International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Mi-Ying Huang


Best-of-Both-Worlds Multiparty Quantum Computation with Publicly Verifiable Identifiable Abort
Alon et al. (CRYPTO 2021) introduced a multiparty quantum computation protocol that is secure with identifiable abort (MPQC-SWIA). However, their protocol allows only inside MPQC parties to know the identity of malicious players. This becomes problematic when two groups of people disagree and need a third party, like a jury, to verify who the malicious party is. This issue takes on heightened significance in the quantum setting, given that quantum states may exist in only a single copy. Thus, we emphasize the necessity of a protocol with publicly verifiable identifiable abort (PVIA), enabling outside observers with only classical computational power to agree on the identity of the malicious party in case of an abort. However, achieving MPQC with PVIA poses significant challenges due to the no-cloning theorem, and previous works proposed by Mahadev (STOC 2018) and Chung et al. (Eurocrypt 2022) for classical verification of quantum computation fall short. In this paper, we obtain the first MPQC-PVIA protocol assuming post-quantum oblivious transfer and a classical broadcast channel. The core component of our construction is a new authentication primitive called auditable quantum authentication (AQA) that identifies the malicious sender with overwhelming probability. Additionally, we provide the first MPQC protocol with best-of-both-worlds (BoBW) security, which guarantees output delivery with an honest majority and remains secure with abort even if the majority is dishonest. Our best-of-both-worlds MPQC protocol also satisfies PVIA upon abort.
Round Efficient Secure Multiparty Quantum Computation with Identifiable Abort 📺
A recent result by Dulek et al. (EUROCRYPT 2020) showed a secure protocol for computing any quantum circuit even without the presence of an honest majority. Their protocol, however, is susceptible to a ``denial of service'' attack and allows even a single corrupted party to force an abort. We propose the first quantum protocol that admits security-with-identifiable-abort, which allows the honest parties to agree on the identity of a corrupted party in case of an abort. Additionally, our protocol is the first to have the property that the number of rounds where quantum communication is required is independent of the circuit complexity. Furthermore, if there exists a post-quantum secure classical protocol whose round complexity is independent of the circuit complexity, then our protocol has this property as well. Our protocol is secure under the assumption that classical quantum-resistant fully homomorphic encryption schemes with decryption circuit of logarithmic depth exist. Interestingly, our construction also admits a reduction from quantum fair secure computation to classical fair secure computation.