CryptoDB
Dipayan Das
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ORCID: 0000-0002-7681-1868
Publications
Year
Venue
Title
2024
EUROCRYPT
Key Recovery Attack on the Partial Vandermonde Knapsack Problem
Abstract
The Partial Vandermonde (PV) Knapsack problem is an algebraic variant of the low-density inhomogeneous SIS problem. The problem has been used as a building block for various lattice-based constructions, including signatures (ACNS'14, ACISP'18), encryptions (DCC'15,DCC'20), and signature aggregation (Eprint'20). At Crypto'22, Boudgoust, Gachon, and Pellet-Mary proposed a key distinguishing attack on the PV Knapsack exploiting algebraic properties of the problem. Unfortunately, their attack doesn't offer key recovery, except for worst-case keys.
In this paper, we propose an alternative attack on the PV Knapsack problem, which provides key recovery for a much larger set of keys. Like the Crypto'22 attack, it is based on lattice reduction and uses a dimension reduction technique to speed-up the underlying lattice reduction algorithm and enhance its performance. As a side bonus, our attack transforms the PV Knapsack problem into uSVP instances instead of SVP instances in the Crypto'22 attack. This also helps the lattice reduction algorithm, both from a theoretical and practical point of view.
We use our attack to re-assess the hardness of the concrete parameters used in the literature. It appears that many contain a non-negligible fraction of weak keys, which are easily identified and extremely susceptible to our attack. For example, a fraction of $2^{-19}$ of the public keys of a parameter set from ACISP'18 can be solved in about $30$ hours on a moderate server using off-the-shelf lattice reduction. This parameter set was initially claimed to have a $129$-bit security against key recovery attack. Its security was reduced to $87$-bit security using the distinguishing attack from Crypto'22. Similarly, the ACNS'14 proposal also includes a parameter set containing a fraction of $2^{-19}$ of weak keys; those can be solved in about $17$ hours.
2023
EUROCRYPT
On the Hardness of the Finite Field Isomorphism Problem
Abstract
The finite field isomorphism $(\ffi)$ problem was introduced in PKC'18, as an alternative to average-case lattice problems (like $\lwe$, $\sis$, or $\NTRU$). As an application, the same paper used the $\ffi$ problem to construct a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. In this work, we prove that the decision variant of the $\ffi$ problem can be solved in polynomial time for any field characteristics $q= \Omega(\beta n^2)$, where $q,\beta,n$ parametrize the $\ffi$ problem. Then we use our result from the $\ffi$ distinguisher to propose polynomial-time attacks on the semantic security of the fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Furthermore, for completeness, we also study the search variant of the $\ffi$ problem and show how to state it as a $q$-ary lattice problem, which was previously unknown. As a result, we can solve the search problem for some previously intractable parameters using a simple lattice reduction approach.
2020
PKC
MPSign: A Signature from Small-Secret Middle-Product Learning with Errors
📺
Abstract
We describe a digital signature scheme $$mathsf {MPSign}$$ , whose security relies on the conjectured hardness of the Polynomial Learning With Errors problem ( $$mathsf {PLWE}$$ ) for at least one defining polynomial within an exponential-size family (as a function of the security parameter). The proposed signature scheme follows the Fiat-Shamir framework and can be viewed as the Learning With Errors counterpart of the signature scheme described by Lyubashevsky at Asiacrypt 2016, whose security relies on the conjectured hardness of the Polynomial Short Integer Solution ( $$mathsf {PSIS}$$ ) problem for at least one defining polynomial within an exponential-size family. As opposed to the latter, $$mathsf {MPSign}$$ enjoys a security proof from $$mathsf {PLWE}$$ that is tight in the quantum-access random oracle model. The main ingredient is a reduction from $$mathsf {PLWE}$$ for an arbitrary defining polynomial among exponentially many, to a variant of the Middle-Product Learning with Errors problem ( $$mathsf {MPLWE}$$ ) that allows for secrets that are small compared to the working modulus. We present concrete parameters for $$mathsf {MPSign}$$ using such small secrets, and show that they lead to significant savings in signature length over Lyubashevsky’s Asiacrypt 2016 scheme (which uses larger secrets) at typical security levels. As an additional small contribution, and in contrast to $$mathsf {MPSign}$$ (or $$mathsf {MPLWE}$$ ), we present an efficient key-recovery attack against Lyubashevsky’s scheme (or the inhomogeneous $$mathsf {PSIS}$$ problem), when it is used with sufficiently small secrets, showing the necessity of a lower bound on secret size for the security of that scheme.
2019
ASIACRYPT
Middle-Product Learning with Rounding Problem and Its Applications
Abstract
At CRYPTO 2017, Roşca et al. introduce a new variant of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, called the Middle-Product LWE (
$${\mathrm {MP}\text {-}\mathrm{LWE}}$$
). The hardness of this new assumption is based on the hardness of the Polynomial LWE (P-LWE) problem parameterized by a set of polynomials, making it more secure against the possible weakness of a single defining polynomial. As a cryptographic application, they also provide an encryption scheme based on the
$${\mathrm {MP}\text {-}\mathrm{LWE}}$$
problem. In this paper, we propose a deterministic variant of their encryption scheme, which does not need Gaussian sampling and is thus simpler than the original one. Still, it has the same quasi-optimal asymptotic key and ciphertext sizes. The main ingredient for this purpose is the Learning With Rounding (LWR) problem which has already been used to derandomize LWE type encryption. The hardness of our scheme is based on a new assumption called Middle-Product Computational Learning With Rounding, an adaption of the computational LWR problem over rings, introduced by Chen et al. at ASIACRYPT 2018. We prove that this new assumption is as hard as the decisional version of MP-LWE and thus benefits from worst-case to average-case hardness guarantees.
Coauthors
- Shi Bai (2)
- Katharina Boudgoust (1)
- Dipayan Das (4)
- Ryo Hiromasa (1)
- Antoine Joux (2)
- Miruna Rosca (1)
- Adeline Roux-Langlois (1)
- Amin Sakzad (1)
- Damien Stehlé (1)
- Ron Steinfeld (1)
- Weiqiang Wen (1)
- Zhenfei Zhang (2)