International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Michiel Van Beirendonck

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
TCHES
Analysis and Comparison of Table-based Arithmetic to Boolean Masking 📺
Michiel Van Beirendonck Jan-Pieter D’Anvers Ingrid Verbauwhede
Masking is a popular technique to protect cryptographic implementations against side-channel attacks and comes in several variants including Boolean and arithmetic masking. Some masked implementations require conversion between these two variants, which is increasingly the case for masking of post-quantum encryption and signature schemes. One way to perform Arithmetic to Boolean (A2B) mask conversion is a table-based approach first introduced by Coron and Tchulkine, and later corrected and adapted by Debraize in CHES 2012. In this work, we show both analytically and experimentally that the table-based A2B conversion algorithm proposed by Debraize does not achieve the claimed resistance against differential power analysis due to a non-uniform masking of an intermediate variable. This non-uniformity is hard to find analytically but leads to clear leakage in experimental validation. To address the non-uniform masking issue, we propose two new A2B conversions: one that maintains efficiency at the cost of additional memory and one that trades efficiency for a reduced memory footprint. We give analytical and experimental evidence for their security, and will make their implementations, which are shown to be free from side-channel leakage in 100.000 power traces collected on the ARM Cortex-M4, available online. We conclude that when designing side-channel protection mechanisms, it is of paramount importance to perform both a theoretical analysis and an experimental validation of the method.
2021
TCHES
Attacking and Defending Masked Polynomial Comparison for Lattice-Based Cryptography 📺
In this work, we are concerned with the hardening of post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) against side-channel attacks, with a focus on the comparison operation required for the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform. We identify critical vulnerabilities in two proposals for masked comparison and successfully attack the masked comparison algorithms from TCHES 2018 and TCHES 2020. To do so, we use first-order side-channel attacks and show that the advertised security properties do not hold. Additionally, we break the higher-order secured masked comparison from TCHES 2020 using a collision attack, which does not require side-channel information. To enable implementers to spot such flaws in the implementation or underlying algorithms, we propose a framework that is designed to test the re-encryption step of the FO transform for information leakage. Our framework relies on a specifically parametrized t-test and would have identified the previously mentioned flaws in the masked comparison. Our framework can be used to test both the comparison itself and the full decapsulation implementation.