## CryptoDB

### Yi-Fu Lai

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2024

PKC

Breaking Parallel ROS: Implication for Isogeny and Lattice-based Blind Signatures
Abstract

Many of the three-round blind signatures based on identification protocols are only proven to be $\ell$-concurrently unforgeable for $\ell = \polylog(\secpar)$. It was only recently shown in a seminal work by Benhamouda et al.~(EUROCRYPT'21) that this is not just a limitation of the proof technique. They proposed an elegant polynomial time attack against the $\ell$-concurrently unforgeability of the classical blind Schnorr protocol for $\ell = \poly(\secpar)$. However, there are still many blind signatures following a similar recipe to blind Schnorr where the attack by Benhamouda et al. does not apply. This includes for instance the isogeny-based blind signature CSI-Otter by Katsumata et al (CRYPTO'23), the lattice-based blind signatures BLAZE+ by Alkeilani et al (ACISP'20) and BlindOR by Alkeilani et al (CANS'20).
In this work, we provide a simple and novel attack on blind signatures based on identification protocols performing \emph{parallel repetition} to reduce the soundness error. Our attack translates to a polynomial time break for the $\ell$-concurrent unforgeability of CSI-Otter, BLAZE+, and BlindOR for $\ell = \poly(\secpar)$. More formally, we define an intermediate problem called Parallel Random inhomogeneities in an Overdetermined Solvable system of linear equations ($\pROS$) problem and show that an attack against $\pROS$ implies an attack to the above blind signatures. One takeaway of our finding is that while parallel repetition allows to exponentially reduce the soundness error of an identification protocol, this has minimal effect on the resulting blind signature.Our attack is concretely very efficient and for instance breaks 4-concurrent unforgeability of CSI-Otter in time roughly 2^{34} hash computations.

2024

PKC

A Simpler and More Efficient Reduction of DLOG to CDH for Abelian Group Actions
Abstract

Abelian group actions appear in several areas of cryptography, especially isogeny-based post-quantum cryptography. A natural problem is to relate the analogues of the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and discrete logarithm (DLOG) problems for abelian group actions. Galbraith, Panny, Smith and Vercauteren (Mathematical Cryptology '21) gave a quantum reduction of DLOG to CDH, assuming a CDH oracle with perfect correctness. Montgomery and Zhandry (Asiacrypt '22, best paper award) showed how to convert an unreliable CDH circuit into one that is correct with overwhelming probability. However, while a theoretical breakthrough, their reduction is quite inefficient: if the CDH oracle is correct with probability $q$ then their algorithm to amplify the success requires on the order of $1/q^{21}$ calls to the CDH oracle.
We revisit this line of work and give a much simpler and tighter algorithm. Our method only takes on the order of $1/q^{4}$ CDH oracle calls and is much conceptually simpler than the Montgonery-Zhandry reduction. Our algorithm is also fully black-box, whereas the Montgomery-Zhandry algorithm is slightly non-black-box. Our main tool is a thresholding technique that replaces the comparison of distributions in Montgomery-Zhandry with testing equality of thresholded sets.
We also give evidence that $1/q^{2}$ calls to the CDH oracle (or perhaps even more) is necessary, showing that it will be potentially difficult to substantially improve our method further.

2023

CRYPTO

CSI-Otter: Isogeny-based (Partially) Blind Signatures from the Class Group Action with a Twist
Abstract

In this paper, we construct the first provably-secure isogeny-based (partially) blind signature scheme. While at a high level the scheme resembles the Schnorr blind signature, our work does not directly follow from that construction, since isogenies do not offer as rich an algebraic structure. Specifically, our protocol does not fit into the linear identification protocol abstraction introduced by Hauck, Kiltz, and Loss (EUROCYRPT’19), which was used to generically construct Schnorr-like blind signatures based on modules such as classical groups and lattices. Consequently, our scheme does not seem susceptible to the recent efficient ROS attack exploiting the linear nature of the underlying mathematical tool.
In more detail, our blind signature exploits the quadratic twist of an elliptic curve in an essential way to endow isogenies with a strictly richer structure than abstract group actions (but still more restrictive than modules). The basic scheme has public key size 128 B and signature size 8 KB under the CSIDH-512 parameter sets—these are the smallest among all provably secure post-quantum secure blind signatures. Relying on a new ring variant of the group action inverse problem (rGAIP), we can halve the signature size to 4 KB while increasing the public key size to 512 B. We provide preliminary cryptanalysis of rGAIP and show that for certain parameter settings, it is essentially as secure as the standard GAIP. Finally, we show a novel way to turn our blind signature into a partially blind signature, where we deviate from prior methods since they require hashing into the set of public keys while hiding the corresponding secret key—constructing such a hash function in the isogeny setting remains an open problem.

2022

EUROCRYPT

Group Signature and More from Isogenies and Lattices: Generic, Simple, and Efficient
📺
Abstract

We construct an efficient dynamic group signature (or more generally an accountable ring signature) from isogeny and lattice assumptions. Our group signature is based on a simple generic construction that can be instantiated by cryptographically hard group actions such as the CSIDH group action or an MLWE-based group action. The signature is of size $O(¥log N)$, where $N$ is the number of users in the group. Our idea builds on the recent efficient OR-proof by Beullens, Katsumata, and Pintore (Asiacrypt'20), where we efficiently add a proof of valid ciphertext to their OR-proof and further show that the resulting non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system is ¥emph{online extractable}.
Our group signatures satisfy more ideal security properties compared to previously known constructions, while simultaneously having an attractive signature size. The signature size of our isogeny-based construction is an order of magnitude smaller than all previously known post-quantum group signatures (e.g., 6.6 KB for 64 members). In comparison, our lattice-based construction has a larger signature size (e.g., either 126 KB or 89 KB for 64 members depending on the satisfied security property). However, since the $O(¥cdot)$-notation hides a very small constant factor, it remains small even for very large group sizes, say $2^{20}$.

2021

EUROCRYPT

Compact, Efficient and UC-Secure Isogeny-Based Oblivious Transfer
📺
Abstract

Oblivious transfer (OT) is an essential cryptographic tool that can serve as a building block for almost all secure multiparty functionalities. The strongest security notion against malicious adversaries is universal composability (UC-secure).
An important goal is to have post-quantum OT protocols. One area of interest for post-quantum cryptography is isogeny-based crypto. Isogeny-based cryptography has some similarities to Diffie-Hellman, but lacks some algebraic properties that are needed for discrete-log-based OT protocols. Hence it is not always possible to directly adapt existing protocols to the isogeny setting.
We propose the first practical isogeny-based UC-secure oblivious transfer protocol in the presence of malicious adversaries. Our scheme uses the CSIDH framework and does not have an analogue in the Diffie-Hellman setting. The scheme consists of a constant number of isogeny computations. The underlying computational assumption is a problem that we call the computational reciprocal CSIDH problem, and that we prove polynomial-time equivalent to the computational CSIDH problem.

#### Coauthors

- Ward Beullens (1)
- Samuel Dobson (1)
- Steven D. Galbraith (2)
- Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem (1)
- Shuichi Katsumata (3)
- Yi-Fu Lai (5)
- Jason T. LeGrow (1)
- Hart Montgomery (1)
- Federico Pintore (1)
- Ling Qin (1)
- Michael Reichle (1)