CryptoDB
François Dupressoir
ORCID: 0000-0003-3497-3110
Publications
Year
Venue
Title
2024
CRYPTO
Formally Verifying Kyber Episode V: Machine-checked IND-CCA security and correctness of ML-KEM in EasyCrypt
Abstract
We present a formally verified proof of the correctness and IND-CCA security of ML-KEM, the Kyber-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) undergoing standardization by NIST.
The proof is machine-checked in EasyCrypt and it includes:
1) A formalization of the correctness (decryption failure probability) and IND-CPA security of the Kyber base public-key encryption scheme, following Bos et al. at Euro S&P 2018;
2) A formalization of the relevant variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform in the Random Oracle Model (ROM), which follows closely (but not exactly) Hofheinz, Hovelmanns and Kiltz at TCC 2017;
3) A proof that the IND-CCA security of the ML-KEM specification and its correctness as a KEM follows from the previous results;
4) Two formally verified implementations of ML-KEM written in Jasmin that are provably constant-time, functionally equivalent to the ML-KEM specification and, for this reason, inherit the provable security guarantees established in the previous points.
The top-level theorems give self-contained concrete bounds for the correctness and security of ML-KEM down to (a variant of) Module-LWE.
We discuss how they are built modularly by leveraging various EasyCrypt features.
2023
CRYPTO
Machine-Checked Security for XMSS as in RFC 8391 and SPHINCS+
Abstract
This work presents a novel machine-checked tight security proof for XMSS --- a stateful hash-based signature scheme that is (1) standardized in RFC 8391 and NIST SP 800-208, and (2) employed as a primary building block of SPHINCS+, one of the signature schemes recently selected for standardization as a result of NIST's post-quantum competition.
In 2020, Kudinov, Kiktenko, and Fedoro pointed out a flaw affecting the tight security proofs of SPHINCS+ and XMSS. For the case of SPHINCS+, this flaw was fixed in a subsequent tight security proof by Hülsing and Kudinov. Unfortunately, employing the fix from this proof to construct an analogous tight security proof for XMSS would merely demonstrate security with respect to an insufficient notion.
At the cost of modeling the message-hashing function as a random oracle, we complete the tight security proof for XMSS and formally verify it using the EasyCrypt proof assistant. (Note that this merely extends the use of the random oracle model, as this model is already required in other parts of the security analysis to justify the currently standardized parameter values). As part of this endeavor, we formally verify the crucial step common to the security proofs of SPHINCS+ and XMSS that was found to be flawed before, thereby confirming that the core of the aforementioned security proof by Hülsing and Kudinov is correct.
As this is the first work to formally verify proofs for hash-based signature schemes in EasyCrypt, we develop several novel libraries for the fundamental cryptographic concepts underlying such schemes --- e.g., hash functions and digital signature schemes --- establishing a common starting point for future formal verification efforts. These libraries will be particularly helpful in formally verifying proofs of other hash-based signature schemes such as LMS or SPHINCS+.
Program Committees
- Crypto 2022
- CHES 2021
- CHES 2019
Coauthors
- José Bacelar Almeida (2)
- Santiago Arranz Olmos (1)
- Manuel Barbosa (3)
- Gilles Barthe (5)
- Sonia Belaïd (1)
- François Dupressoir (6)
- Sebastian Faust (1)
- Pierre-Alain Fouque (2)
- Benjamin Grégoire (5)
- Andreas Hülsing (1)
- Vincent Laporte (1)
- Jean-Christophe Léchenet (1)
- Cameron Low (1)
- Matthias Meijers (1)
- Tiago Oliveira (1)
- Hugo Pacheco (1)
- Miguel Quaresma (1)
- Peter Schwabe (1)
- François-Xavier Standaert (1)
- Pierre-Yves Strub (4)
- Mehdi Tibouchi (1)
- Jean-Christophe Zapalowicz (1)