International Association
for Cryptologic Research

In their Eurocrypt'21 seminal paper, Li and Micciancio presented a passive attack against the CKKS approximate FHE scheme and introduced the notion of CPAD security. The current status quo is that this line of attacks does not apply to "exact" FHE. In this paper, we challenge this status quo by exhibiting a CPAD key recovery attack on the linearly homomorphic Regev cryptosystem which easily generalizes to other xHE schemes such as BFV, BGV and TFHE showing that these cryptosystems are not CPAD secure in their basic form. We also show that existing threshold variants of BFV, BGV and CKKS are particularily exposed to CPAD attackers and would be CPAD-insecure without proper smudging noise addition after partial decryption. Finally we successfully implement our attack against several mainstream FHE libraries and discuss a number of natural countermeasures as well as their consequences in terms of FHE practice, security and efficiency. The attack itself is quite practical as it typically takes less than an hour on an average laptop PC, requiring a few thousand ciphertexts as well as up to around a million evaluations/decryptions, to perform a full key recovery.

This paper presents a hardware implementation of a Residue Polynomial Multiplier (RPM), designed to accelerate the full Residue Number System (RNS) variant of the Fan-Vercauteren scheme proposed by Bajard et al. [BEHZ16]. Our design speeds up polynomial multiplication via a Negative Wrapped Convolution (NWC) which locally computes the required RNS channel dependent twiddle factors. Compared to related works, this design is more versatile regarding the addressable parameter sets for the BFV scheme. This is mainly brought by our proposed twiddle factor generator that makes the design BRAM utilization independent of the RNS basis size, with a negligible communication bandwidth usage for non-payload data. Furthermore, the generalization of a DFT hardware generator is explored in order to generate RNS friendly NTT architectures. This approach helps us to validate our RPM design over parameter sets from the work of Halevi et al. [HPS18]. For the depth-20 setting, we achieve an estimated speed up for the residue polynomial multiplications greater than 76 during ciphertexts multiplication, and greater than 16 during relinearization. It thus results in a single-threaded Mult&Relin ciphertext operation in 109.4 ms (×3.19 faster than [HPS18]) with RPM counting for less than 15% of the new computation time. Our RPM design scales up with reasonable use of hardware resources and realistic bandwidth requirements. It can also be exploited for other RNS based implementations of RLWE cryptosystems.