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Tightly-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited
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| Presentation: | Slides |
| Conference: | EUROCRYPT 2021 |
| Abstract: | We introduce new tightly-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols that are extremely efficient, yet have only a constant security loss and can be instantiated in the random oracle model both from the standard DDH assumption and a subgroup assumption over RSA groups. These protocols can be deployed with optimal parameters, independent of the number of users or sessions, without the need to compensate a security loss with increased parameters and thus decreased computational efficiency. We use the standard “Single-Bit-Guess” AKE security (with forward secrecy and state corruption) requiring all challenge keys to be simultaneously pseudo-random. In contrast, most previous papers on tightly secure AKE protocols (Bader et al., TCC 2015; Gjøsteen and Jager, CRYPTO 2018; Liu et al., ASIACRYPT 2020) concentrated on a non-standard “Multi-Bit-Guess” AKE security which is known not to compose tightly with symmetric primitives to build a secure communication channel. Our key technical contribution is a new generic approach to construct tightly-secure AKE protocols based on non-committing key encapsulation mechanisms. The resulting DDH-based protocols are considerably more efficient than all previous constructions. |
Video from EUROCRYPT 2021
BibTeX
@inproceedings{eurocrypt-2021-30836,
title={Tightly-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
doi={10.1007/978-3-030-77870-5_5},
author={Tibor Jager and Eike Kiltz and Doreen Riepel and Sven Schäge},
year=2021
}