International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Xavier Bonnetain

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2020
EUROCRYPT
Quantum Security Analysis of CSIDH
Xavier Bonnetain André Schrottenloher
CSIDH is a recent proposal for post-quantum non-interactive key-exchange, based on supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. It is similar in design to a previous scheme by Couveignes, Rostovtsev and Stolbunov, but aims at an improved balance between efficiency and security. In the proposal, the authors suggest concrete parameters in order to meet some desired levels of quantum security. These parameters are based on the hardness of recovering a hidden isogeny between two elliptic curves, using a quantum subexponential algorithm of Childs, Jao and Soukharev. This algorithm combines two building blocks: first, a quantum algorithm for recovering a hidden shift in a commutative group. Second, a computation in superposition of all isogenies originating from a given curve, which the algorithm calls as a black box. In this paper, we give a comprehensive security analysis of CSIDH. Our first step is to revisit three quantum algorithms for the abelian hidden shift problem from the perspective of non-asymptotic cost, with trade-offs between their quantum and classical complexities. Second, we complete the non-asymptotic study of the black box in the hidden shift algorithm. We give a quantum procedure that evaluates CSIDH-512 using less than 40~000 logical qubits. This allows us to show that the parameters proposed by the authors of CSIDH do not meet their expected quantum security.
2019
TOSC
Quantum Security Analysis of AES
In this paper we analyze for the first time the post-quantum security of AES. AES is the most popular and widely used block cipher, established as the encryption standard by the NIST in 2001. We consider the secret key setting and, in particular, AES-256, the recommended primitive and one of the few existing ones that aims at providing a post-quantum security of 128 bits. In order to determine the new security margin, i.e., the lowest number of non-attacked rounds in time less than 2128 encryptions, we first provide generalized and quantized versions of the best known cryptanalysis on reduced-round AES, as well as a discussion on attacks that don’t seem to benefit from a significant quantum speed-up. We propose a new framework for structured search that encompasses both the classical and quantum attacks we present, and allows to efficiently compute their complexity. We believe this framework will be useful for future analysis.Our best attack is a quantum Demirci-Selçuk meet-in-the-middle attack. Unexpectedly, using the ideas underlying its design principle also enables us to obtain new, counter-intuitive classical TMD trade-offs. In particular, we can reduce the memory in some attacks against AES-256 and AES-128.One of the building blocks of our attacks is solving efficiently the AES S-Box differential equation, with respect to the quantum cost of a reversible S-Box. We believe that this generic quantum tool will be useful for future quantum differential attacks. Judging by the results obtained so far, AES seems a resistant primitive in the post-quantum world as well as in the classical one, with a bigger security margin with respect to quantum generic attacks.
2019
ASIACRYPT
Anomalies and Vector Space Search: Tools for S-Box Analysis
Xavier Bonnetain Léo Perrin Shizhu Tian
S-boxes are functions with an input so small that the simplest way to specify them is their lookup table (LUT). How can we quantify the distance between the behavior of a given S-box and that of an S-box picked uniformly at random?To answer this question, we introduce various “anomalies”. These real numbers are such that a property with an anomaly equal to a should be found roughly once in a set of $$2^{a}$$ random S-boxes. First, we present statistical anomalies based on the distribution of the coefficients in the difference distribution table, linear approximation table, and for the first time, the boomerang connectivity table.We then count the number of S-boxes that have block-cipher like structures to estimate the anomaly associated to those. In order to recover these structures, we show that the most general tool for decomposing S-boxes is an algorithm efficiently listing all the vector spaces of a given dimension contained in a given set, and we present such an algorithm.Combining these approaches, we conclude that all permutations that are actually picked uniformly at random always have essentially the same cryptographic properties and the same lack of structure.
2019
ASIACRYPT
Quantum Attacks Without Superposition Queries: The Offline Simon’s Algorithm
In symmetric cryptanalysis, the model of superposition queries has led to surprising results, with many constructions being broken in polynomial time thanks to Simon’s period-finding algorithm. But the practical implications of these attacks remain blurry. In contrast, the results obtained so far for a quantum adversary making classical queries only are less impressive.In this paper, we introduce a new quantum algorithm which uses Simon’s subroutines in a novel way. We manage to leverage the algebraic structure of cryptosystems in the context of a quantum attacker limited to classical queries and offline quantum computations. We obtain improved quantum-time/classical-data tradeoffs with respect to the current literature, while using only as much hardware requirements (quantum and classical) as a standard exhaustive search with Grover’s algorithm. In particular, we are able to break the Even-Mansour construction in quantum time $$\tilde{O}(2^{n/3})$$, with $$O(2^{n/3})$$ classical queries and $$O(n^2)$$ qubits only. In addition, we improve some previous superposition attacks by reducing the data complexity from exponential to polynomial, with the same time complexity.Our approach can be seen in two complementary ways: reusing superposition queries during the iteration of a search using Grover’s algorithm, or alternatively, removing the memory requirement in some quantum attacks based on a collision search, thanks to their algebraic structure.We provide a list of cryptographic applications, including the Even-Mansour construction, the FX construction, some Sponge authenticated modes of encryption, and many more.
2018
ASIACRYPT
Hidden Shift Quantum Cryptanalysis and Implications
Xavier Bonnetain María Naya-Plasencia
At Eurocrypt 2017 a tweak to counter Simon’s quantum attack was proposed: replace the common bitwise addition with other operations, as a modular addition. The starting point of our paper is a follow up of these previous results:First, we have developed new algorithms that improves and generalizes Kuperberg’s algorithm for the hidden shift problem, which is the algorithm that applies instead of Simon when considering modular additions. Thanks to our improved algorithm, we have been able to build a quantum attack in the superposition model on Poly1305, proposed at FSE 2005, widely used and claimed to be quantumly secure. We also answer an open problem by analyzing the effect of the tweak to the FX construction.We have also generalized the algorithm. We propose for the first time a quantum algorithm for solving the hidden problem with parallel modular additions, with a complexity that matches both Simon and Kuperberg in its extremes.In order to verify our theoretical analysis, and to get concrete estimates of the cost of the algorithms, we have simulated them, and were able to validate our estimated complexities.Finally, we analyze the security of some classical symmetric constructions with concrete parameters, to evaluate the impact and practicality of the proposed tweak. We concluded that the tweak does not seem to be efficient.