International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Security Analysis of RSA-BSSA

Anna Lysyanskaya , Brown University
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-31368-4_10
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Presentation: Slides
Conference: PKC 2023
Abstract: In a blind signature scheme, a user can obtain a digital signature on a message of her choice without revealing anything about the message or the resulting signature to the signer. Blind signature schemes have recently found applications for privacy-preserving web browsing and ad ecosystems, and as such, are ripe for standardization. In this paper, we show that the recent proposed standard of Denis, Jacobs and Wood constitutes a strongly one-more-unforgeable blind signature scheme in the random-oracle model under the one-more-RSA assumption. Further, we show that the blind version of RSA-FDH proposed and analyzed by Bellare, Namprempre, Pointcheval and Semanko does not satisfy blindness when the public key is chosen maliciously, but satisfies a weaker notion of a blind token.
  title={Security Analysis of RSA-BSSA},
  author={Anna Lysyanskaya},