International Association
for Cryptologic Research

<p>The server-aided model for multiparty computation (MPC) was introduced to capture a real-world scenario where clients wish to off-load the heavy computation of MPC protocols to dedicated servers. A rich body of work has studied various trade-offs between security guarantees (e.g., semi-honest vs malicious), trust assumptions (e.g., the threshold on corrupted servers), and efficiency.</p><p>However, all existing works make the assumption that all clients must agree on employing the same servers, and accept the same corruption threshold. In this paper, we challenge this assumption and introduce a new paradigm for server-aided MPC, where each client can choose their own set of servers and their own threshold of corrupted servers. In this new model, the privacy of each client is guaranteed as long as their own threshold is satisfied, regardless of the other servers/clients. We call this paradigm per-party private server-aided MPC to highlight both a security and efficiency guarantee: (1) per-party privacy, which means that each party gets their own privacy guarantees that depend on their own choice of the servers; (2) per-party complexity, which means that each party only needs to communicate with their chosen servers. Our primary contribution is a new theoretical framework for server-aided MPC. We provide two protocols to show feasibility, but leave it as a future work to investigate protocols that focus on concrete efficiency. </p>

<p> A central question in the theory of cryptography is whether we can build protocols that achieve stronger security guarantees, e.g., security against malicious adversaries, by combining building blocks that achieve much weaker security guarantees, e.g., security only against semi-honest adversaries; and with the minimal number of rounds. An additional focus is whether these building blocks can be used only as a black-box. Since Oblivious Transfer (OT) is the necessary and sufficient building block to securely realize any two-party (and multi-party) functionality, theoreticians often focus on proving whether maliciously secure OT can be built from a weaker notion of OT.</p><p>There is a rich body of literature that provides (black-box) compilers that build malicious OT from OTs that achieve weaker security such as semi-malicious OT and defensibly secure OT, within the minimal number of rounds. However, no round-optimal compiler exists that builds malicious OT from the weakest notion of semi-honest OT, in the plain model.</p><p>Correlation intractable hash (CIH) functions are special hash functions whose properties allow instantiating the celebrated Fiat-Shamir transform, and hence reduce the round complexity of public-coin proof systems.</p><p>In this work, we devise the first round-optimal compiler from semi-honest OT to malicious OT, by a novel application of CIH for collapsing rounds in the plain model. We provide the following contributions. First, we provide a new CIH-based round-collapsing construction for general cut-and-choose. This gadget can be used generally to prove the correctness of the evaluation of a function. Then, we use our gadget to build the first round-optimal compiler from semi-honest OT to malicious OT.</p><p> Our compiler uses the semi-honest OT protocol and the other building blocks in a black-box manner. However, for technical reasons, the underlying CIH construction requires the upper bound of the circuit size of the semi-honest OT protocol used. The need for this upper-bound makes our protocol not fully black-box, hence is incomparable with existing, fully black-box, compilers.</p>

In cryptocurrencies, all transactions are public. For their adoption, it is important that these transactions, while publicly verifiable, do not leak information about the identity and the balances of the transactors. For UTXO-based cryptocurrencies, there are well-established approaches (e.g., ZCash) that guarantee full privacy to the transactors. Full privacy in UTXO means that each transaction is anonymous within the set of all private transactions ever posted on the blockchain. In contrast, for account-based cryptocurrencies (e.g., Ethereum) full privacy, that is, privacy within the set of all accounts, seems to be impossible to achieve within the constraints of blockchain transactions (e.g., they have to fit in a block). Indeed, every approach proposed in the literature achieves only a much weaker privacy guarantee called k-anonymity where a transactor is private within a set of $k$ account holders. $k-$anonymity is achieved by adding k accounts to the transaction, which concretely limits the anonymity guarantee to a very small constant (e.g., $~$64 for QuisQuis and ~256 for anonymous Zether), compared to the set of all possible accounts. In this paper, we propose a completely new approach that does not achieve anonymity by including more accounts in the transaction, but instead makes the transaction itself ``smarter''. Our key contribution is to provide a mechanism whereby a compact transaction can be used to correctly update all accounts. Intuitively, this guarantees that all accounts are equally likely to be the recipients/sender of such a transaction. We, therefore, provide the first protocol that guarantees full privacy in account-based cryptocurrencies PriFHEte The contribution of this paper is theoretical. Our main objective is to demonstrate that achieving full privacy in account-based cryptocurrency is actually possible. We see our work as opening a door to new possibilities for anonymous account-based cryptocurrencies. Nonetheless, in this paper, we also discuss PriFHEte's potential to be developed in practice by leveraging the power of off-chain scalability solutions such as zk rollups.

Publicly Verifiable Zero-Knowledge proofs are known to exist only from setup assumptions such as a trusted common reference string or a random oracle. Unfortunately, the former requires a trusted party while the latter does not exist. Blockchains are distributed systems that already exist and provide certain security properties (under some honest majority assumption), hence, a natural recent research direction has been to use a blockchain as an alternative setup assumption. In TCC 2017 Goyal and Goyal proposed a construction of a publicly verifiable zero-knowledge (pvZK) proof system for some proof-of-stake blockchains. The zero-knowledge property of their construction however relies on some additional and not fully specified assumptions about the current and future behavior of honest blockchain players. In this paper, we provide several contributions. First, we show that when using a blockchain to design a provably secure protocol, it is dangerous to rely on demanding additional requirements on behaviors of the blockchain players. We do so by showing an ``attack of the clones'' whereby a malicious verifier can use a smart contract to slyly (not through bribing) clone capabilities of honest stakeholders and use those to invalidate the zero-knowledge property of the proof system by Goyal and Goyal. Second, we propose a new publicly verifiable zero-knowledge proof system that relies on non-interactive commitments and on an assumption on the min-entropy of some blocks appearing on the blockchain. Third, motivated by the fact that blockchains are a recent innovation and their resilience, in the long run, is still controversial, we introduce the concept of collapsing blockchain, and we prove that the zero-knowledge property of our scheme holds even if the blockchain eventually becomes insecure and all blockchain players eventually become dishonest.

A t -out-of- N threshold ring signature allows t parties to jointly and anonymously compute a signature on behalf on N public keys, selected in an arbitrary manner among the set of all public keys registered in the system. Existing definitions for t -out-of- N threshold ring signatures guarantee security only when the public keys are honestly generated, and many even restrict the ability of the adversary to actively participate in the computation of the signatures. Such definitions do not capture the open settings envisioned for threshold ring signatures, where parties can independently add themselves to the system, and join other parties for the computation of the signature. Furthermore, known constructions of threshold ring signatures are not provably secure in the post-quantum setting, either because they are based on non-post quantum secure problems (e.g. Discrete Log, RSA), or because they rely on transformations such as Fiat-Shamir, that are not always secure in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). In this paper, we provide the first definition of t -out-of- N threshold ring signatures against active adversaries who can participate in the system and arbitrarily deviate from the prescribed procedures. Second, we present a post-quantum secure realization based on any (post-quantum secure) trapdoor commitment, which we prove secure in the QROM. Our construction is black-box and it can be instantiated with any trapdoor commitment, thus allowing the use of a variety of hardness assumptions.

A proof system is publicly verifiable, if anyone, by looking at the transcript of the proof, can be convinced that the corresponding theorem is true. Public verifiability is important in many applications since it allows to compute a proof only once while convincing an unlimited number of verifiers.Popular interactive proof systems (e.g., $$\varSigma $$-protocols) protect the witness through various properties (e.g., witness indistinguishability (WI) and zero knowledge (ZK)) but typically they are not publicly verifiable since such proofs are convincing only for those verifiers who contributed to the transcripts of the proofs. The only known proof systems that are publicly verifiable rely on a non-interactive (NI) prover, through trust assumptions (e.g., NIZK in the CRS model), heuristic assumptions (e.g., NIZK in the random oracle model), specific number-theoretic assumptions on bilinear groups or relying on obfuscation assumptions (obtaining NIWI with no setups).In this work we construct publicly verifiable witness-indistinguishable proof systems from any $$\varSigma $$-protocol, based only on the existence of a very generic blockchain. The novelty of our approach is in enforcing a non-interactive verification (thus guaranteeing public verifiability) while allowing the prover to be interactive and talk to the blockchain (this allows us to circumvent the need of strong assumptions and setups). This opens interesting directions for the design of cryptographic protocols leveraging on blockchain technology.

“Break-glass” is a term used in IT healthcare systems to denote an emergency access to private information without having the credentials to do so.In this paper we introduce the concept of break-glass encryption for cloud storage, where the security of the ciphertexts – stored on a cloud – can be violated exactly once, for emergency circumstances, in a way that is detectable and without relying on a trusted party.Detectability is the crucial property here: if a cloud breaks glass without permission from the legitimate user, the latter should detect it and have a proof of such violation. However, if the break-glass procedure is invoked by the legitimate user, then semantic security must still hold and the cloud will learn nothing. Distinguishing that a break-glass is requested by the legitimate party is also challenging in absence of secrets.In this paper, we provide a formalization of break-glass encryption and a secure instantiation using hardware tokens. Our construction aims to be a feasibility result and is admittedly impractical. Whether hardware tokens are necessary to achieve this security notion and whether more practical solutions can be devised are interesting open questions.