A Very Compact "Perfectly Masked" S-Box for AES (corrected)
Implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), including hardware applications with limited resources (e.g., smart cards), may be vulnerable to "side-channel attacks" such as differential power analysis. One countermeasure against such attacks is adding a random mask to the data; this randomizes the statistics of the calculation at the cost of computing "mask corrections." The single nonlinear step in each AES round is the "S-box" (involving a Galois inversion), which incurs the majority of the cost for mask corrections. Oswald et al. showed how the "tower field" representation allows maintaining an additive mask throughout the Galois inverse calculation. This work applies a similar masking strategy to the most compact (unmasked) S-box to date. The result is the most compact masked S-box so far, with "perfect masking" (by the definition of Blomer) giving suitable implementations immunity to first-order differential side-channel attacks.
Avoid Mask Re-use in Masked Galois Multipliers
This work examines a weakness in re-using masks for masked Galois inversion, specifically in the masked Galois multipliers. Here we show that the mask re-use scheme included in our work cannot result in "perfect masking," regardless of the order in which the terms are added; explicit distributions are derived for each step. The same problem requires new masks in the subfield calculations, not included in . Hence, for resistance to first-order differential attacks, the masked S-box must use distinct, independent masks for input and output bytes of the masked inverter, and new masks in the subfields, resulting in a larger size. Ref: Canright, D., Batina, L.: A Very Compact "Perfectly Masked" S-Box for AES. In ACNS2008, LNCS 5037, Springer-Verlag (2008), 446-459