International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Paper: Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks on Masked AES with Fault Countermeasures

Christoph Dobraunig
Maria Eichlseder
Hannes Gross
Stefan Mangard
Florian Mendel
Robert Primas
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-03329-3_11
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Presentation: Slides
Conference: ASIACRYPT 2018
Abstract: Implementation attacks like side-channel and fault attacks are a threat to deployed devices especially if an attacker has physical access. As a consequence, devices like smart cards and IoT devices usually provide countermeasures against implementation attacks, such as masking against side-channel attacks and detection-based countermeasures like temporal or spacial redundancy against fault attacks. In this paper, we show how to attack implementations protected with both masking and detection-based fault countermeasures by using statistical ineffective fault attacks using a single fault induction per execution. Our attacks are largely unaffected by the deployed protection order of masking and the level of redundancy of the detection-based countermeasure. These observations show that the combination of masking plus error detection alone may not provide sufficient protection against implementation attacks.
  title={Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks on Masked AES with Fault Countermeasures},
  booktitle={Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2018},
  series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  author={Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Hannes Gross and Stefan Mangard and Florian Mendel and Robert Primas},