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Formally Verifying Kyber Episode V: Machine-checked IND-CCA security and correctness of ML-KEM in EasyCrypt
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Conference: | CRYPTO 2024 |
Abstract: | We present a formally verified proof of the correctness and IND-CCA security of ML-KEM, the Kyber-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) undergoing standardization by NIST. The proof is machine-checked in EasyCrypt and it includes: 1) A formalization of the correctness (decryption failure probability) and IND-CPA security of the Kyber base public-key encryption scheme, following Bos et al. at Euro S&P 2018; 2) A formalization of the relevant variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform in the Random Oracle Model (ROM), which follows closely (but not exactly) Hofheinz, Hovelmanns and Kiltz at TCC 2017; 3) A proof that the IND-CCA security of the ML-KEM specification and its correctness as a KEM follows from the previous results; 4) Two formally verified implementations of ML-KEM written in Jasmin that are provably constant-time, functionally equivalent to the ML-KEM specification and, for this reason, inherit the provable security guarantees established in the previous points. The top-level theorems give self-contained concrete bounds for the correctness and security of ML-KEM down to (a variant of) Module-LWE. We discuss how they are built modularly by leveraging various EasyCrypt features. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{crypto-2024-34226, title={Formally Verifying Kyber Episode V: Machine-checked IND-CCA security and correctness of ML-KEM in EasyCrypt}, publisher={Springer-Verlag}, doi={10.1007/978-3-031-68379-4_12}, author={José Bacelar Almeida and Santiago Arranz Olmos and Manuel Barbosa and Gilles Barthe and Francois Dupressoir and Benjamin Gregoire and Vincent Laporte and Jean-Christophe Léchenet and Cameron Low and Tiago Oliveira and Hugo Pacheco and Miguel Quaresma and Peter Schwabe and Pierre-Yves Strub}, year=2024 }