## CryptoDB

### Alexander Nilsson

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2022
TCHES
Well before large-scale quantum computers will be available, traditional cryptosystems must be transitioned to post-quantum (PQ) secure schemes. The NIST PQC competition aims to standardize suitable cryptographic schemes. Candidates are evaluated not only on their formal security strengths, but are also judged based on the security with regard to resistance against side-channel attacks. Although round 3 candidates have already been intensively vetted with regard to such attacks, one important attack vector has hitherto been missed: PQ schemes often rely on rejection sampling techniques to obtain pseudorandomness from a specific distribution. In this paper, we reveal that rejection sampling routines that are seeded with secretdependent information and leak timing information result in practical key recovery attacks in the code-based key encapsulation mechanisms HQC and BIKE.Both HQC and BIKE have been selected as alternate candidates in the third round of the NIST competition, which puts them on track for getting standardized separately o the finalists. They have already been specifically hardened with constant-time decoders to avoid side-channel attacks. However, in this paper, we show novel timing vulnerabilities in both schemes: (1) Our secret key recovery attack on HQC requiresonly approx. 866,000 idealized decapsulation timing oracle queries in the 128-bit security setting. It is structurally different from previously identified attacks on the scheme: Previously, exploitable side-channel leakages have been identified in the BCH decoder of a previously submitted HQC version, in the ciphertext check as well as in the pseudorandom function of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation. In contrast, our attack uses the fact that the rejection sampling routine invoked during the deterministic re-encryption of the decapsulation leaks secret-dependent timing information, which can be efficiently exploited to recover the secret key when HQC is instantiated with the (now constant-time) BCH decoder, as well as with the RMRS decoder of the current submission. (2) From the timing information of the constant weight word sampler in the BIKE decapsulation, we demonstrate how to distinguish whether the decoding step is successful or not, and how this distinguisher is then used in the framework of the GJS attack to derive the distance spectrum of the secret key, using 5.8 x 107 idealized timing oracle queries. We provide details and analyses of the fully implemented attacks, as well as a discussion on possible countermeasures and their limits.
2020
CRYPTO
In the implementation of post-quantum primitives, it is well known that all computations that handle secret information need to be implemented to run in constant time. Using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation or any of its different variants, a CPA-secure primitive can be converted into an IND-CCA secure KEM. In this paper we show that although the transformation does not handle secret information apart from calls to the CPA-secure primitive, it has to be implemented in constant time. Namely, if the ciphertext comparison step in the transformation is leaking side-channel information, we can launch a key-recovery attack. Several proposed schemes in round 2 of the NIST post-quantum standardization project are susceptible to the proposed attack and we develop and show the details of the attack on one of them, being FrodoKEM. It is implemented on the reference implementation of FrodoKEM, which is claimed to be secure against all timing attacks. In the experiments, the attack code is able to extract the secret key for all security levels using about $2^{30}$ decapsulation calls.
2019
TCHES
Code-based cryptography is one of the main techniques enabling cryptographic primitives in a post-quantum scenario. In particular, the MDPC scheme is a basic scheme from which many other schemes have been derived. These schemes rely on iterative decoding in the decryption process and thus have a certain small probability p of having a decryption (decoding) error.In this paper we show a very fundamental and important property of code-based encryption schemes. Given one initial error pattern that fails to decode, the time needed to generate another message that fails to decode is strictly much less than 1/p. We show this by developing a method for fast generation of undecodable error patterns (error pattern chaining), which additionally proves that a measure of closeness in ciphertext space can be exploited through its strong linkage to the difficulty of decoding these messages. Furthermore, if side-channel information is also available (time to decode), then the initial error pattern no longer needs to be given since one can be easily generated in this case.These observations are fundamentally important because they show that a, say, 128- bit encryption scheme is not inherently safe from reaction attacks even if it employs a decoder with a failure rate of 2−128. In fact, unless explicit protective measures are taken, having a failure rate at all – of any magnitude – can pose a security problem because of the error amplification effect of our method.A key-recovery reaction attack was recently shown on the MDPC scheme as well as similar schemes, taking advantage of decoding errors in order to recover the secret key. It was also shown that knowing the number of iterations in the iterative decoding step, which could be received in a timing attack, would also enable and enhance such an attack. In this paper we apply our error pattern chaining method to show how to improve the performance of such reaction attacks in the CPA case. We show that after identifying a single decoding error (or a decoding step taking more time than expected in a timing attack), we can adaptively create new error patterns that have a much higher decoding error probability than for a random error. This leads to a significant improvement of the attack based on decoding errors in the CPA case and it also gives the strongest known attack on MDPC-like schemes, both with and without using side-channel information.
2019
PKC
In this paper we investigate the impact of decryption failures on the chosen-ciphertext security of lattice-based primitives. We discuss a generic framework for secret key recovery based on decryption failures and present an attack on the NIST Post-Quantum Proposal ss-ntru-pke. Our framework is split in three parts: First, we use a technique to increase the failure rate of lattice-based schemes called failure boosting. Based on this technique we investigate the minimal effort for an adversary to obtain a failure in three cases: when he has access to a quantum computer, when he mounts a multi-target attack or when he can only perform a limited number of oracle queries. Secondly, we examine the amount of information that an adversary can derive from failing ciphertexts. Finally, these techniques are combined in an overall analysis of the security of lattice based schemes under a decryption failure attack. We show that an attacker could significantly reduce the security of lattice based schemes that have a relatively high failure rate. However, for most of the NIST Post-Quantum Proposals, the number of required oracle queries is above practical limits. Furthermore, a new generic weak-key (multi-target) model on lattice-based schemes, which can be viewed as a variant of the previous framework, is proposed. This model further takes into consideration the weak-key phenomenon that a small fraction of keys can have much larger decoding error probability for ciphertexts with certain key-related properties. We apply this model and present an attack in detail on the NIST Post-Quantum Proposal – ss-ntru-pke – with complexity below the claimed security level.