CryptoDB
Security Analysis of RSA-BSSA
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| Conference: | PKC 2023 |
| Abstract: | In a blind signature scheme, a user can obtain a digital signature on a message of her choice without revealing anything about the message or the resulting signature to the signer. Blind signature schemes have recently found applications for privacy-preserving web browsing and ad ecosystems, and as such, are ripe for standardization. In this paper, we show that the recent proposed standard of Denis, Jacobs and Wood constitutes a strongly one-more-unforgeable blind signature scheme in the random-oracle model under the one-more-RSA assumption. Further, we show that the blind version of RSA-FDH proposed and analyzed by Bellare, Namprempre, Pointcheval and Semanko does not satisfy blindness when the public key is chosen maliciously, but satisfies a weaker notion of a blind token. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{pkc-2023-32812,
title={Security Analysis of RSA-BSSA},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
doi={10.1007/978-3-031-31368-4_10},
author={Anna Lysyanskaya},
year=2023
}