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Amplification of Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge, Revisited
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| Conference: | CRYPTO 2024 |
| Abstract: | In an (α,β)-weak non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK), the soundness error is at most α and the zero-knowledge error is at most β. Goyal, Jain, and Sahai (CRYPTO 2019) stated that if α+β<1 for some constants α,β, then (α,β)-weak NIZK can be turned into fully-secure NIZK, assuming sub-exponentially-secure public-key encryption. Later, however, they have discovered a gap in their proof. We revisit the problem of NIZK amplification: – We amplify NIZK arguments assuming only polynomially-secure public-key encryption, for any constants α+β<1. – We amplify NIZK proofs assuming only one-way functions, for any constants α+β<1. – When the soundness error α is negligible to begin with, we can also amplify NIZK arguments assuming only one-way functions. Our results take a different route than that of Goyal, Jain, and Sahai. They are based on the hidden-bits paradigm, and can be viewed as a reduction from NIZK amplification to the better understood problem of pseudorandomness amplification. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{crypto-2024-34273,
title={Amplification of Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge, Revisited},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
author={Nir Bitansky and Nathan Geier},
year=2024
}