## CryptoDB

### Tom Suad

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2023

JOFC

On the Power of an Honest Majority in Three-Party Computation Without Broadcast
Abstract

Fully secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to compute some function of their inputs, while guaranteeing correctness, privacy, fairness, and output delivery. Understanding the necessary and sufficient assumptions that allow for fully secure MPC is an important goal. Cleve (STOC’86) showed that full security cannot be obtained in general without an honest majority. Conversely, by Rabin and Ben-Or (STOC’89), assuming a broadcast channel and an honest majority enables a fully secure computation of any function. Our goal is to characterize the set of functionalities that can be computed with full security, assuming an honest majority, but no broadcast. This question was fully answered by Cohen et al. (TCC’16)—for the restricted class of symmetric functionalities (where all parties receive the same output). Instructively, their results crucially rely on agreement and do not carry over to general asymmetric functionalities. In this work, we focus on the case of three-party asymmetric functionalities, providing a variety of necessary and sufficient conditions to enable fully secure computation. An interesting use-case of our results is server-aided computation, where an untrusted server helps two parties to carry out their computation. We show that without a broadcast assumption, the resource of an external non-colluding server provides no additional power. Namely, a functionality can be computed with the help of the server if and only if it can be computed without it. For fair coin tossing, we further show that the optimal bias for three-party (server-aided) r -round protocol remains $$\Theta \left( 1/r\right) $$ Θ 1 / r (as in the two-party setting).

2022

TCC

Leakage-resilient Linear Secret-sharing against arbitrary Bounded-size Leakage Family
Abstract

Motivated by leakage-resilient secure computation of circuits with addition and multiplication gates, this work studies the leakage-resilience of linear secret-sharing schemes with a small reconstruction threshold against any {\em bounded-size} family of joint leakage attacks, \ie, the leakage function can leak {\em global} information from all secret shares.
We first prove that, with high probability, the Massey secret-sharing scheme corresponding to a random linear code over a finite field $F$ is leakage-resilient against any $\ell$-bit joint leakage family of size at most $\abs{F}^{k-2.01}/8^\ell $, where $k$ is the reconstruction threshold. Our result (1) bypasses the bottleneck due to the existing Fourier-analytic approach, (2) enables secure multiplication of secrets, and (3) is near-optimal. We use combinatorial and second-moment techniques to prove the result.
Next, we show that the Shamir secret-sharing scheme over a prime-order field $F$ with randomly chosen evaluation places and with threshold $k$ is leakage-resilient to any $\ell$-bit joint leakage family of size at most $\abs{F}^{2k-n-2.01}/(k!\cdot 8^\ell)$ with high probability. We prove this result by marrying our proof techniques for the first result with the existing Fourier analytical approach. Moreover, it is unlikely that one can extend this result beyond $k/n\leq0.5$ due to the technical hurdle of the Fourier-analytic approach.

2021

EUROCRYPT

Leakage-resilience of the Shamir Secret-sharing Scheme against Physical-bit Leakages
📺
Abstract

Efficient Reed-Solomon code reconstruction algorithms, for example, by Guruswami and Wooters (STOC--2016), translate into local leakage attacks on Shamir secret-sharing schemes over characteristic-2 fields. However, Benhamouda, Degwekar, Ishai, and Rabin (CRYPTO--2018) showed that the Shamir secret sharing scheme over prime-fields is leakage resilient to one-bit local leakage if the reconstruction threshold is roughly 0.87 times the total number of parties. In several application scenarios, like secure multi-party multiplication, the reconstruction threshold must be at most half the number of parties. Furthermore, the number of leakage bits that the Shamir secret sharing scheme is resilient to is also unclear.
Towards this objective, we study the Shamir secret-sharing scheme's leakage-resilience over a prime-field $F$. The parties' secret-shares, which are elements in the finite field $F$, are naturally represented as $\lambda$-bit binary strings representing the elements $\{0,1,\dotsc,p-1\}$. In our leakage model, the adversary can independently probe $m$ bit-locations from each secret share. The inspiration for considering this leakage model stems from the impact that the study of oblivious transfer combiners had on general correlation extraction algorithms, and the significant influence of protecting circuits from probing attacks has on leakage-resilient secure computation.
Consider arbitrary reconstruction threshold $k\geq 2$, physical bit-leakage parameter $m\geq 1$, and the number of parties $n\geq 1$. We prove that Shamir's secret-sharing scheme with random evaluation places is leakage-resilient with high probability when the order of the field $F$ is sufficiently large; ignoring polylogarithmic factors, one needs to ensure that $\log \abs F \geq n/k$. Our result, excluding polylogarithmic factors, states that Shamir's scheme is secure as long as the total amount of leakage $m\cdot n$ is less than the entropy $k\cdot\lambda$ introduced by the Shamir secret-sharing scheme. Note that our result holds even for small constant values of the reconstruction threshold $k$, which is essential to several application scenarios.
To complement this positive result, we present a physical-bit leakage attack for $m=1$ physical bit-leakage from $n=k$ secret shares and any prime-field $F$ satisfying $\abs F=1\mod k$. In particular, there are (roughly) $\abs F^{n-k+1}$ such vulnerable choices for the $n$-tuple of evaluation places. We lower-bound the advantage of this attack for small values of the reconstruction threshold, like $k=2$ and $k=3$, and any $\abs F=1\mod k$. In general, we present a formula calculating our attack's advantage for every $k$ as $\abs F\rightarrow\infty.$
Technically, our positive result relies on Fourier analysis, analytic properties of proper rank-$r$ generalized arithmetic progressions, and B\'ezout's theorem to bound the number of solutions to an equation over finite fields. The analysis of our attack relies on determining the ``discrepancy'' of the Irwin-Hall distribution. A probability distribution's discrepancy is a new property of distributions that our work introduces, which is of potential independent interest.

2021

CRYPTO

Constructing Locally Leakage-resilient Linear Secret-sharing Schemes
📺
Abstract

Innovative side-channel attacks have repeatedly falsified the assumption that cryptographic implementations are opaque black-boxes. Therefore, it is essential to ensure cryptographic constructions' security even when information leaks via unforeseen avenues. One such fundamental cryptographic primitive is the secret-sharing schemes, which underlies nearly all threshold cryptography. Our understanding of the leakage-resilience of secret-sharing schemes is still in its preliminary stage.
This work studies locally leakage-resilient linear secret-sharing schemes. An adversary can leak $m$ bits of arbitrary local leakage from each $n$ secret shares. However, in a locally leakage-resilient secret-sharing scheme, the leakage's joint distribution reveals no additional information about the secret.
For every constant $m$, we prove that the Massey secret-sharing scheme corresponding to a random linear code of dimension $k$ (over sufficiently large prime fields) is locally leakage-resilient, where $k/n > 1/2$ is a constant. The previous best construction by Benhamouda, Degwekar, Ishai, Rabin (CRYPTO--2018) needed $k/n > 0.907$. A technical challenge arises because the number of all possible $m$-bit local leakage functions is exponentially larger than the number of random linear codes. Our technical innovation begins with identifying an appropriate pseudorandomness-inspired family of tests; passing them suffices to ensure leakage-resilience. We show that most linear codes pass all tests in this family. This Monte-Carlo construction of linear secret-sharing scheme that is locally leakage-resilient has applications to leakage-resilient secure computation.
Furthermore, we highlight a crucial bottleneck for all the analytical approaches in this line of work. Benhamouda et al. introduced an analytical proxy to study the leakage-resilience of secret-sharing schemes; if the proxy is small, then the scheme is leakage-resilient. However, we present a one-bit local leakage function demonstrating that the converse is false, motivating the need for new analytically well-behaved functions that capture leakage-resilience more accurately.
Technically, the analysis involves probabilistic and combinatorial techniques and (discrete) Fourier analysis. The family of new ``tests'' capturing local leakage functions, we believe, is of independent and broader interest.

2020

TCC

On the Power of an Honest Majority in Three-Party Computation Without Broadcast
📺
Abstract

Fully secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to compute some function of their inputs, while guaranteeing correctness, privacy, fairness, and output delivery. Understanding the necessary and sufficient assumptions that allow for fully secure MPC is an important goal. Cleve (STOC'86) showed that full security cannot be obtained in general without an honest majority. Conversely, by Rabin and Ben-Or (FOCS'89), assuming a broadcast channel and an honest majority, any function can be computed with full security.
Our goal is to characterize the set of functionalities that can be computed with full security, assuming an honest majority, but no broadcast. This question was fully answered by Cohen et al. (TCC'16) -- for the restricted class of \emph{symmetric} functionalities (where all parties receive the same output). Instructively, their results crucially rely on \emph{agreement} and do not carry over to general \emph{asymmetric} functionalities. In this work, we focus on the case of three-party asymmetric functionalities, providing a variety of necessary and sufficient conditions to enable fully secure computation.
An interesting use-case of our results is \emph{server-aided} computation, where an untrusted server helps two parties to carry out their computation. We show that without a broadcast assumption, the resource of an external non-colluding server provides no additional power. Namely, a functionality can be computed with the help of the server if and only if it can be computed without it.
For fair coin tossing, we further show that the optimal bias for three-party (server-aided) $r$-round protocol remains $\Theta(1/r)$ (as in the two-party setting).

#### Coauthors

- Bar Alon (2)
- Ran Cohen (2)
- Hemanta K. Maji (3)
- Hai H. Nguyen (2)
- Eran Omri (2)
- Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky (3)
- Tom Suad (5)
- Mingyuan Wang (3)
- Xiuyu Ye (1)
- Albert Yu (1)