CryptoDB
Partial Lattice Trapdoors: How to Split Lattice Trapdoors, Literally
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| Conference: | ASIACRYPT 2025 |
| Abstract: | Lattice trapdoor algorithms allow us to sample hard random lattices together with their trapdoors, given which short preimage vectors of any given target images can be sampled efficiently. This enables a wide range of advanced cryptographic primitives, such as attribute-based encryption and homomorphic signatures. To obtain thresholdised variants of these primitives, one approach is to design a non-interactive mechanism to distribute the preimage sampling process. While generic tools such as the universal thresholdiser exist for this task, they require homomorphically sampling from Gaussian distributions which is non-trivial. We ask: can we distribute lattice trapdoors non-interactively and algebraically? We present a natural approach to this problem: splitting full trapdoors into partial trapdoors for different lower-rank sublattices that allow the local sampling of short sublattice vectors, using essentially only linear algebra but not generic tools such as fully homomorphic encryption or multiparty computation. Our partial trapdoor algorithms generate (partial) preimages of dimension linear in the recovery threshold $t$ but otherwise polylogarithmic in the number of shareholders k. Given sufficiently many short sublattice vectors, these can then be combined to yield short vectors in the original lattice. This process can be repeated an unbounded polynomial number of times without needing the (full) trapdoor owner to intervene. A wide range of lattice-trapdoor-based primitives can be thresholdised non-interactively by simply substituting the trapdoor preimage sampling procedure with our partial analogue. We prove the one-wayness and indistinguishability properties of our construction, against adversaries who are given at most t-1 partial trapdoors, from the κ-SIS and κ-LWE assumptions, which were previously shown to be implied by the plain SIS and LWE assumptions, respectively. The security proofs extend naturally to the ring or module settings under the respective analogues of these assumptions. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{asiacrypt-2025-36009,
title={Partial Lattice Trapdoors: How to Split Lattice Trapdoors, Literally},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
author={Martin R. Albrecht and Russell W. F. Lai and Oleksandra Lapiha and Ivy K. Y. Woo},
year=2025
}