Logarithmic-Size (Linkable) Threshold Ring Signatures in the Plain Model 📺
A $1$-out-of-$N$ ring signature scheme, introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman-Kalai (ASIACRYPT '01), allows a signer to sign a message as part of a set of size $N$ (the so-called ``ring'') which are anonymous to any verifier, including other members of the ring. Threshold ring (or ``thring'') signatures generalize ring signatures to $t$-out-of-$N$ parties, with $t \geq 1$, who anonymously sign messages and show that they are distinct signers (Bresson et al., CRYPTO'02). Until recently, there was no construction of ring signatures that both $(i)$ had logarithmic signature size in $N$, and $(ii)$ was secure in the plain model. The work of Backes et al. (EUROCRYPT'19) resolved both these issues. However, threshold ring signatures have their own particular problem: with a threshold $t \geq 1$, signers must often reveal their identities to the other signers as part of the signing process. This is an issue in situations where a ring member has something controversial to sign; he may feel uncomfortable requesting that other members join the threshold, as this reveals his identity. Building on the Backes et al. template, in this work we present the first construction of a thring signature that is logarithmic-sized in $N$, in the plain model, and does not require signers to interact with each other to produce the thring signature. We also present a linkable counterpart to our construction, which supports a fine-grained control of linkability. Moreover, our thring signatures can easily be adapted to achieve the recent notions of claimability and repudiability (Park and Sealfon, CRYPTO'19).
Garbled Circuits With Sublinear Evaluator
A recent line of work, Stacked Garbled Circuit (SGC), showed that Garbled Circuit (GC) can be improved for functions that include conditional behavior. SGC relieves the communication bottleneck of 2PC by only sending enough garbled material for a single branch out of the $b$ total branches. Hence, communication is sublinear in the circuit size. However, both the evaluator and the generator pay in computation and perform at least factor $\log b$ extra work as compared to standard GC evaluation. We extend the sublinearity of SGC to also include the work performed by the GC Evaluator E; thus we achieve a fully sublinear E, which is essential when optimizing for the online phase. We formalize our approach as a garbling scheme called GCWise: GC WIth Sublinear Evaluator. We show one attractive and immediate application, Garbled PIR, a primitive that marries GC with Private Information Retrieval. Garbled PIR allows the GC to non-interactively and sublinearly access a privately indexed element from a publicly known database, and then use this element in continued GC evaluation.
Threshold Ring Signatures: New Definitions and Post-quantum Security 📺
A t -out-of- N threshold ring signature allows t parties to jointly and anonymously compute a signature on behalf on N public keys, selected in an arbitrary manner among the set of all public keys registered in the system. Existing definitions for t -out-of- N threshold ring signatures guarantee security only when the public keys are honestly generated, and many even restrict the ability of the adversary to actively participate in the computation of the signatures. Such definitions do not capture the open settings envisioned for threshold ring signatures, where parties can independently add themselves to the system, and join other parties for the computation of the signature. Furthermore, known constructions of threshold ring signatures are not provably secure in the post-quantum setting, either because they are based on non-post quantum secure problems (e.g. Discrete Log, RSA), or because they rely on transformations such as Fiat-Shamir, that are not always secure in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). In this paper, we provide the first definition of t -out-of- N threshold ring signatures against active adversaries who can participate in the system and arbitrarily deviate from the prescribed procedures. Second, we present a post-quantum secure realization based on any (post-quantum secure) trapdoor commitment, which we prove secure in the QROM. Our construction is black-box and it can be instantiated with any trapdoor commitment, thus allowing the use of a variety of hardness assumptions.