CryptoDB
Spartan and Bulletproofs are simulation-extractable (for free!)
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| Conference: | EUROCRYPT 2023 |
| Abstract: | Increasing deployment of advanced zero-knowledge proof systems, especially zkSNARKs, has raised critical questions about their security against real-world attacks. Two classes of attacks of concern in practice are adaptive soundness attacks, where an attacker can prove false statements by choosing its public input after generating a proof, and malleability attacks, where an attacker can use a valid proof to create another valid proof it could not have created itself. Prior work has shown that simulation-extractability (SIM-EXT), a strong notion of security for proof systems, rules out these attacks. In this paper, we prove that two transparent, discrete-log-based zkSNARKs, Spartan and Bulletproofs, are simulation-extractable (SIM-EXT) in the random oracle model if the discrete logarithm assumption holds in the underlying group. Since these assumptions are required to prove standard security properties for Spartan and Bulletproofs, our results show that SIM-EXT is, surprisingly, ``for free'' with these schemes. Our result is the first SIM-EXT proof for Spartan and encompasses both linear- and sublinear-verifier variants. Our result for Bulletproofs encompasses both the aggregate range proof and arithmetic circuit variants, and is the first to not rely on the algebraic group model (AGM), resolving an open question posed by Ganesh et al. (EUROCRYPT'22). As part of our analysis, we develop a generalization of the tree-builder extraction theorem of Attema et al. (TCC'22), which may be of independent interest. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{eurocrypt-2023-32969,
title={Spartan and Bulletproofs are simulation-extractable (for free!)},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
doi={10.1007/978-3-031-30617-4_18},
author={Quang Dao and Paul Grubbs},
year=2023
}