## CryptoDB

### Prasanna Ravi

#### Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2022
TCHES
We focus on the multiple persistent faults analysis in this paper to fill existing gaps in its application in a variety of scenarios. Our major contributions are twofold. First, we propose a novel technique to apply persistent fault apply in the multiple persistent faults setting that decreases the number of survived keys and the required data. We demonstrate that by utilizing 1509 and 1448 ciphertexts, the number of survived keys after performing persistent fault analysis on AES in the presence of eight and sixteen faults can be reduced to only $2^9$ candidates, whereas the best known attacks need 2008 and 1643 ciphertexts, respectively, with a time complexity of $2^{50}$. Second, we develop generalized frameworks for retrieving the key in the ciphertext-only model. Our methods for both performing persistent fault attacks and key-recovery processes are highly flexible and provide a general trade-off between the number of required ciphertexts and the time complexity. To break AES with 16 persistent faults in the Sbox, our experiments show that the number of required ciphertexts can be decreased to 477 while the attack is still practical with respect to the time complexity. To confirm the accuracy of our methods, we performed several simulations as well as experimental validations on the ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller with electromagnetic fault injection on AES and LED, which are two well-known block ciphers to validate the types of faults and the distribution of the number of faults in practice.
2022
TCHES
In this work, we propose generic and novel side-channel assisted chosen-ciphertext attacks on NTRU-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). These KEMs are IND-CCA secure, that is, they are secure in the chosen-ciphertext model. Our attacks involve the construction of malformed ciphertexts. When decapsulated by the target device, these ciphertexts ensure that a targeted intermediate variable becomes very closely related to the secret key. An attacker, who can obtain information about the secret-dependent variable through side-channels, can subsequently recover the full secret key. We propose several novel CCAs which can be carried through by using side-channel leakage from the decapsulation procedure. The attacks instantiate three different types of oracles, namely a plaintext-checking oracle, a decryption-failure oracle, and a full-decryption oracle, and are applicable to two NTRU-based schemes, which are NTRU and NTRU Prime. The two schemes are candidates in the ongoing NIST standardization process for post-quantum cryptography. We perform experimental validation of the attacks on optimized and unprotected implementations of NTRU-based schemes, taken from the open-source pqm4 library, using the EM-based side-channel on the $32$-bit ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. All of our proposed attacks are capable of recovering the full secret key in only a few thousand chosen ciphertext queries on all parameter sets of NTRU and NTRU Prime. Our attacks, therefore, stress on the need for concrete side-channel protection strategies for NTRU-based KEMs.
2022
TCHES
Persistent Fault Analysis (PFA) is an innovative and powerful analysis technique in which fault persists throughout the execution. The prior prominent results on PFA were on SPN block ciphers, and the security of Feistel ciphers against this attack has received less attention. In this paper, we introduce a framework to utilize Statistical Ineffective Fault Analysis (SIFA) in the persistent fault setting by proposing Statistical Ineffective Persistent Faults Analysis (SIPFA) that can be efficiently applied to Feistel ciphers in a variety of scenarios. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique, we apply SIFPA on three widely used Feistel schemes, DES, 3DES, and Camellia. Our analysis reveals that the secret key of these block ciphers can be extracted with a complexity of at most $2^{50}$ utilizing a single unknown fault. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the secret can be recovered in a fraction of a second by increasing the adversary's control over the injected faults. To evaluate SIPFA in a variety of scenarios, we conducted both simulations and real experiments utilizing electromagnetic fault injection on DES and 3DES.
2021
TCHES
We focus on the multiple persistent faults analysis in this paper to fill existing gaps in its application in a variety of scenarios. Our major contributions are twofold. First, we propose a novel technique to apply persistent fault apply in the multiple persistent faults setting that decreases the number of survived keys and the required data. We demonstrate that by utilizing 1509 and 1448 ciphertexts, the number of survived keys after performing persistent fault analysis on AES in the presence of eight and sixteen faults can be reduced to only 29 candidates, whereas the best known attacks need 2008 and 1643 ciphertexts, respectively, with a time complexity of 250. Second, we develop generalized frameworks for retrieving the key in the ciphertext-only model. Our methods for both performing persistent fault attacks and key-recovery processes are highly flexible and provide a general trade-off between the number of required ciphertexts and the time complexity. To break AES with 16 persistent faults in the Sbox, our experiments show that the number of required ciphertexts can be decreased to 477 while the attack is still practical with respect to the time complexity. To confirm the accuracy of our methods, we performed several simulations as well as experimental validations on the ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller with electromagnetic fault injection on AES and LED, which are two well-known block ciphers to validate the types of faults and the distribution of the number of faults in practice.
2021
TCHES
In this work, we propose generic and novel side-channel assisted chosenciphertext attacks on NTRU-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). These KEMs are IND-CCA secure, that is, they are secure in the chosen-ciphertext model. Our attacks involve the construction of malformed ciphertexts. When decapsulated by the target device, these ciphertexts ensure that a targeted intermediate variable becomes very closely related to the secret key. An attacker, who can obtain information about the secret-dependent variable through side-channels, can subsequently recover the full secret key. We propose several novel CCAs which can be carried through by using side-channel leakage from the decapsulation procedure. The attacks instantiate three different types of oracles, namely a plaintext-checking oracle, a decryptionfailure oracle, and a full-decryption oracle, and are applicable to two NTRU-based schemes, which are NTRU and NTRU Prime. The two schemes are candidates in the ongoing NIST standardization process for post-quantum cryptography. We perform experimental validation of the attacks on optimized and unprotected implementations of NTRU-based schemes, taken from the open-source pqm4 library, using the EM-based side-channel on the 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. All of our proposed attacks are capable of recovering the full secret key in only a few thousand chosen ciphertext queries on all parameter sets of NTRU and NTRU Prime. Our attacks, therefore, stress on the need for concrete side-channel protection strategies for NTRUbased KEMs.
2020
TCHES
In this work, we demonstrate generic and practical EM side-channel assisted chosen ciphertext attacks over multiple LWE/LWR-based Public Key Encryption (PKE) and Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM) secure in the chosen ciphertext model (IND-CCA security). We show that the EM side-channel information can be efficiently utilized to instantiate a plaintext checking oracle, which provides binary information about the output of decryption, typically concealed within IND-CCA secure PKE/KEMs, thereby enabling our attacks. Firstly, we identified EM-based side-channel vulnerabilities in the error correcting codes (ECC) enabling us to distinguish based on the value/validity of decrypted codewords. We also identified similar vulnerabilities in the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform which leaks information about decrypted messages applicable to schemes that do not use ECC. We subsequently exploit these vulnerabilities to demonstrate practical attacks applicable to six CCA-secure lattice-based PKE/KEMs competing in the second round of the NIST standardization process. We perform experimental validation of our attacks on implementations taken from the open-source pqm4 library, running on the ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. Our attacks lead to complete key-recovery in a matter of minutes on all the targeted schemes, thus showing the effectiveness of our attack.