## CryptoDB

### Ran Cohen

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2022

EUROCRYPT

Guaranteed Output in O(sqrt(n)) Rounds for Round-Robin Sampling Protocols
📺
Abstract

We introduce a notion of round-robin secure sampling that captures several protocols in the literature, such as the "powers-of-tau" setup protocol for pairing-based polynomial commitments and zk-SNARKs, and certain verifiable mixnets.
Due to their round-robin structure, protocols of this class inherently require n sequential broadcast rounds, where n is the number of participants.
We describe how to compile them generically into protocols that require only O(sqrt(n)) broadcast rounds. Our compiled protocols guarantee output delivery against any dishonest majority. This stands in contrast to prior techniques, which require Omega(n) sequential broadcasts in most cases (and sometimes many more). Our compiled protocols permit a certain amount of adversarial bias in the output, as all sampling protocols with guaranteed output must, due to Cleve's impossibility result (STOC'86). We show that in the context of the aforementioned applications, this bias is harmless.

2021

JOFC

From Fairness to Full Security in Multiparty Computation
Abstract

In the setting of secure multiparty computation (MPC), a set of mutually distrusting parties wish to jointly compute a function, while guaranteeing the privacy of their inputs and the correctness of the output. An MPC protocol is called fully secure if no adversary can prevent the honest parties from obtaining their outputs. A protocol is called fair if an adversary can prematurely abort the computation, however, only before learning any new information. We present efficient transformations from fair computations to fully secure computations, assuming a constant fraction of honest parties (e.g., $$1\%$$ 1 % of the parties are honest). Compared to previous transformations that require linear invocations (in the number of parties) of the fair computation, our transformations require super-logarithmic, and sometimes even super-constant, such invocations. The main idea is to delegate the computation to random committees that invoke the fair computation. Apart from the benefit of uplifting security, the reduction in the number of parties is also useful, since only committee members are required to work, whereas the remaining parties simply “listen” to the computation over a broadcast channel. One application of these transformations is a new $$\delta $$ δ -bias coin-flipping protocol, whose round complexity has a super-logarithmic dependency on the number of parties, improving over the linear-dependency protocol of Beimel, Omri, and Orlov (Crypto 2010). A second application is a new fully secure protocol for computing the Boolean OR function, with a super-constant round complexity, improving over the protocol of Gordon and Katz (TCC 2009) whose round complexity is linear in the number of parties. Finally, we show that our positive results are in a sense optimal, by proving that for some functionalities, a super-constant number of (sequential) invocations of the fair computation is necessary for computing the functionality in a fully secure manner.

2021

JOFC

Round-Preserving Parallel Composition of Probabilistic-Termination Cryptographic Protocols
Abstract

An important benchmark for multi-party computation protocols (MPC) is their round complexity . For several important MPC tasks, such as broadcast, (tight) lower bounds on the round complexity are known. However, some of these lower bounds can be circumvented when the termination round of every party is not a priori known, and simultaneous termination is not guaranteed. Protocols with this property are called probabilistic-termination ( PT ) protocols. Running PT protocols in parallel affects the round complexity of the resulting protocol in somewhat unexpected ways. For instance, an execution of m protocols with constant expected round complexity might take $$O(\log m)$$ O ( log m ) rounds to complete. In a seminal work, Ben-Or and El-Yaniv (Distributed Computing ‘03) developed a technique for a parallel execution of arbitrarily many broadcast protocols, while preserving expected round complexity. More recently, Cohen et al. (CRYPTO ‘16) devised a framework for universal composition of PT protocols, and provided the first composable parallel-broadcast protocol with a simulation-based proof. These constructions crucially rely on the fact that broadcast is “privacy-free,” and do not generalize to arbitrary protocols in a straightforward way. This raises the question of whether it is possible to execute arbitrary PT protocols in parallel, without increasing the round complexity. In this paper we tackle this question and provide both feasibility and infeasibility results. We construct a round-preserving protocol compiler, tolerating any dishonest minority of actively corrupted parties, that compiles arbitrary protocols into a protocol realizing their parallel composition, while having a black-box access to the underlying protocols . Furthermore, we prove that the same cannot be achieved, using known techniques, given only black-box access to the functionalities realized by the protocols, unless merely security against semi-honest corruptions is required, for which case we provide a protocol. To prove our results, we utilize the language and results by Cohen et al. , which we extend to capture parallel composition and reactive functionalities, and to handle the case of an honest majority.

2020

EUROCRYPT

Broadcast-Optimal Two-Round MPC
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Abstract

An intensive effort by the cryptographic community to minimize the round complexity of secure multi-party computation (MPC) has recently led to optimal two-round protocols from minimal assumptions. Most of the proposed solutions, however, make use of a broadcast channel in every round, and it is unclear if the broadcast channel can be replaced by standard point-to-point communication in a round-preserving manner, and if so, at what cost on the resulting security.
In this work, we provide a complete characterization of the trade-off between number of broadcast rounds and achievable security level for two-round MPC tolerating arbitrarily many active corruptions. Specifically, we consider all possible combinations of broadcast and point-to-point rounds against the three standard levels of security for maliciously se- cure MPC protocols, namely, security with identifiable, unanimous, and selective abort. For each of these notions and each combination of broadcast and point-to-point rounds, we provide either a tight feasibility or an infeasibility result of two-round MPC. Our feasibility results hold assuming two-round OT in the CRS model, whereas our impossibility results hold given any correlated randomness.

2020

CRYPTO

Multiparty Generation of an RSA Modulus
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Abstract

We present a new multiparty protocol for the distributed generation of biprime RSA moduli, with security against any subset of maliciously colluding parties assuming oblivious transfer and the hardness of factoring.
Our protocol is highly modular, and its uppermost layer can be viewed as a template that generalizes the structure of prior works and leads to a simpler security proof. We introduce a combined sampling-and-sieving technique that eliminates both the inherent leakage in the approach of Frederiksen et al. (Crypto'18), and the dependence upon additively homomorphic encryption in the approach of Hazay et al. (JCrypt'19). We combine this technique with an efficient, privacy-free check to detect malicious behavior retroactively when a sampled candidate is not a biprime, and thereby overcome covert rejection-sampling attacks and achieve both asymptotic and concrete efficiency improvements over the previous state of the art.

2020

TCC

On the Power of an Honest Majority in Three-Party Computation Without Broadcast
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Abstract

Fully secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to compute some function of their inputs, while guaranteeing correctness, privacy, fairness, and output delivery. Understanding the necessary and sufficient assumptions that allow for fully secure MPC is an important goal. Cleve (STOC'86) showed that full security cannot be obtained in general without an honest majority. Conversely, by Rabin and Ben-Or (FOCS'89), assuming a broadcast channel and an honest majority, any function can be computed with full security.
Our goal is to characterize the set of functionalities that can be computed with full security, assuming an honest majority, but no broadcast. This question was fully answered by Cohen et al. (TCC'16) -- for the restricted class of \emph{symmetric} functionalities (where all parties receive the same output). Instructively, their results crucially rely on \emph{agreement} and do not carry over to general \emph{asymmetric} functionalities. In this work, we focus on the case of three-party asymmetric functionalities, providing a variety of necessary and sufficient conditions to enable fully secure computation.
An interesting use-case of our results is \emph{server-aided} computation, where an untrusted server helps two parties to carry out their computation. We show that without a broadcast assumption, the resource of an external non-colluding server provides no additional power. Namely, a functionality can be computed with the help of the server if and only if it can be computed without it.
For fair coin tossing, we further show that the optimal bias for three-party (server-aided) $r$-round protocol remains $\Theta(1/r)$ (as in the two-party setting).

2020

TCC

Topology-Hiding Communication from Minimal Assumptions.
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Abstract

Topology-hiding broadcast (THB) enables parties communicating over an incomplete network to broadcast messages while hiding the topology from within a given class of graphs. THB is a central tool underlying general topology-hiding secure computation (THC) (Moran et al. TCC’15). Although broadcast is a privacy-free task, it was recently shown that THB for certain graph classes necessitates computational assumptions, even in the semi-honest setting, and even given a single corrupted party.
In this work we investigate the minimal assumptions required for topology-hiding communication—both Broadcast or Anonymous Broadcast (where the broadcaster’s identity is hidden). We develop new techniques that yield a variety of necessary and sufficient conditions for the feasibility of THB/THAB in different cryptographic settings: information theoretic, given existence of key agreement, and given existence of oblivious transfer. Our results show that feasibility can depend on various properties of the graph class, such as connectivity, and highlight the role of different properties of topology when kept hidden, including direction, distance, and/or distance-of-neighbors to the broadcaster. An interesting corollary of our results is a dichotomy for THC with a public number of at least three parties, secure against one corruption: information-theoretic feasibility if all graphs are 2-connected; necessity and sufficiency of key agreement otherwise.

2019

CRYPTO

Adaptively Secure MPC with Sublinear Communication Complexity
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Abstract

A central challenge in the study of MPC is to balance between security guarantees, hardness assumptions, and resources required for the protocol. In this work, we study the cost of tolerating adaptive corruptions in MPC protocols under various corruption thresholds. In the strongest setting, we consider adaptive corruptions of an arbitrary number of parties (potentially all) and achieve the following results:A two-round secure function evaluation (SFE) protocol in the CRS model, assuming LWE and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). The communication, the CRS size, and the online-computation are sublinear in the size of the function. The iO assumption can be replaced by secure erasures. Previous results required either the communication or the CRS size to be polynomial in the function size.Under the same assumptions, we construct a “Bob-optimized” 2PC (where Alice talks first, Bob second, and Alice learns the output). That is, the communication complexity and total computation of Bob are sublinear in the function size and in Alice’s input size. We prove impossibility of “Alice-optimized” protocols.Assuming LWE, we bootstrap adaptively secure NIZK arguments to achieve proof size sublinear in the circuit size of the NP-relation.
On a technical level, our results are based on laconic function evaluation (LFE) (Quach, Wee, and Wichs, FOCS’18) and shed light on an interesting duality between LFE and FHE.Next, we analyze adaptive corruptions of all-but-one of the parties and show a two-round SFE protocol in the threshold PKI model (where keys of a threshold FHE scheme are pre-shared among the parties) with communication complexity sublinear in the circuit size, assuming LWE and NIZK. Finally, we consider the honest-majority setting, and show a two-round SFE protocol with guaranteed output delivery under the same constraints.

2019

TCC

Is Information-Theoretic Topology-Hiding Computation Possible?
Abstract

Topology-hiding computation (THC) is a form of multi-party computation over an incomplete communication graph that maintains the privacy of the underlying graph topology. Existing THC protocols consider an adversary that may corrupt an arbitrary number of parties, and rely on cryptographic assumptions such as DDH.In this paper we address the question of whether information-theoretic THC can be achieved by taking advantage of an honest majority. In contrast to the standard MPC setting, this problem has remained open in the topology-hiding realm, even for simple “privacy-free” functions like broadcast, and even when considering only semi-honest corruptions.We uncover a rich landscape of both positive and negative answers to the above question, showing that what types of graphs are used and how they are selected is an important factor in determining the feasibility of hiding topology information-theoretically. In particular, our results include the following.
We show that topology-hiding broadcast (THB) on a line with four nodes, secure against a single semi-honest corruption, implies key agreement. This result extends to broader classes of graphs, e.g., THB on a cycle with two semi-honest corruptions.On the other hand, we provide the first feasibility result for information-theoretic THC: for the class of cycle graphs, with a single semi-honest corruption.
Given the strong impossibilities, we put forth a weaker definition of distributional-THC, where the graph is selected from some distribution (as opposed to worst-case).
We present a formal separation between the definitions, by showing a distribution for which information theoretic distributional-THC is possible, but even topology-hiding broadcast is not possible information-theoretically with the standard definition.We demonstrate the power of our new definition via a new connection to adaptively secure low-locality MPC, where distributional-THC enables parties to “reuse” a secret low-degree communication graph even in the face of adaptive corruptions.

2019

JOFC

Probabilistic Termination and Composability of Cryptographic Protocols
Abstract

When analyzing the round complexity of multi-party protocols, one often overlooks the fact that underlying resources, such as a broadcast channel, can by themselves be expensive to implement. For example, it is well known that it is impossible to implement a broadcast channel by a (deterministic) protocol in a sublinear (in the number of corrupted parties) number of rounds. The seminal works of Rabin and Ben-Or from the early 1980s demonstrated that limitations as the above can be overcome by using randomization and allowing parties to terminate at different rounds, igniting the study of protocols over point-to-point channels with probabilistic termination and expected constant round complexity. However, absent a rigorous simulation-based definition, the suggested protocols are proven secure in a property-based manner or via ad hoc simulation-based frameworks, therefore guaranteeing limited, if any, composability. In this work, we put forth the first simulation-based treatment of multi-party cryptographic protocols with probabilistic termination. We define secure multi-party computation (MPC) with probabilistic termination in the UC framework and prove a universal composition theorem for probabilistic termination protocols. Our theorem allows to compile a protocol using deterministic termination hybrids into a protocol that uses expected constant round protocols for emulating these hybrids, preserving the expected round complexity of the calling protocol. We showcase our definitions and compiler by providing the first composable protocols (with simulation-based security proofs) for the following primitives, relying on point-to-point channels: (1) expected constant round perfect Byzantine agreement, (2) expected constant round perfect parallel broadcast, and (3) perfectly secure MPC with round complexity independent of the number of parties.

2018

CRYPTO

Must the Communication Graph of MPC Protocols be an Expander?
📺
Abstract

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) on incomplete communication networks has been studied within two primary models: (1) Where a partial network is fixed a priori, and thus corruptions can occur dependent on its structure, and (2) Where edges in the communication graph are determined dynamically as part of the protocol. Whereas a rich literature has succeeded in mapping out the feasibility and limitations of graph structures supporting secure computation in the fixed-graph model (including strong classical lower bounds), these bounds do not apply in the latter dynamic-graph setting, which has recently seen exciting new results, but remains relatively unexplored.In this work, we initiate a similar foundational study of MPC within the dynamic-graph model. As a first step, we investigate the property of graph expansion. All existing protocols (implicitly or explicitly) yield communication graphs which are expanders, but it is not clear whether this is inherent. Our results consist of two types:Upper bounds: We demonstrate secure protocols whose induced communication graphs are not expanders, within a wide range of settings (computational, information theoretic, with low locality, and adaptive security), each assuming some form of input-independent setup.Lower bounds: In the setting without setup and adaptive corruptions, we demonstrate that for certain functionalities, no protocol can maintain a non-expanding communication graph against all adversarial strategies. Our lower bound relies only on protocol correctness (not privacy), and requires a surprisingly delicate argument.

#### Program Committees

- Eurocrypt 2022
- Eurocrypt 2020
- TCC 2020
- TCC 2019

#### Coauthors

- Bar Alon (1)
- Marshall Ball (2)
- Elette Boyle (3)
- Megan Chen (1)
- Sandro Coretti (3)
- Deepesh Data (1)
- Jack Doerner (2)
- Juan A. Garay (4)
- Iftach Haitner (3)
- Pavel Hubáček (1)
- Lisa Kohl (1)
- Yashvanth Kondi (2)
- Eysa Lee (1)
- Yehuda Lindell (2)
- Tal Malkin (2)
- Pierre Meyer (1)
- Tal Moran (2)
- Eran Omri (4)
- Schuyler Rosefield (1)
- Lior Rotem (3)
- Abhi Shelat (3)
- Tom Suad (1)
- Daniel Wichs (1)
- Vassilis Zikas (4)