International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Ling Qin


CSI-Otter: Isogeny-based (Partially) Blind Signatures from the Class Group Action with a Twist
In this paper, we construct the first provably-secure isogeny-based (partially) blind signature scheme. While at a high level the scheme resembles the Schnorr blind signature, our work does not directly follow from that construction, since isogenies do not offer as rich an algebraic structure. Specifically, our protocol does not fit into the linear identification protocol abstraction introduced by Hauck, Kiltz, and Loss (EUROCYRPT’19), which was used to generically construct Schnorr-like blind signatures based on modules such as classical groups and lattices. Consequently, our scheme does not seem susceptible to the recent efficient ROS attack exploiting the linear nature of the underlying mathematical tool. In more detail, our blind signature exploits the quadratic twist of an elliptic curve in an essential way to endow isogenies with a strictly richer structure than abstract group actions (but still more restrictive than modules). The basic scheme has public key size 128 B and signature size 8 KB under the CSIDH-512 parameter sets—these are the smallest among all provably secure post-quantum secure blind signatures. Relying on a new ring variant of the group action inverse problem (rGAIP), we can halve the signature size to 4 KB while increasing the public key size to 512 B. We provide preliminary cryptanalysis of rGAIP and show that for certain parameter settings, it is essentially as secure as the standard GAIP. Finally, we show a novel way to turn our blind signature into a partially blind signature, where we deviate from prior methods since they require hashing into the set of public keys while hiding the corresponding secret key—constructing such a hash function in the isogeny setting remains an open problem.
Cube-like Attack on Round-Reduced Initialization of Ketje Sr
This paper studies the Keccak-based authenticated encryption (AE) scheme Ketje Sr against cube-like attacks. Ketje is one of the remaining 16 candidates of third round CAESAR competition, whose primary recommendation is Ketje Sr. Although the cube-like method has been successfully applied to Ketje’s sister ciphers, including Keccak-MAC and Keyak – another Keccak-based AE scheme, similar attacks are missing for Ketje. For Ketje Sr, the state (400-bit) is much smaller than Keccak-MAC and Keyak (1600-bit), thus the 128-bit key and cubes with the same dimension would occupy more lanes in Ketje Sr. Hence, the number of key bits independent of the cube sum is very small, which makes the divide-and-conquer method (it has been applied to 7-round attack on Keccak-MAC by Dinur et al.) can not be translated to Ketje Sr trivially. This property seems to be the barrier for the translation of the previous cube-like attacks to Ketje Sr. In this paper, we evaluate Ketje Sr against the divide-and-conquer method. Firstly, by applying the linear structure technique, we find some 32/64-dimension cubes of Ketje Sr that do not multiply with each other as well as some bits of the key in the first round. In addition, we introduce the new dynamic variable instead of the auxiliary variable (it was used in Dinur et al.’s divide-and-conquer attack to reduce the diffusion of the key) to reduce the diffusion of the key as well as the cube variables. Finally, we successfully launch a 6/7-round1 key recovery attack on Ketje Sr v1 and v2 (v2 is presented for the 3rd round CAESAR competition.). In 7-round attack, the complexity of online phase for Ketje Sr v1 is 2113, while for Ketje Sr v2, it is 297 (the preprocessing complexity is the same). We claim 7-round reduced Ketje Sr v2 is weaker than v1 against our attacks. In addition, some results on other Ketje instances and Ketje Sr with smaller nonce are given. Those are the first results on Ketje and bridge the gaps of cryptanalysis between its sister ciphers – Keyak and the Keccak keyed modes.