International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


M&M: Masks and Macs against Physical Attacks

Lauren De Meyer , KU Leuven, imec - COSIC
Victor Arribas , KU Leuven, imec - COSIC
Svetla Nikova , KU Leuven, imec - COSIC
Ventzislav Nikov , NXP Semiconductors
Vincent Rijmen , KU Leuven, imec - COSIC
DOI: 10.13154/tches.v2019.i1.25-50
Search ePrint
Search Google
Presentation: Slides
Abstract: Cryptographic implementations on embedded systems need to be protected against physical attacks. Today, this means that apart from incorporating countermeasures against side-channel analysis, implementations must also withstand fault attacks and combined attacks. Recent proposals in this area have shown that there is a big tradeoff between the implementation cost and the strength of the adversary model. In this work, we introduce a new combined countermeasure M&M that combines Masking with information-theoretic MAC tags and infective computation. It works in a stronger adversary model than the existing scheme ParTI, yet is a lot less costly to implement than the provably secure MPC-based scheme CAPA. We demonstrate M&M with a SCA- and DFA-secure implementation of the AES block cipher. We evaluate the side-channel leakage of the second-order secure design with a non-specific t-test and use simulation to validate the fault resistance.
Video from TCHES 2019
  title={M&M: Masks and Macs against Physical Attacks},
  journal={IACR Trans. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst.},
  publisher={Ruhr-Universit├Ąt Bochum},
  volume={2019, Issue 1},
  author={Lauren De Meyer and Victor Arribas and Svetla Nikova and Ventzislav Nikov and Vincent Rijmen},