
Our schemes are obtained through a general and modular approach that combines
a public-key inner product functional encryption satisfying a new security
notion called gradual simulation security and an information-theoretic
randomized encoding scheme called arithmetic key garbling scheme.

2019

EUROCRYPT

How to Leverage Hardness of Constant-Degree Expanding Polynomials over $\mathbb {R}$R to build $i\mathcal {O}$iO
Abstract

In this work, we introduce and construct D-restricted Functional Encryption (FE) for any constant $$D \ge 3$$D≥3, based only on the SXDH assumption over bilinear groups. This generalizes the notion of 3-restricted FE recently introduced and constructed by Ananth et al. (ePrint 2018) in the generic bilinear group model.A $$D=(d+2)$$D=(d+2)-restricted FE scheme is a secret key FE scheme that allows an encryptor to efficiently encrypt a message of the form $$M=(\varvec{x},\varvec{y},\varvec{z})$$M=(x,y,z). Here, $$\varvec{x}\in \mathbb {F}_{\mathbf {p}}^{d\times n}$$x∈Fpd×n and $$\varvec{y},\varvec{z}\in \mathbb {F}_{\mathbf {p}}^n$$y,z∈Fpn. Function keys can be issued for a function $$f=\varSigma _{\varvec{I}= (i_1,..,i_d,j,k)}\ c_{\varvec{I}}\cdot \varvec{x}[1,i_1] \cdots \varvec{x}[d,i_d] \cdot \varvec{y}[j]\cdot \varvec{z}[k]$$f=ΣI=(i1,..,id,j,k)cI·x[1,i1]⋯x[d,id]·y[j]·z[k] where the coefficients $$c_{\varvec{I}}\in \mathbb {F}_{\mathbf {p}}$$cI∈Fp. Knowing the function key and the ciphertext, one can learn $$f(\varvec{x},\varvec{y},\varvec{z})$$f(x,y,z), if this value is bounded in absolute value by some polynomial in the security parameter and n. The security requirement is that the ciphertext hides $$\varvec{y}$$y and $$\varvec{z}$$z, although it is not required to hide $$\varvec{x}$$x. Thus $$\varvec{x}$$x can be seen as a public attribute.D-restricted FE allows for useful evaluation of constant-degree polynomials, while only requiring the SXDH assumption over bilinear groups. As such, it is a powerful tool for leveraging hardness that exists in constant-degree expanding families of polynomials over $$\mathbb {R}$$R. In particular, we build upon the work of Ananth et al. to show how to build indistinguishability obfuscation ($$i\mathcal {O}$$iO) assuming only SXDH over bilinear groups, LWE, and assumptions relating to weak pseudorandom properties of constant-degree expanding polynomials over $$\mathbb {R}$$R.

2019

EUROCRYPT

Non-Malleable Codes Against Bounded Polynomial Time Tampering
📺
Abstract

We construct efficient non-malleable codes (NMC) that are (computationally) secure against tampering by functions computable in any fixed polynomial time. Our construction is in the plain (no-CRS) model and requires the assumptions that (1) $$\mathbf {E}$$E is hard for $$\mathbf {NP}$$NP circuits of some exponential $$2^{\beta n}$$2βn ($$\beta >0$$β>0) size (widely used in the derandomization literature), (2) sub-exponential trapdoor permutations exist, and (3) $$\mathbf {P}$$P-certificates with sub-exponential soundness exist.While it is impossible to construct NMC secure against arbitrary polynomial-time tampering (Dziembowski, Pietrzak, Wichs, ICS ’10), the existence of NMC secure against $$O(n^c)$$O(nc)-time tampering functions (for any fixedc), was shown (Cheraghchi and Guruswami, ITCS ’14) via a probabilistic construction. An explicit construction was given (Faust, Mukherjee, Venturi, Wichs, Eurocrypt ’14) assuming an untamperable CRS with length longer than the runtime of the tampering function. In this work, we show that under computational assumptions, we can bypass these limitations. Specifically, under the assumptions listed above, we obtain non-malleable codes in the plain model against $$O(n^c)$$O(nc)-time tampering functions (for any fixed c), with codeword length independent of the tampering time bound.Our new construction of NMC draws a connection with non-interactive non-malleable commitments. In fact, we show that in the NMC setting, it suffices to have a much weaker notion called quasi non-malleable commitments—these are non-interactive, non-malleable commitments in the plain model, in which the adversary runs in $$O(n^c)$$O(nc)-time, whereas the honest parties may run in longer (polynomial) time. We then construct a 4-tag quasi non-malleable commitment from any sub-exponential OWF and the assumption that $$\mathbf {E}$$E is hard for some exponential size $$\mathbf {NP}$$NP-circuits, and use tag amplification techniques to support an exponential number of tags.

2019

CRYPTO

Indistinguishability Obfuscation Without Multilinear Maps: New Paradigms via Low Degree Weak Pseudorandomness and Security Amplification
📺
Abstract

The existence of secure indistinguishability obfuscators (
$$i\mathcal {O}$$
) has far-reaching implications, significantly expanding the scope of problems amenable to cryptographic study. All known approaches to constructing
$$i\mathcal {O}$$
rely on d-linear maps. While secure bilinear maps are well established in cryptographic literature, the security of candidates for
$$d>2$$
is poorly understood.We propose a new approach to constructing
$$i\mathcal {O}$$
for general circuits. Unlike all previously known realizations of
$$i\mathcal {O}$$
, we avoid the use of d-linear maps of degree
$$d \ge 3$$
.At the heart of our approach is the assumption that a new weak pseudorandom object exists. We consider two related variants of these objects, which we call perturbation resilient generator (
$$\varDelta $$
RG) and pseudo flawed-smudging generator (
$$\mathrm {PFG}$$
), respectively. At a high level, both objects are polynomially expanding functions whose outputs partially hide (or smudge) small noise vectors when added to them. We further require that they are computable by a family of degree-3 polynomials over
$$\mathbb {Z}$$
. We show how they can be used to construct functional encryption schemes with weak security guarantees. Finally, we use novel amplification techniques to obtain full security.As a result, we obtain
$$i\mathcal {O}$$
for general circuits assuming:Subexponentially secure LWEBilinear Maps
$$\mathrm {poly}(\lambda )$$
-secure 3-block-local PRGs
$$\varDelta $$
RGs or
$$\mathrm {PFG}$$
s

2018

EUROCRYPT

2018

TCC

Two-Round Adaptively Secure Multiparty Computation from Standard Assumptions
Abstract

We present the first two-round multiparty computation (MPC) protocols secure against malicious adaptive corruption in the common reference string (CRS) model, based on DDH, LWE, or QR. Prior two-round adaptively secure protocols were known only in the two-party setting against semi-honest adversaries, or in the general multiparty setting assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO).Our protocols are constructed in two steps. First, we construct two-round oblivious transfer (OT) protocols secure against malicious adaptive corruption in the CRS model based on DDH, LWE, or QR. We achieve this by generically transforming any two-round OT that is only secure against static corruption but has certain oblivious sampleability properties, into a two-round adaptively secure OT. Prior constructions were only secure against semi-honest adversaries or based on iO.Second, building upon recent constructions of two-round MPC from two-round OT in the weaker static corruption setting [Garg and Srinivasan, Benhamouda and Lin, Eurocrypt’18] and using equivocal garbled circuits from [Canetti, Poburinnaya and Venkitasubramaniam, STOC’17], we show how to construct two-round adaptively secure MPC from two-round adaptively secure OT and constant-round adaptively secure MPC, with respect to both malicious and semi-honest adversaries. As a corollary, we also obtain the first 2-round MPC secure against semi-honest adaptive corruption in the plain model based on augmented non-committing encryption (NCE), which can be based on a variety of assumptions, CDH, RSA, DDH, LWE, or factoring Blum integers. Finally, we mention that our OT and MPC protocols in the CRS model are, in fact, adaptively secure in the Universal Composability framework.

2018

TCC

One-Message Zero Knowledge and Non-malleable Commitments
Abstract

We introduce a new notion of one-message zero-knowledge (1ZK) arguments that satisfy a weak soundness guarantee—the number of false statements that a polynomial-time non-uniform adversary can convince the verifier to accept is not much larger than the size of its non-uniform advice. The zero-knowledge guarantee is given by a simulator that runs in (mildly) super-polynomial time. We construct such 1ZK arguments based on the notion of multi-collision-resistant keyless hash functions, recently introduced by Bitansky, Kalai, and Paneth (STOC 2018). Relying on the constructed 1ZK arguments, subexponentially-secure time-lock puzzles, and other standard assumptions, we construct one-message fully-concurrent non-malleable commitments. This is the first construction that is based on assumptions that do not already incorporate non-malleability, as well as the first based on (subexponentially) falsifiable assumptions.

#### Program Committees

- TCC 2021
- TCC 2020
- Eurocrypt 2019
- Crypto 2017
- TCC 2016
- Crypto 2015
- Crypto 2013

#### Coauthors

- Prabhanjan Ananth (2)
- Marshall Ball (2)
- Fabrice Benhamouda (4)
- Nir Bitansky (5)
- Ran Canetti (3)
- Yu-Chi Chen (1)
- Binyi Chen (1)
- Alessandro Chiesa (1)
- Kai-Min Chung (2)
- Dana Dachman-Soled (2)
- Quang Dao (1)
- Romain Gay (1)
- Shafi Goldwasser (1)
- Vipul Goyal (1)
- Alex B. Grilo (1)
- Shai Halevi (1)
- Samuel B. Hopkins (1)
- Yao-Ching Hsieh (1)
- Yuval Ishai (1)
- Paul Lou (1)
- Aayush Jain (10)
- Susumu Kiyoshima (1)
- Ilan Komargodski (1)
- Mukul Kulkarni (1)
- Hanjun Li (3)
- Wei-Kai Lin (1)
- Tianren Liu (3)
- Ji Luo (6)
- Tal Malkin (1)
- Christian Matt (2)
- Omkant Pandey (1)
- Omer Paneth (2)
- Rafael Pass (9)
- Antigoni Polychroniadou (2)
- Aviad Rubinstein (1)
- Amit Sahai (6)
- Karn Seth (2)
- Omri Shmueli (1)
- Fang Song (1)
- Sidharth Telang (2)
- Stefano Tessaro (5)
- Eran Tromer (1)
- Wei-Lung Dustin Tseng (1)
- Vinod Vaikuntanathan (2)
- Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam (5)
- Hoeteck Wee (1)
- Daniel Wichs (1)