CryptoDB
Threshold PAKE with Security against Compromise of all Servers
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| Conference: | ASIACRYPT 2024 |
| Abstract: | We revisit the notion of Threshold Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (tPAKE), and we extend it to augmented tPAKE (atPAKE), which protects password information even in case of compromise of all servers, except for allowing an (inevitable) offline dictionary attack. Compared to prior notions of tPAKE this is analogous to replacing symmetric PAKE, where the server stores the user’s password, with an augmented (or asymmetric) PAKE, like OPAQUE [39], where the server stores a password hash, which can be used only as a target in an offline dictionary search for the password. An atPAKE scheme also strictly improves on security of an aPAKE, by secret-sharing the password hash among a set of servers. Indeed, our atPAKE protocol is a natural realization of threshold OPAQUE. We formalize atPAKE in the framework of Universal Composability (UC), and show practical ways to realize it. All our schemes are generic compositions which interface to any aPAKE used as a sub-protocol, making them easier to adopt. Our main scheme relies on threshold Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (tOPRF), and our independent contribution fixes a flaw in the UC tOPRF notion of [36] and upgrades the tOPRF scheme therein to achieve the fixed definition while preserving its minimal cost and round complexity. The technique we use enforces implicit agreement on arbitrary context information within threshold computation, and it is of general interest. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{asiacrypt-2024-34603,
title={Threshold PAKE with Security against Compromise of all Servers},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
author={Yanqi Gu and Stanislaw Jarecki and Paweł Kędzior and Phillip Nazarian and Jiayu Xu},
year=2024
}