International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Louiza Khati


Generic Attack on Duplex-Based AEAD Modes using Random Function Statistics
Duplex-based authenticated encryption modes with a sufficiently large key length are proven to be secure up to the birthday bound 2^(c/2), where c is the capacity. However this bound is not known to be tight and the complexity of the best known generic attack, that is based on multicollisions, is much larger: it reaches (2^c)/α where α represents a small security loss factor. There is thus an uncertainty on the true extent of security beyond the bound 2^(c/2) provided by such constructions. In this paper, we describe a new generic attack against several duplex-based AEAD modes. Our attack produces a forgery in time complexity O(2^(3c/4)) using negligible memory and no encryption queries. Furthermore, for some duplex-based modes, our attack also recovers the secret key with a negligible amount of additional computations. Most notably, our attack breaks a security claim made by the designers of the NIST lightweight competition candidate Xoodyak. This attack is a step further towards determining the exact security provided by duplex-based constructions.
Security of Even-Mansour Ciphers under Key-Dependent Messages
The iterated Even–Mansour (EM) ciphers form the basis of many blockcipher designs. Several results have established their security in the CPA/CCA models, under related-key attacks, and in the indifferentiability framework. In this work, we study the Even–Mansour ciphers under key-dependent message (KDM) attacks. KDM security is particularly relevant for blockciphers since non-expanding mechanisms are convenient in setting such as full disk encryption (where various forms of key-dependency might exist). We formalize the folklore result that the ideal cipher is KDM secure. We then show that EM ciphers meet varying levels of KDM security depending on the number of rounds and permutations used. One-round EM achieves some form of KDM security, but this excludes security against offsets of keys. With two rounds we obtain KDM security against offsets, and using different round permutations we achieve KDM security against all permutation-independent claw-free functions. As a contribution of independent interest, we present a modular framework that can facilitate the security treatment of symmetric constructions in models that allow for correlated inputs.