## CryptoDB

### Tibor Jager

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2023

PKC

Simple, Fast, Efficient, and Tightly-Secure Non-Malleable Non-Interactive Timed Commitments
Abstract

Timed commitment schemes, introduced by Boneh and Naor (CRYPTO 2000), can be used to achieve fairness in secure computation protocols in a simple and elegant way. The only known non-malleable construction in the standard model is due to Katz, Loss, and Xu (TCC 2020). This construction requires general-purpose zero knowledge proofs with specific properties, and it suffers from an inefficient commitment protocol, which requires the committing party to solve a computationally expensive puzzle.
We propose new constructions of non-malleable non-interactive timed commitments, which combine (an extension of) the Naor-Yung paradigm used to construct IND-CCA secure encryption with a non-interactive ZK proof for a simple algebraic language. This yields much simpler and more efficient non-malleable timed commitments in the standard model.
Furthermore, our constructions also compare favourably to known constructions of timed commitments in the random oracle model, as they achieve several further interesting properties that make the schemes very practical. This includes the possibility of using a homomorphism for the forced opening of multiple commitments in the sense of Malavolta and Thyagarajan (CRYPTO 2019), and they are the first constructions to achieve public verifiability, which seems particularly useful to apply the homomorphism in practical applications.

2023

CRYPTO

On Optimal Tightness for Key Exchange with Full Forward Secrecy via Key Confirmation
Abstract

A standard paradigm for building key exchange protocols with full forward secrecy (and explicit authentication) is to add key confirmation messages to an underlying protocol having only weak forward secrecy (and implicit authentication). Somewhat surprisingly, we show through an impossibility result that this simple trick must nevertheless incur a linear tightness loss in the number of parties for many natural protocols. This includes Krawczyk’s HMQV protocol (CRYPTO 2005) and the protocol of Cohn-Gordon et al. (CRYPTO 2019).
Cohn-Gordon et al. gave a very efficient underlying protocol with weak forward secrecy having a linear security loss, and showed that this is optimal for certain reductions. However, they also claimed that full forward secrecy can be achieved via key confirmation without any additional loss. Our impossibility result disproves this claim, showing that their approach, in fact, has an overall loss which is quadratic.
Motivated by this predicament we seek to restore the original lin- ear loss claim of Cohn-Gordon et al. by using a different proof strategy. Specifically, we start by lowering the goal for the underlying protocol with weak forward secrecy, to a selective security notion where the adversary must commit to a long-term key it cannot reveal. This allows a tight reduction rather than a linear loss reduction. Next, we show that the protocol can be upgraded to full forward secrecy using key confirmation messages with a linear tightness loss, even when starting from the weaker selective security notion. Thus, our approach yields an overall tightness loss for the fully forward-secret protocol that is only linear, as originally claimed. Finally, we confirm that the underlying protocol of Cohn-Gordon et al. can indeed be proven selectively secure, tightly.

2023

CRYPTO

Security Analysis of the WhatsApp End-to-End Encrypted Backup Protocol
Abstract

WhatsApp is an end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging service used by billions of people. In late 2021, WhatsApp rolled out a new protocol for backing up chat histories. The E2EE WhatsApp backup protocol (WBP) allows users to recover their chat history from passwords, leaving WhatsApp oblivious of the actual encryption keys. The WBP builds upon the OPAQUE framework for password-based key exchange, which is currently undergoing standardization.
While considerable efforts have gone into the design and auditing of the WBP, the complexity of the protocol’s design and shortcomings in the existing security analyses of its building blocks make it hard to understand the actual security guarantees that the WBP provides.
In this work, we provide the first formal security analysis of the WBP. Our analysis in the universal composability (UC) framework confirms that the WBP provides strong protection of users’ chat history and passwords. It also shows that a corrupted server can under certain conditions make more password guesses than what previous analysis suggests.

2022

EUROCRYPT

On the Concrete Security of TLS 1.3 PSK Mode
📺
Abstract

The pre-shared key (PSK) handshake modes of TLS 1.3 allow for the performant, low-latency resumption of previous connections and are widely used on the Web and by resource-constrained devices, e.g., in the Internet of Things. Taking advantage of these performance benefits with optimal and theoretically-sound parameters requires tight security proofs. We give the first tight security proofs for the TLS 1.3 PSK handshake modes.
Our main technical contribution is to address a gap in prior tight security proofs of TLS 1.3 which modeled either the entire key schedule or components thereof as independent random oracles to enable tight proof techniques. These approaches ignore existing interdependencies in TLS 1.3's key schedule, arising from the fact that the same cryptographic hash function is used in several components of the key schedule and the handshake more generally. We overcome this gap by proposing a new abstraction for the key schedule and carefully arguing its soundness via the indifferentiability framework. Interestingly, we observe that for one specific configuration, PSK-only mode with hash function SHA-384, it seems difficult to argue indifferentiability due to a lack of domain separation between the various hash function usages. We view this as an interesting insight for the design of protocols, such as future TLS versions.
For all other configurations however, our proofs significantly tighten the security of the TLS 1.3 PSK modes, confirming standardized parameters (for which prior bounds provided subpar or even void guarantees) and enabling a theoretically-sound deployment.

2021

EUROCRYPT

Tightly-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited
📺
Abstract

We introduce new tightly-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols that are extremely efficient, yet have only a constant security loss and can be instantiated in the random oracle model both from the standard DDH assumption and a subgroup assumption over RSA groups. These protocols can be deployed with optimal parameters, independent of the number of users or sessions, without the need to compensate a security loss with increased parameters and thus decreased computational efficiency.
We use the standard “Single-Bit-Guess” AKE security (with forward secrecy and state corruption) requiring all challenge keys to be simultaneously pseudo-random. In contrast, most previous papers on tightly secure AKE protocols (Bader et al., TCC 2015; Gjøsteen and Jager, CRYPTO 2018; Liu et al., ASIACRYPT 2020) concentrated on a non-standard “Multi-Bit-Guess” AKE security which is known not to compose tightly with symmetric primitives to build a secure communication channel.
Our key technical contribution is a new generic approach to construct tightly-secure AKE protocols based on non-committing key encapsulation mechanisms. The resulting DDH-based protocols are considerably more efficient than all previous constructions.

2021

PKC

Efficient Adaptively-Secure IB-KEMs and VRFs via Near-Collision Resistance
📺
Abstract

We construct more efficient cryptosystems with provable security against adaptive attacks, based on simple and natural hardness
assumptions in the standard model. Concretely, we describe:
– An adaptively-secure variant of the efficient, selectively-secure LWE-
based identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme of Agrawal, Boneh,
and Boyen (EUROCRYPT 2010). In comparison to the previously
most efficient such scheme by Yamada (CRYPTO 2017) we achieve
smaller lattice parameters and shorter public keys of size O(log \lambda),
where \lambda is the security parameter.
– Adaptively-secure variants of two efficient selectively-secure pairing-
based IBEs of Boneh and Boyen (EUROCRYPT 2004). One is based
on the DBDH assumption, has the same ciphertext size as the cor-
responding BB04 scheme, and achieves full adaptive security with
public parameters of size only O(log \lambda). The other is based on a q-
type assumption and has public key size O(\lambda), but a ciphertext is
only a single group element and the security reduction is quadrat-
ically tighter than the corresponding scheme by Jager and Kurek
(ASIACRYPT 2018).
– A very efficient adaptively-secure verifiable random function where
proofs, public keys, and secret keys have size O(log \lambda).
As a technical contribution we introduce blockwise partitioning, which
leverages the assumption that a cryptographic hash function is weak
near-collision resistant to prove full adaptive security of cryptosystems.

2021

PKC

Subversion-Resilient Public Key Encryption with Practical Watchdogs
📺
Abstract

Restoring the security of maliciously implemented cryptosystems has been widely considered challenging due to the fact that the subverted implementation could arbitrarily deviate from the official specification. Achieving security against adversaries that can arbitrarily subvert implementations seems to inherently require trusted component assumptions and/or architectural properties. At ASIACRYPT 2016, Russell et al. proposed a very useful model where a watchdog is used to test and approve individual components of implementation before or during deployment. Such a detection-based strategy has been shown very useful for designing a broad class of cryptographic schemes that are provable resilient to subversion.
We consider Russell et al.'s watchdog model from a practical perspective. We find that the asymptotic definitional framework, while permitting strong positive theoretical results, does not yet provide practical solutions, due to the fact that the running time of a watchdog is only bounded by an abstract polynomial. Hence, in the worst case, the running time of the watchdog might exceed the running time of the adversary, which seems not very practical. We adopt Russell et al.'s watchdog model to the concrete security setting. We design the first subversion-resilient public-key encryption scheme, which additionally allows for extremely efficient watchdogs with only linear running time.
At the core of our construction is a new variant of a combiner for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) by Giacon et al. (PKC'18). We combine this construction with a new subversion-resilient randomness generator that also can be checked by a very efficient watchdog, even in constant time, which could be of independent interest for the design of other subversion-resilient cryptographic schemes with practical watchdogs. Our work thus shows how to apply Russell et al.'s watchdog model to design subversion-resilient cryptography with efficient and very practical watchdogs.

2021

PKC

More Efficient Digital Signatures with Tight Multi-User Security
📺
Abstract

We construct the currently most efficient signature schemes with tight multi-user security against adaptive corruptions. It is the first generic construction of such schemes, based on lossy identification schemes (Abdalla etal; JoC 2016), and the first to achieve strong existential unforgeability. It also has significantly more compact signatures than the previously most efficient construction by Gjosteen and Jager (CRYPTO 2018). When instantiated based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, a signature consists of only three exponents.
We propose a new variant of the generic construction of signatures from sequential OR-proofs by Abe, Ohkubo, and Suzuki (ASIACRYPT 2002) and Fischlin, Harasser, and Janson (EUROCRYPT 2020).
In comparison to Fischlin etal, who focus on constructing signatures in the non-programmable random oracle model (NPROM), we aim to achieve tight security against adaptive corruptions, maximize efficiency, and to directly achieve strong existential unforgeability (also in the NPROM).
This yields a slightly different construction and we use slightly different and additional properties of the lossy identification scheme.
Signatures with tight multi-user security against adaptive corruptions are a commonly-used standard building block for tightly-secure authenticated key exchange protocols. We also show how our construction improves the efficiency of all existing tightly-secure AKE protocols.

2021

CRYPTO

Authenticated Key Exchange and Signatures with Tight Security in the Standard Model
📺
Abstract

We construct the first authenticated key exchange protocols that achieve tight security in the standard model. Previous works either relied on techniques that seem to inherently require a random oracle, or achieved only “Multi-Bit-Guess” security, which is not known to compose tightly, for instance, to build a secure channel.
Our constructions are generic, based on digital signatures and key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). The main technical challenges we resolve is to determine suitable KEM security notions which on the one hand are strong enough to yield tight security, but at the same time weak enough to be efficiently instantiable in the standard model, based on standard techniques such as universal hash proof systems.
Digital signature schemes with tight multi-user security in presence of adaptive corruptions are a central building block, which is used in all known constructions of tightly-secure AKE with full forward security. We identify a subtle gap in the security proof of the only previously known efficient standard model scheme by Bader et al. (TCC 2015). We develop a new variant, which yields the currently most efficient signature scheme that achieves this strong security notion without random oracles and based on standard hardness assumptions.

2021

ASIACRYPT

Symmetric Key Exchange with Full Forward Security and Robust Synchronization
📺
Abstract

We construct lightweight authenticated key exchange protocols based on pre-shared keys, which achieve full forward security and rely only on simple and efficient symmetric-key primitives. All of our protocols have rigorous security proofs in a strong security model, all have low communication complexity, and are particularly suitable for resource-constrained devices. We describe three protocols that apply linear key evolution to provide different performance and security properties. Correctness in parallel and concurrent protocol sessions is difficult to achieve for linearly key-evolving protocols, emphasizing the need for assurance of availability alongside the usual confidentiality and authentication security goals. We introduce synchronization robustness as a new formal security goal, which essentially guarantees that parties can re-synchronize efficiently. All of our new protocols achieve this property. Since protocols based on linear key evolution cannot guarantee that all concurrently initiated sessions successfully derive a key, we also propose two constructions with non-linear key evolution based on puncturable PRFs. These are instantiable from standard hash functions and require O( C log(|CTR|)) memory, where C is the number of concurrent sessions and |CTR| is an upper bound on the total number of sessions per party. These are the first protocols to simultaneously achieve full forward security, synchronization robustness, and concurrent correctness.

2021

ASIACRYPT

Digital Signatures with Memory-Tight Security in the Multi-Challenge Setting
📺
Abstract

The standard security notion for digital signatures is "single-challenge" (SC) EUF-CMA security, where the adversary outputs a single message-signature pair and "wins" if it is a forgery. Auerbach et al. (CRYPTO 2017) introduced memory-tightness of reductions and argued that the right security goal in this setting is actually a stronger "multi-challenge" (MC) definition, where an adversary may output many message-signature pairs and "wins" if at least one is a forgery.
Currently, no construction from simple standard assumptions is known to achieve full tightness with respect to time, success probability, and memory simultaneously. Previous works showed that memory-tight signatures cannot be achieved via certain natural classes of reductions (Auerbach et al., CRYPTO 2017; Wang et al., EUROCRYPT 2018). These impossibility results may give the impression that the construction of memory-tight signatures is difficult or even impossible.
We show that this impression is false, by giving the first constructions of signature schemes with full tightness in all dimensions in the MC setting. To circumvent the known impossibility results, we first introduce the notion of canonical reductions in the SC setting. We prove a general theorem establishing that every signature scheme with a canonical reduction is already memory-tightly secure in the MC setting, provided that it is strongly unforgeable, the adversary receives only one signature per message, and assuming the existence of a tightly-secure pseudorandom function. We then achieve memory-tight many-signatures-per-message security in the MC setting by a simple additional generic transformation. This yields the first memory-tightly, strongly EUF-CMA-secure signature schemes in the MC setting.
Finally, we show that standard security proofs often already can be viewed as canonical reductions. Concretely, we show this for signatures from lossy identification schemes (Abdalla et al., EUROCRYPT 2012), two variants of RSA Full-Domain Hash (Bellare and Rogaway, EUROCRYPT 1996), and two variants of BLS signatures (Boneh et al., ASIACRYPT 2001).

2021

JOFC

On the Tight Security of TLS 1.3: Theoretically Sound Cryptographic Parameters for Real-World Deployments
Abstract

We consider the theoretically sound selection of cryptographic parameters, such as the size of algebraic groups or RSA keys, for TLS 1.3 in practice. While prior works gave security proofs for TLS 1.3, their security loss is quadratic in the total number of sessions across all users, which due to the pervasive use of TLS is huge. Therefore, in order to deploy TLS 1.3 in a theoretically sound way, it would be necessary to compensate this loss with unreasonably large parameters that would be infeasible for practical use at large scale. Hence, while these previous works show that in principle the design of TLS 1.3 is secure in an asymptotic sense, they do not yet provide any useful concrete security guarantees for real-world parameters used in practice. In this work, we provide a new security proof for the cryptographic core of TLS 1.3 in the random oracle model, which reduces the security of TLS 1.3 tightly (that is, with constant security loss) to the (multi-user) security of its building blocks. For some building blocks, such as the symmetric record layer encryption scheme, we can then rely on prior work to establish tight security. For others, such as the RSA-PSS digital signature scheme currently used in TLS 1.3, we obtain at least a linear loss in the number of users, independent of the number of sessions, which is much easier to compensate with reasonable parameters. Our work also shows that by replacing the RSA-PSS scheme with a tightly secure scheme (e.g., in a future TLS version), one can obtain the first fully tightly secure TLS protocol. Our results enable a theoretically sound selection of parameters for TLS 1.3, even in large-scale settings with many users and sessions per user.

2021

JOFC

Session Resumption Protocols and Efficient Forward Security for TLS 1.3 0-RTT
Abstract

The TLS 1.3 0-RTT mode enables a client reconnecting to a server to send encrypted application-layer data in “0-RTT” (“zero round-trip time”), without the need for a prior interactive handshake. This fundamentally requires the server to reconstruct the previous session’s encryption secrets upon receipt of the client’s first message. The standard techniques to achieve this are session caches or, alternatively, session tickets . The former provides forward security and resistance against replay attacks, but requires a large amount of server-side storage. The latter requires negligible storage, but provides no forward security and is known to be vulnerable to replay attacks. In this paper, we first formally define session resumption protocols as an abstract perspective on mechanisms like session caches and session tickets. We give a new generic construction that provably provides forward security and replay resilience, based on puncturable pseudorandom functions (PPRFs). We show that our construction can immediately be used in TLS 1.3 0-RTT and deployed unilaterally by servers, without requiring any changes to clients or the protocol. To this end, we present a generic composition of our new construction with TLS 1.3 and prove its security. This yields the first construction that achieves forward security for all messages, including the 0-RTT data. We then describe two new constructions of PPRFs, which are particularly suitable for use for forward-secure and replay-resilient session resumption in TLS 1.3. The first construction is based on the strong RSA assumption. Compared to standard session caches, for “128-bit security” it reduces the required server storage by a factor of almost 20, when instantiated in a way such that key derivation and puncturing together are cheaper on average than one full exponentiation in an RSA group. Hence, a 1 GB session cache can be replaced with only about 51 MBs of storage, which significantly reduces the amount of secure memory required. For larger security parameters or in exchange for more expensive computations, even larger storage reductions are achieved. The second construction combines a standard binary tree PPRF with a new “domain extension” technique. For a reasonable choice of parameters, this reduces the required storage by a factor of up to 5 compared to a standard session cache. It employs only symmetric cryptography, is suitable for high-traffic scenarios, and can serve thousands of tickets per second.

2021

JOFC

Bloom Filter Encryption and Applications to Efficient Forward-Secret 0-RTT Key Exchange
Abstract

Forward secrecy is considered an essential design goal of modern key establishment (KE) protocols, such as TLS 1.3, for example. Furthermore, efficiency considerations such as zero round-trip time (0-RTT), where a client is able to send cryptographically protected payload data along with the very first KE message, are motivated by the practical demand for secure low-latency communication. For a long time, it was unclear whether protocols that simultaneously achieve 0-RTT and full forward secrecy exist. Only recently, the first forward-secret 0-RTT protocol was described by Günther et al. ( Eurocrypt , 2017). It is based on puncturable encryption. Forward secrecy is achieved by “puncturing” the secret key after each decryption operation, such that a given ciphertext can only be decrypted once (cf. also Green and Miers, S&P 2015). Unfortunately, their scheme is completely impractical, since one puncturing operation takes between 30 s and several minutes for reasonable security and deployment parameters, such that this solution is only a first feasibility result, but not efficient enough to be deployed in practice. In this paper, we introduce a new primitive that we term Bloom filter encryption (BFE), which is derived from the probabilistic Bloom filter data structure. We describe different constructions of BFE schemes and show how these yield new puncturable encryption mechanisms with extremely efficient puncturing. Most importantly, a puncturing operation only involves a small number of very efficient computations, plus the deletion of certain parts of the secret key, which outperforms previous constructions by orders of magnitude. This gives rise to the first forward-secret 0-RTT protocols that are efficient enough to be deployed in practice. We believe that BFE will find applications beyond forward-secret 0-RTT protocols.

2019

EUROCRYPT

Session Resumption Protocols and Efficient Forward Security for TLS 1.3 0-RTT
📺
Abstract

The TLS 1.3 0-RTT mode enables a client reconnecting to a server to send encrypted application-layer data in “0-RTT” (“zero round-trip time”), without the need for a prior interactive handshake. This fundamentally requires the server to reconstruct the previous session’s encryption secrets upon receipt of the client’s first message. The standard techniques to achieve this are Session Caches or, alternatively, Session Tickets. The former provides forward security and resistance against replay attacks, but requires a large amount of server-side storage. The latter requires negligible storage, but provides no forward security and is known to be vulnerable to replay attacks.In this paper, we first formally define session resumption protocols as an abstract perspective on mechanisms like Session Caches and Session Tickets. We give a new generic construction that provably provides forward security and replay resilience, based on puncturable pseudorandom functions (PPRFs). This construction can immediately be used in TLS 1.3 0-RTT and deployed unilaterally by servers, without requiring any changes to clients or the protocol.We then describe two new constructions of PPRFs, which are particularly suitable for use for forward-secure and replay-resilient session resumption in TLS 1.3. The first construction is based on the strong RSA assumption. Compared to standard Session Caches, for “128-bit security” it reduces the required server storage by a factor of almost 20, when instantiated in a way such that key derivation and puncturing together are cheaper on average than one full exponentiation in an RSA group. Hence, a 1 GB Session Cache can be replaced with only about 51 MBs of storage, which significantly reduces the amount of secure memory required. For larger security parameters or in exchange for more expensive computations, even larger storage reductions are achieved. The second construction combines a standard binary tree PPRF with a new “domain extension” technique. For a reasonable choice of parameters, this reduces the required storage by a factor of up to 5 compared to a standard Session Cache. It employs only symmetric cryptography, is suitable for high-traffic scenarios, and can serve thousands of tickets per second.

2019

CRYPTO

Highly Efficient Key Exchange Protocols with Optimal Tightness
📺
Abstract

In this paper we give nearly-tight reductions for modern implicitly authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocols in the style of the Signal and Noise protocols, which are extremely simple and efficient. Unlike previous approaches, the combination of nearly-tight proofs and efficient protocols enables the first real-world instantiations for which the parameters can be chosen in a theoretically sound manner.Our reductions have only a linear loss in the number of users, implying that our protocols are more efficient than the state of the art when instantiated with theoretically sound parameters. We also prove that our security proofs are optimal: a linear loss in the number of users is unavoidable for our protocols for a large and natural class of reductions.

2019

JOFC

On Tight Security Proofs for Schnorr Signatures
Abstract

The Schnorr signature scheme is the most efficient signature scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem and a long line of research investigates the existence of a tight security reduction for this scheme in the random oracle model. Almost all recent works present lower tightness bounds and most recently Seurin EUROCRYPT 2012 showed that under certain assumptions the non -tight security proof for Schnorr signatures in the random oracle by Pointcheval and Stern EUROCRYPT’96 is essentially optimal. All previous works in this direction rule out tight reductions from the (one-more) discrete logarithm problem. In this paper, we introduce a new meta-reduction technique, which shows lower bounds for the large and very natural class of generic reductions. A generic reduction is independent of a particular representation of group elements. Most reductions in state-of-the-art security proofs have this property. It is desirable, because then the reduction applies generically to any concrete instantiation of the group. Our approach shows unconditionally that there is no tight generic reduction from any natural non-interactive computational problem $$\Pi $$ Π defined over algebraic groups to breaking Schnorr signatures, unless solving $$\Pi $$ Π is easy. In an additional application of the new meta-reduction technique, we also unconditionally rule out any (even non-tight) generic reduction from natural non-interactive computational problems defined over algebraic groups to breaking Schnorr signatures in the non-programmable random oracle model.

2018

EUROCRYPT

2018

CRYPTO

Practical and Tightly-Secure Digital Signatures and Authenticated Key Exchange
📺
Abstract

Tight security is increasingly gaining importance in real-world cryptography, as it allows to choose cryptographic parameters in a way that is supported by a security proof, without the need to sacrifice efficiency by compensating the security loss of a reduction with larger parameters. However, for many important cryptographic primitives, including digital signatures and authenticated key exchange (AKE), we are still lacking constructions that are suitable for real-world deployment.We construct the first truly practical signature scheme with tight security in a real-world multi-user setting with adaptive corruptions. The scheme is based on a new way of applying the Fiat-Shamir approach to construct tightly-secure signatures from certain identification schemes.Then we use this scheme as a building block to construct the first practical AKE protocol with tight security. It allows the establishment of a key within 1 RTT in a practical client-server setting, provides forward security, is simple and easy to implement, and thus very suitable for practical deployment. It is essentially the “signed Diffie-Hellman” protocol, but with an additional message, which is crucial to achieve tight security. This additional message is used to overcome a technical difficulty in constructing tightly-secure AKE protocols.For a theoretically-sound choice of parameters and a moderate number of users and sessions, our protocol has comparable computational efficiency to the simple signed Diffie-Hellman protocol with EC-DSA, while for large-scale settings our protocol has even better computational performance, at moderately increased communication complexity.

2018

ASIACRYPT

Short Digital Signatures and ID-KEMs via Truncation Collision Resistance
Abstract

Truncation collision resistance is a simple non-interactive complexity assumption that seems very plausible for standard cryptographic hash functions like SHA-3. We describe how this assumption can be leveraged to obtain standard-model constructions of public-key cryptosystems that previously seemed to require a programmable random oracle. This includes the first constructions of identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms (ID-KEMs) and digital signatures over bilinear groups with full adaptive security and without random oracles, where a ciphertext or signature consists of only a single element of a prime-order group. We also describe a generic construction of ID-KEMs with full adaptive security from a scheme with very weak security (“selective and non-adaptive chosen-ID security”), and a similar generic construction for digital signatures.

2018

ASIACRYPT

Simple and More Efficient PRFs with Tight Security from LWE and Matrix-DDH
Abstract

We construct efficient and tightly secure pseudorandom functions (PRFs) with only logarithmic security loss and short secret keys. This yields very simple and efficient variants of well-known constructions, including those of Naor-Reingold (FOCS 1997) and Lewko-Waters (ACM CCS 2009). Most importantly, in combination with the construction of Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen (EUROCRYPT 2012) we obtain the currently most efficient LWE-based PRF from a weak LWE-assumption with a much smaller modulus than the original construction. In comparison to the only previous construction with this property, which is due to Döttling and Schröder (CRYPTO 2015), we use a modulus of similar size, but only a single instance of the underlying PRF, instead of parallel instances, where is the security parameter. Like Döttling and Schröder, our security proof is only almost back-box, due to the fact that the number of queries made by the adversary and its advantage must be known a-priori.Technically, we introduce all-prefix universal hash functions (APUHFs), which are hash functions that are (almost-)universal, even if any prefix of the output is considered. We give simple and very efficient constructions of APUHFs, and show how they can be combined with the augmented cascade of Boneh et al. (ACM CCS 2010) to obtain our results. Along the way, we develop a new and more direct way to prove security of PRFs based on the augmented cascade.

2016

TCC

2010

PKC

#### Program Committees

- Crypto 2024
- Asiacrypt 2023
- Eurocrypt 2023
- Eurocrypt 2022
- Crypto 2022
- Crypto 2020
- PKC 2019
- PKC 2018
- PKC 2017
- Eurocrypt 2016
- PKC 2013

#### Coauthors

- Nimrod Aviram (2)
- Christoph Bader (2)
- Pascal Bemmann (1)
- Florian Bergsma (1)
- Florian Böhl (2)
- Colin Boyd (1)
- Rongmao Chen (1)
- Peter Chvojka (1)
- Katriel Cohn-Gordon (1)
- Cas Cremers (1)
- Gareth T. Davies (2)
- Hannah Elizabeth Davis (1)
- Bor de Kock (1)
- David Derler (2)
- Denis Diemert (4)
- Sebastian Faller (1)
- Nils Fleischhacker (2)
- Kai Gellert (8)
- Kristian Gjøsteen (3)
- Felix Günther (2)
- Britta Hale (1)
- Shuai Han (1)
- Tobias Handirk (1)
- Kristiyan Haralambiev (1)
- Julia Hesse (1)
- Felix Heuer (1)
- Dennis Hofheinz (9)
- Máté Horváth (1)
- Håkon Jacobsen (2)
- Tibor Jager (43)
- Dakshita Khurana (1)
- Eike Kiltz (6)
- Edward Knapp (1)
- Jessica Koch (2)
- Florian Kohlar (3)
- Rafael Kurek (3)
- Sebastian Lauer (1)
- Yong Li (2)
- Shengli Liu (1)
- Lin Lyu (2)
- Lise Millerjord (1)
- David Niehues (1)
- Jiaxin Pan (2)
- Doreen Riepel (2)
- Andy Rupp (2)
- Amit Sahai (1)
- Sven Schäge (7)
- Dominique Schröder (2)
- Jörg Schwenk (5)
- Jae Hong Seo (1)
- Victor Shoup (1)
- Daniel Slamanig (2)
- Martijn Stam (1)
- Ryan Stanley-Oakes (1)
- Christoph Striecks (4)
- Bogdan Warinschi (1)
- Brent Waters (1)
- Mark Zhandry (1)