International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Pasin Manurangsi


Private Aggregation from Fewer Anonymous Messages 📺
Consider the setup where $n$ parties are each given an element~$x_i$ in the finite field $\F_q$ and the goal is to compute the sum $\sum_i x_i$ in a secure fashion and with as little communication as possible. We study this problem in the \emph{anonymized model} of Ishai et al.~(FOCS 2006) where each party may broadcast anonymous messages on an insecure channel. We present a new analysis of the one-round ``split and mix'' protocol of Ishai et al. In order to achieve the same security parameter, our analysis reduces the required number of messages by a $\Theta(\log n)$ multiplicative factor. We also prove lower bounds showing that the dependence of the number of messages on the domain size, the number of parties, and the security parameter is essentially tight. Using a reduction of Balle et al. (2019), our improved analysis of the protocol of Ishai et al. yields, in the same model, an $\left(\varepsilon, \delta\right)$-differentially private protocol for aggregation that, for any constant $\varepsilon > 0$ and any $\delta = \frac{1}{\poly(n)}$, incurs only a constant error and requires only a \emph{constant number of messages} per party. Previously, such a protocol was known only for $\Omega(\log n)$ messages per party.
Nearly Optimal Robust Secret Sharing against Rushing Adversaries 📺
Robust secret sharing is a strengthening of standard secret sharing that allows the shared secret to be recovered even if some of the shares being used in the reconstruction have been adversarially modified. In this work, we study the setting where out of all the $n$ shares, the adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt and modify up to $t$ shares, where $n = 2t+1$.\footnote{Note that if the adversary is allowed to modify any more shares, then correct reconstruction would be impossible.} Further, we deal with \emph{rushing} adversaries, meaning that the adversary is allowed to see the honest parties' shares before modifying its own shares. It is known that when $n = 2t+1$, to share a secret of length $m$ bits and recover it with error less than $2^{-\sec}$, shares of size at least $m+\sec$ bits are needed. Recently, Bishop, Pastro, Rajaraman, and Wichs (EUROCRYPT 2016) constructed a robust secret sharing scheme with shares of size $m + O(\sec\cdot\polylog(n,m,\sec))$ bits that is secure in this setting against non-rushing adversaries. Later, Fehr and Yuan (EUROCRYPT 2019) constructed a scheme that is secure against rushing adversaries, but has shares of size $m + O(\sec\cdot n^{\eps}\cdot \polylog(n,m,\sec))$ bits for an arbitrary constant $\eps > 0$. They also showed a variant of their construction with share size $m + O(\sec\cdot\polylog(n,m,\sec))$ bits, but with super-polynomial reconstruction time. We present a robust secret sharing scheme that is simultaneously close-to-optimal in all of these respects -- it is secure against rushing adversaries, has shares of size $m+O(\sec \log{n} (\log{n}+\log{m}))$ bits, and has polynomial-time sharing and reconstruction. Central to our construction is a polynomial-time algorithm for a problem on semi-random graphs that arises naturally in the paradigm of local authentication of shares used by us and in the aforementioned work.