International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Sruthi Sekar

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2022
CRYPTO
Short Leakage Resilient and Non-malleable Secret Sharing Schemes 📺
Leakage resilient secret sharing (LRSS) allows a dealer to share a secret amongst $n$ parties such that any authorized subset of the parties can recover the secret from their shares, while an adversary that obtains shares of any unauthorized subset of parties along with bounded leakage from the other shares learns no information about the secret. Non-malleable secret sharing (NMSS) provides a guarantee that even shares that are tampered by an adversary will reconstruct to either the original message or something independent of it. The most important parameter of LRSS and NMSS schemes is the size of each share. For LRSS, in the "local leakage model" (i.e., when the leakage functions on each share are independent of each other and bounded), Srinivasan and Vasudevan (CRYPTO 2019), gave a scheme for threshold access structures with a share size of approximately 3.((message length) + $\mu$), where $\mu$ is the number of bits of leakage tolerated from every share. For the case of NMSS, the best-known result (again due to the above work) has a share size of 11.(message length). In this work, we build LRSS and NMSS schemes with much improved share size. Additionally, our LRSS scheme obtains optimal share and leakage size. In particular, we get the following results: -We build an information-theoretic LRSS scheme for threshold access structures with a share size of (message length + $\mu$). -As an application of the above result, we obtain an NMSS with a share size of 4.(message length). Further, for the special case of sharing random messages, we obtain a share size of 2.(message length).
2022
TCC
IBE with Incompressible Master Secret and Small Identity Secrets
Side-stepping the protection provided by cryptography, exfiltration attacks are becoming a considerable real-world threat. With the goal of mitigating the exfiltration of cryptographic keys, big-key cryptosystems have been developed over the past few years. These systems come with very large secret keys which are thus hard to exfiltrate. Typically, in such systems, the setup time must be large as it generates the large secret key. However, subsequently, the encryption and decryption operations, that must be performed repeatedly, are required to be efficient. Specifically, the encryption uses only a small public key and the decryption only accesses small ciphertext-dependent parts of the full secret key. Nonetheless, these schemes require decryption to have access to the entire secret key. Thus, using such big-key cryptosystems necessitate that users carry around large secret keys on their devices, which can be a hassle and in some cases might also render exfiltration easy. With the goal of removing this problem, in this work, we initiate the study of big-key identity-based encryption (bk-IBE). In such a system, the master secret key is allowed to be large but we require that the identity-based secret keys are short. This allows users to use the identity-based short keys as the ephemeral secret keys that can be more easily carried around and allow for decrypting ciphertexts matching a particular identity, e.g. messages that were encrypted on a particular date. In particular: -We build a new definitional framework for bk-IBE capturing a range of applications. In the case when the exfiltration is small our definition promises stronger security --- namely, an adversary can break semantic security for only a few identities, proportional to the amount of leakage it gets. In contrast, in the catastrophic case where a large fraction of the master secret key has been ex-filtrated, we can still resort to a guarantee that the ciphertexts generated for a randomly chosen identity (or, an identity with enough entropy) remain protected. We demonstrate how this framework captures the best possible security guarantees. -We show the first construction of such a bk-IBE offering strong security properties. Our construction is based on standard assumptions on groups with bilinear pairings and brings together techniques from seemingly different contexts such as leakage resilient cryptography, reusable two-round MPC, and laconic oblivious transfer. We expect our techniques to be of independent interest.
2021
CRYPTO
Adaptive Extractors and their Application to Leakage Resilient Secret Sharing 📺
We introduce Adaptive Extractors, which unlike traditional randomness extractors, guarantee security even when an adversary obtains leakage on the source \textit{after} observing the extractor output. We make a compelling case for the study of such extractors by demonstrating their use in obtaining adaptive leakage in secret sharing schemes. Specifically, at FOCS 2020, Chattopadhyay, Goodman, Goyal, Kumar, Li, Meka, Zuckerman, built an adaptively secure leakage resilient secret sharing scheme (LRSS) with both rate and leakage rate being $\mathcal{O}(1/n)$, where $n$ is the number of parties. In this work, we build an adaptively secure LRSS that offers an interesting trade-off between rate, leakage rate, and the total number of shares from which an adversary can obtain leakage. As a special case, when considering $t$-out-of-$n$ secret sharing schemes for threshold $t = \alpha n$ (constant $0<\alpha<1$), we build a scheme with constant rate, constant leakage rate, and allow the adversary leakage from all but $t-1$ of the shares, while giving her the remaining $t-1$ shares completely in the clear. (Prior to this, constant rate LRSS scheme tolerating adaptive leakage was unknown for \textit{any} threshold.) Finally, we show applications of our techniques to both non-malleable secret sharing and secure message transmission.
2019
PKC
Registration-Based Encryption from Standard Assumptions
The notion of Registration-Based Encryption (RBE) was recently introduced by Garg, Hajiabadi, Mahmoody, and Rahimi [TCC’18] with the goal of removing the private-key generator (PKG) from IBE. Specifically, RBE allows encrypting to identities using a (compact) master public key, like how IBE is used, with the benefit that the PKG is substituted with a weaker entity called “key curator” who has no knowledge of any secret keys. Here individuals generate their secret keys on their own and then publicly register their identities and their corresponding public keys to the key curator. Finally, individuals obtain “rare” decryption-key updates from the key curator as the population grows. In their work, they gave a construction of RBE schemes based on the combination of indistinguishability obfuscation and somewhere statistically binding hash functions. However, they left open the problem of constructing RBE schemes based on standard assumptions.In this work, we resolve the above problem and construct RBE schemes based on standard assumptions (e.g., CDH or LWE). Furthermore, we show a new application of RBE in a novel context. In particular, we show that anonymous variants of RBE (which we also construct under standard assumptions) can be used for realizing abstracts forms of anonymous messaging tasks in simple scenarios in which the parties communicate by writing messages on a shared board in a synchronized way.
2019
JOFC
Four-State Non-malleable Codes with Explicit Constant Rate
Non-malleable codes (NMCs), introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs (ITCS 2010), provide a powerful guarantee in scenarios where the classical notion of error-correcting codes cannot provide any guarantee: a decoded message is either the same or completely independent of the underlying message, regardless of the number of errors introduced into the codeword. Informally, NMCs are defined with respect to a family of tampering functions $$\mathcal {F}$$ F and guarantee that any tampered codeword decodes either to the same message or to an independent message, so long as it is tampered using a function $$f \in \mathcal {F}$$ f ∈ F . One of the well-studied tampering families for NMCs is the t -split-state family, where the adversary tampers each of the t “states” of a codeword, arbitrarily but independently. Cheraghchi and Guruswami (TCC 2014) obtain a rate-1 non-malleable code for the case where $$t = \mathcal {O}(n)$$ t = O ( n ) with n being the codeword length and, in (ITCS 2014), show an upper bound of $$1-1/t$$ 1 - 1 / t on the best achievable rate for any t -split state NMC. For $$t=10$$ t = 10 , Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman (FOCS 2014) achieve a constant-rate construction where the constant is unknown. In summary, there is no known construction of an NMC with an explicit constant rate for any $$t= o(n)$$ t = o ( n ) , let alone one that comes close to matching Cheraghchi and Guruswami’s lowerbound! In this work, we construct an efficient non-malleable code in the t -split-state model, for $$t=4$$ t = 4 , that achieves a constant rate of $$\frac{1}{3+\zeta }$$ 1 3 + ζ , for any constant $$\zeta > 0$$ ζ > 0 , and error $$2^{-\varOmega (\ell / log^{c+1} \ell )}$$ 2 - Ω ( ℓ / l o g c + 1 ℓ ) , where $$\ell $$ ℓ is the length of the message and $$c > 0$$ c > 0 is a constant.
2018
EUROCRYPT
2017
TCC