International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Emmanuel Prouff

Affiliation: ANSSI

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2019
TCHES
Deep Learning to Evaluate Secure RSA Implementations
This paper presents the results of several successful profiled side-channel attacks against a secure implementation of the RSA algorithm. The implementation was running on a ARM Core SC 100 completed with a certified EAL4+ arithmetic co-processor. The analyses have been conducted by three experts’ teams, each working on a specific attack path and exploiting information extracted either from the electromagnetic emanation or from the power consumption. A particular attention is paid to the description of all the steps that are usually followed during a security evaluation by a laboratory, including the acquisitions and the observations preprocessing which are practical issues usually put aside in the literature. Remarkably, the profiling portability issue is also taken into account and different device samples are involved for the profiling and testing phases. Among other aspects, this paper shows the high potential of deep learning attacks against secure implementations of RSA and raises the need for dedicated countermeasures.
2018
TCHES
Linear Repairing Codes and Side-Channel Attacks 📺
To strengthen the resistance of countermeasures based on secret sharing,several works have suggested to use the scheme introduced by Shamir in 1978, which proposes to use the evaluation of a random d-degree polynomial into n ≥ d + 1 public points to share the sensitive data. Applying the same principles used against the classical Boolean sharing, all these works have assumed that the most efficient attack strategy was to exploit the minimum number of shares required to rebuild the sensitive value; which is d + 1 if the reconstruction is made with Lagrange’s interpolation. In this paper, we highlight first an important difference between Boolean and Shamir’s sharings which implies that, for some signal-to-noise ratio, it is more advantageous for the adversary to observe strictly more than d + 1 shares. We argue that this difference is related to the existence of so-called linear exact repairing codes, which themselves come with reconstruction formulae that need (much) less information (counted in bits) than Lagrange’s interpolation. In particular, this result implies that the choice of the public points in Shamir’s sharing has an impact on the countermeasure strength, which confirms previous observations made by Wang et al. at CARDIS 2016 for the so-called inner product sharing which is a generalization of Shamir’s scheme. As another contribution, we exhibit a positive impact of the existence of linear exact repairing schemes; we indeed propose to use them to improve the state-of-the-art multiplication algorithms dedicated to Shamir’s sharing. We argue that the improvement can be effective when the multiplication operation in the sub-fields is at least two times smaller than that of the base field.
2017
CRYPTO
2017
CHES
Convolutional Neural Networks with Data Augmentation Against Jitter-Based Countermeasures
Eleonora Cagli Cécile Dumas Emmanuel Prouff
In the context of the security evaluation of cryptographic implementations, profiling attacks (aka Template Attacks) play a fundamental role. Nowadays the most popular Template Attack strategy consists in approximating the information leakages by Gaussian distributions. Nevertheless this approach suffers from the difficulty to deal with both the traces misalignment and the high dimensionality of the data. This forces the attacker to perform critical preprocessing phases, such as the selection of the points of interest and the realignment of measurements. Some software and hardware countermeasures have been conceived exactly to create such a misalignment. In this paper we propose an end-to-end profiling attack strategy based on the Convolutional Neural Networks: this strategy greatly facilitates the attack roadmap, since it does not require a previous trace realignment nor a precise selection of points of interest. To significantly increase the performances of the CNN, we moreover propose to equip it with the data augmentation technique that is classical in other applications of Machine Learning. As a validation, we present several experiments against traces misaligned by different kinds of countermeasures, including the augmentation of the clock jitter effect in a secure hardware implementation over a modern chip. The excellent results achieved in these experiments prove that Convolutional Neural Networks approach combined with data augmentation gives a very efficient alternative to the state-of-the-art profiling attacks.
2016
EUROCRYPT
2016
CHES
2016
CHES
2016
EUROCRYPT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
EPRINT
2015
CRYPTO
2015
CHES
2014
CHES
2014
CHES
2013
CHES
2013
ASIACRYPT
2013
EUROCRYPT
2013
FSE
2012
FSE
2011
CHES
2011
CHES
2011
JOFC
2010
EPRINT
First-Order Side-Channel Attacks on the Permutation Tables Countermeasure –Extended Version–
Emmanuel Prouff Robert McEvoy
The use of random permutation tables as a side-channel attack countermeasure was recently proposed by Coron [6]. The countermeasure operates by ensuring that during the execution of an algorithm, each intermediate variable that is handled is in a permuted form described by the random permutation tables. In this paper, we examine the application of this countermeasure to the AES algorithm as described in [6], and show that certain operations admit first-order side-channel leakage. New side-channel attacks are developed to exploit these flaws, using correlation-based and mutual information-based methods. The attacks have been verified in simulation, and in practice on a smart card.
2010
EPRINT
Provably Secure Higher-Order Masking of AES
Matthieu Rivain Emmanuel Prouff
Implementations of cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to Side Channel Analysis (SCA). To counteract it, masking schemes are usually involved which randomize key-dependent data by the addition of one or several random value(s) (the masks). When $d$th-order masking is involved (i.e. when $d$ masks are used per key-dependent variable), the complexity of performing an SCA grows exponentially with the order $d$. The design of generic $d$th-order masking schemes taking the order $d$ as security parameter is therefore of great interest for the physical security of cryptographic implementations. This paper presents the first generic $d$th-order masking scheme for AES with a provable security and a reasonable software implementation overhead. Our scheme is based on the hardware-oriented masking scheme published by Ishai et al. at Crypto 2003. Compared to this scheme, our solution can be efficiently implemented in software on any general-purpose processor. This result is of importance considering the lack of solution for $d\geq 3$.
2010
CHES
2009
CHES
2009
CHES
2008
FSE
2008
EPRINT
Block Ciphers Implementations Provably Secure Against Second Order Side Channel Analysis
In the recent years, side channel analysis has received a lot of attention, and attack techniques have been improved. Side channel analysis of second order is now successful in breaking implementations of block ciphers supposed to be effectively protected. This progress shows not only the practicability of second order attacks, but also the need for provably secure countermeasures. Surprisingly, while many studies have been dedicated to the attacks, only a few papers have been published about the dedicated countermeasures. In fact, only the method proposed by Schramm and Paar at CT-RSA 2006 enables to thwart second order side channel analysis. In this paper, we introduce two new methods which constitute a worthwhile alternative to Schramm and Paar's proposition. We prove their security in a strong security model and we exhibit a way to signifficantly improve their efficiency by using the particularities of the targeted architectures. Finally, we argue that the introduced methods allow to efficiently protect a wide variety of block ciphers, including AES.
2008
CHES
2007
CHES
2006
CHES
2005
FSE
DPA Attacks and S-Boxes
Emmanuel Prouff
2005
EPRINT
A New Approach to Counteract DPA Attacks on Block Ciphers
Christophe Giraud Emmanuel Prouff
Since the publication of Differential Power Analysis (DPA) in 1998, many countermeasures have been published to counteract this very efficient kind of attacks. All these countermeasures follow the same approach : they try to make sensitive operations uncorrelated with the input. Such a method is very costly in terms of both timing and memory space. In this paper, we suggest a new approach where block ciphers are designed to inherently thwart DPA attacks. The idea we develop in this paper is based on a theoretical analysis of DPA attacks and it essentially consists in embedding existing iterated block ciphers in a secure layer. We analyse the security of our proposal and we show that it induces very small overheads.
2003
FSE

Program Committees

CHES 2019
CHES 2018
Eurocrypt 2017
CHES 2017
CHES 2016
CHES 2015
Eurocrypt 2015
Eurocrypt 2014
CHES 2014
Asiacrypt 2014
CHES 2013
CHES 2012
CHES 2010
CHES 2008