International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Privately Puncturing PRFs from Lattices: Adaptive Security and Collusion Resistant Pseudorandomness

Rupeng Yang , School of Computing and Information Technology, University of Wollongong
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-30620-4_6 (login may be required)
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Presentation: Slides
Conference: EUROCRYPT 2023
Abstract: A private puncturable pseudorandom function (PRF) enables one to create a constrained version of a PRF key, which can be used to evaluate the PRF at all but some punctured points. In addition, the constrained key reveals no information about the punctured points and the PRF values on them. Existing constructions of private puncturable PRFs are only proven to be secure against a restricted adversary that must commit to the punctured points before viewing any information. It is an open problem to achieve the more natural adaptive security, where the adversary can make all its choices on-the-fly. In this work, we solve the problem by constructing an adaptively secure private puncturable PRF from standard lattice assumptions. To achieve this goal, we present a new primitive called explainable hash, which allows one to reprogram the hash function on a given input. The new primitive may find further applications in constructing more cryptographic schemes with adaptive security. Besides, our construction has collusion resistant pseudorandomness, which requires that even given multiple constrained keys, no one could learn the values of the PRF at the punctured points. Private puncturable PRFs with collusion resistant pseudorandomness were only known from multilinear maps or indistinguishability obfuscations in previous works, and we provide the first solution from standard lattice assumptions.
  title={Privately Puncturing PRFs from Lattices: Adaptive Security and Collusion Resistant Pseudorandomness},
  author={Rupeng Yang},