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Overloading the Nonce: Rugged PRPs, Nonce-Set AEAD, and Order-Resilient Channels
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Presentation: | Slides |
Conference: | CRYPTO 2022 |
Abstract: | We introduce a new security notion that lies right in between pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) and strong pseudorandom permutations (SPRPs). We call this new security notion and any (tweakable) cipher that satisfies it a rugged pseudorandom permutation (RPRP). Rugged pseudorandom permutations lend themselves to some interesting applications, have practical benefits, and lead to novel cryptographic constructions. Analogous to the encode-then-encipher paradigm first proposed by Bellare and Rogaway and later extended by Shrimpton and Terashima, we can transform a variable-length tweakable RPRP into an AEAD scheme. However, we can construct RPRPs more efficiently as they are weaker primitives than SPRPs (the notion traditionally required by the encode-then-encipher paradigm). We can construct RPRPs using two-pass schemes, whereas SPRPs typically require three passes over the input data. We also identify new transformations that yield RUP-secure AEAD schemes with more compact ciphertexts than previously known. Further extending this approach, we arrive at a new generalized notion of authenticated encryption and a matching construction, which we refer to as nonce-set AEAD. Nonce-set AEAD is particularly well-suited in the context of secure channels, like QUIC and DTLS, that operate over unreliable transports and employ a window mechanism at the receiver's end of the channel. We conclude by presenting a generic construction for transforming a nonce-set AEAD scheme into an order-resilient secure channel. Our channel construction sheds new light on order-resilient channels and additionally leads to more compact ciphertexts when instantiated from RPRPs. |
Video from CRYPTO 2022
BibTeX
@inproceedings{crypto-2022-32189, title={Overloading the Nonce: Rugged PRPs, Nonce-Set AEAD, and Order-Resilient Channels}, publisher={Springer-Verlag}, author={Jean Paul Degabriele and Vukašin Karadžić}, year=2022 }