Threshold and Proactive Pseudo-Random Permutations
We construct a reasonably efficient threshold and proactive pseudo-random permutation (PRP). Our protocol needs only O(1) communication rounds. It tolerates up to (n-1)/2 of n dishonest servers in the semi-honest environment. Many protocols that use PRPs (e.g., a CBC block cipher mode) can now be translated into the distributed setting. Our main technique for constructing invertible threshold PRPs is a distributed Luby-Rackoff construction where both the secret keys *and* the input are shared among the servers. We also present protocols for obliviously computing pseudo-random functions by Naor-Reingold and Dodis-Yampolskiy with shared input and keys.
Spreading Alerts Quietly and the Subgroup Escape Problem
We introduce a new cryptographic primitive called the blind coupon mechanism (BCM). In effect, the BCM is an authenticated bit-commitment, which is AND-homomorphic. It has not been known how to construct such commitments before. We show that the BCM has natural and important applications. In particular, we use it to construct a mechanism for transmitting alerts undetectably in a message-passing system of n nodes. Our algorithms allow an alert to quickly propagate to all nodes without its source or existence being detected by an adversary, who controls all message traffic. Our proofs of security are based on a new subgroup escape problem, which seems hard on certain groups with bilinear pairings and on elliptic curves over the ring Zn.
A Verifiable Random Function With Short Proofs and Keys
We give a simple and efficient construction of a verifiable random function (VRF) on bilinear groups. Our construction is direct. In contrast to prior VRF constructions [MRV99, Lys02], it avoids using an inefficient Goldreich-Levin transformation, thereby saving several factors in security. Our proofs of security are based on a decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption, which seems reasonable given current state of knowledge. For small message spaces, our VRF's proofs and keys have constant size. By utilizing a collision-resistant hash function, our VRF can also be used with arbitrary message spaces. We show that our scheme can be instantiated with an elliptic group of very reasonable size. Furthermore, it can be made distributed and proactive.