## CryptoDB

### Tako Boris Fouotsa

#### ORCID: 0000-0003-1821-8406

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2024

EUROCRYPT

Isogeny problems with level structure
Abstract

Given two elliptic curves and the degree of an isogeny between
them, finding the isogeny is believed to be a difficult
problem—upon which rests the security of nearly any isogeny-based
scheme.
If, however, to the data above we add information about the behavior
of the isogeny on a large enough subgroup, the problem can become easy,
as recent cryptanalyses on SIDH have shown.
Between the restriction of the isogeny to a full N‑torsion subgroup
and no "torsion information" at all lies a spectrum of interesting
intermediate problems, raising the question of how easy or hard each
of them is.
Here we explore modular isogeny problems where the torsion
information is masked by the action of a group of 2×2
matrices.
We give reductions between these problems, classify them by their
difficulty, and link them to security assumptions found in the
literature.

2024

ASIACRYPT

SQIPrime: A dimension 2 variant of SQISignHD with non-smooth challenge isogenies
Abstract

We introduce SQIPrime, a post-quantum digital signature scheme based on the Deuring correspondence and Kani's Lemma.
Compared to its predecessors that are SQISign and especially SQISignHD, SQIPrime further expands the use of high dimensional isogenies, already in use in the verification in SQISignHD, to all its subroutines.
In doing so, it no longer relies on smooth degree isogenies (of dimension 1). Intriguingly, this includes the challenge isogeny which is also a non-smooth degree isogeny, but has an accessible kernel. The fact that the isogenies do not have rational kernel allows to fit more rational power 2 torsion points which are necessary when computing and representing the response isogeny.
SQIPrime operates with prime numbers of the form $p = 2^\alpha f-1$.
We describe two variants of SQIPrime. SQIPrime4D which incorporates the novelties described above and uses dimension 4 isogenies to represent the response isogeny. The runtime of higher dimensional isogeny computation is exponential in the dimension, hence the smaller the dimension the better for efficiency. The second variant, SQIPrime2D, solely uses dimension 2 isogenies. This is achieved by setting the degree of the secret isogeny to be equal to that of the challenge isogeny and further exploiting Kani's Lemma. SQIPrime2D is more efficient compared to SQIPrime4D and to SQISignHD, at the cost of being comparatively less compact, but still very compact compared to non isogeny based post-quantum signatures.

2023

PKC

SCALLOP: scaling the CSI-FiSh
Abstract

We present SCALLOP: SCALable isogeny action based on Oriented supersingular curves with Prime conductor, a new group action based on isogenies of supersingular curves. Similarly to CSIDH and OSIDH, we use the group action of an imaginary quadratic order's class group on the set of oriented supersingular curves.
Compared to CSIDH, the main benefit of our construction is that it is easy to compute the class-group structure; this data is required to uniquely represent - and efficiently act by - arbitrary group elements, which is a requirement in, e.g., the CSI-FiSh signature scheme by Beullens, Kleinjung and Vercauteren. The index-calculus algorithm used in CSI-FiSh to compute the class-group structure has complexity $L(1/2)$, ruling out class groups much larger than CSIDH-512, a limitation that is particularly problematic in light of the ongoing debate regarding the quantum security of cryptographic group actions.
Hoping to solve this issue, we consider the class group of a quadratic order of large prime conductor inside an imaginary quadratic field of small discriminant. This family of quadratic orders lets us easily determine the size of the class group, and, by carefully choosing the conductor, even exercise significant control on it - in particular supporting highly smooth choices. Although evaluating the resulting group action still has subexponential asymptotic complexity, a careful choice of parameters leads to a practical speedup that we demonstrate in practice for a security level equivalent to CSIDH-1024, a parameter currently firmly out of reach of index-calculus-based methods. However, our implementation takes 35 seconds (resp. 12.5 minutes) for a single group-action evaluation at a CSIDH-512-equivalent (resp. CSIDH-1024-equivalent) security level, showing that, while feasible, the SCALLOP group action does not achieve realistically usable performance yet.

2023

EUROCRYPT

M-SIDH and MD-SIDH: countering SIDH attacks by masking information
Abstract

The SIDH protocol is an isogeny-based key exchange protocol using supersingular isogenies, designed by Jao and De Feo in 2011. The protocol underlies the SIKE algorithm which advanced to the fourth round of NIST's post-quantum standardization project in May 2022. The algorithm was considered very promising: indeed the most significant attacks against SIDH were meet-in-the-middle variants with exponential complexity, and torsion point attacks which only applied to unbalanced parameters (and in particular, not to SIKE).
This security picture dramatically changed in August 2022 with new attacks by Castryck-Decru, Maino-Martindale and Robert. Like prior attacks on unbalanced versions, these new attacks exploit torsion point information provided in the SIDH protocol. Crucially however, the new attacks embed the isogeny problem into a similar isogeny problem in higher dimension to also affect the balanced parameters. As a result of these works, the SIKE algorithm is now fully broken both in theory and in practice. Given the considerable interest attracted by SIKE and related protocols in recent years, it is natural to seek countermeasures to the new attacks.
In this paper, we introduce two such countermeasures based on partially hiding the isogeny degrees and torsion point information in SIDH protocol. We present a preliminary analysis of the resulting schemes including non trivial generalizations of prior attacks. Based on this analysis we suggest parameters for our M-SIDH variant with public key sizes of 4434, 7037 and 9750 bytes respectively for $\lambda=128$, 192 and 256 bits of security.

2023

EUROCRYPT

Supersingular Curves You can Trust
Abstract

Generating a supersingular elliptic curve such that nobody knows its endomorphism ring is a notoriously hard task, despite several isogeny-based protocols relying on such an object. A trusted setup is often proposed as a workaround, but several aspects remain unclear. In this work, we develop the tools necessary to practically run such a distributed trusted-setup ceremony.
Our key contribution is the first statistically zero-knowledge proof of isogeny knowledge that is compatible with any base field. To prove statistical ZK, we introduce isogeny graphs with Borel level structure and prove they have the Ramanujan property. Then, we analyze the security of a distributed trusted-setup protocol based on our ZK proof in the simplified universal composability framework. Lastly, we develop an optimized implementation of the ZK proof, and we propose a strategy to concretely deploy the trusted-setup protocol.

2023

ASIACRYPT

New SIDH Countermeasures for a More Efficient Key Exchange
Abstract

The Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) protocol has been the main and most efficient isogeny-based encryption protocol, until a series of breakthroughs led to a polynomial-time key-recovery attack. While some countermeasures have been proposed, the resulting schemes are significantly slower and larger than the original SIDH.
In this work, we propose a new countermeasure technique that leads to significantly more efficient and compact protocols. To do so, we introduce the concept of artificially oriented curves, i.e. curves with an associated pair of subgroups. We show that this information is sufficient to build parallel isogenies and thus obtain an SIDH-like key exchange, while also revealing significantly less information compared to previous constructions.
After introducing artificially oriented curves, we formalize several related computational problems and thoroughly assess their presumed hardness. We then translate the SIDH key exchange to the artificially oriented setting, obtaining the key-exchange protocols binSIDH, or binary SIDH, and terSIDH, or ternary SIDH, which respectively rely on fixed-degree and variable-degree isogenies.
Lastly, we also provide a proof-of-concept implementation of the proposed protocols. Despite being a high-level SageMath implementation, it already outperforms existing implementations of other isogeny-based encryption schemes, which suggests that terSIDH might be the most efficient isogeny-based encryption protocol.

2022

PKC

On the Isogeny Problem with Torsion Point Information
📺
Abstract

It has recently been rigorously proven (and was previously known under certain heuristics) that the general supersingular isogeny problem reduces to the supersingular endomorphism ring computation problem. However, in order to attack SIDH-type schemes, one requires a particular isogeny which is usually not returned by the general reduction. At Asiacrypt 2016, Galbraith, Petit, Shani and Ti presented a polynomial-time reduction of the problem of finding the secret isogeny in SIDH to the problem of computing the endomorphism ring of a supersingular elliptic curve. Their method exploits the fact that secret isogenies in SIDH are of degree approximately $p^{1/2}$. The method does not extend to other SIDH-type schemes, where secret isogenies of larger degree are used and this condition is not fulfilled.
We present a more general reduction algorithm that generalises to all SIDH-type schemes. The main idea of our algorithm is to exploit available torsion point images together with the KLPT algorithm to obtain a linear system of equations over a certain residue class ring. We show that this system will have a unique solution that can be lifted to the integers if some mild conditions on the parameters are satisfied. This lift then yields the secret isogeny. One consequence of this work is that the choice of the prime $p$ in \mbox{B-SIDH} is tight.

2021

ASIACRYPT

Séta: Supersingular Encryption from Torsion Attacks
📺
Abstract

We present Séta, a new family of public-key encryption schemes with post-quantum security based on isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves.
It is constructed from a new family of trapdoor one-way functions, where the inversion algorithm uses Petit's so called \emph{torsion attacks} on SIDH to compute an isogeny between supersingular elliptic curves given an endomorphism of the starting curve and images of torsion points.
We prove the OW-CPA security of S\'eta and present an IND-CCA variant using the post-quantum OAEP transformation.
Several variants for key generation are explored together with their impact on the selection of parameters, such as the base prime of the scheme.
We furthermore formalise an ``uber'' isogeny assumption framework which aims to generalize computational isogeny problems encountered in schemes including SIDH, CSDIH, OSIDH and ours.
Finally, we carefully select parameters to achieve a balance between security and run-times and present experimental results from our implementation.

2021

ASIACRYPT

SHealS and HealS: isogeny-based PKEs from a key validation method for SIDH
📺
Abstract

In 2016, Galbraith et al. presented an adaptive attack on the
SIDH key exchange protocol.
In SIKE, one applies a variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform to force Bob to reveal his encryption key to Alice, which Alice then uses to re-encrypt Bob's ciphertext and verify its validity. Therefore, Bob can not reuse his encryption keys. There have been two other proposed countermeasures enabling static-static private keys: k-SIDH and its variant by Jao and Urbanik. These countermeasures are relatively expensive since they consist in running multiple parallel instances of SIDH.
In this paper,
firstly, we propose a new countermeasure to the GPST adaptive attack on SIDH. Our countermeasure does not require key disclosure as in SIKE, nor multiple parallel instances as in k-SIDH. We translate our countermeasure into a key validation method for SIDH-type schmes.
Secondly, we use our key validation to design HealSIDH,
an efficient SIDH-type static-static key interactive exchange protocol.
Thirdly, we derive a PKE scheme SHealS
using HealSIDH. SHealS uses larger primes compared to SIKE, has larger keys and ciphertexts, but only $4$ isogenies are computed in a full execution of the scheme, as opposed to $5$ isogenies in SIKE.
We prove that SHealS is IND-CPA secure relying on a new assumption we introduce and we conjecture its IND-CCA security.
We suggest HealS, a variant of SHealS using a smaller prime, providing smaller keys and ciphertexts.
As a result, HealSIDH is a practically efficient SIDH based (interactive) key exchange incorporating a "direct" countermeasure to the GPST adaptive attack.

#### Coauthors

- Andrea Basso (2)
- Giulio Codogni (1)
- Deirdre Connolly (1)
- Luca De Feo (4)
- Max Duparc (1)
- Tako Boris Fouotsa (9)
- Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem (1)
- Péter Kutas (3)
- Antonin Leroux (2)
- Guido Maria Lido (1)
- Simon-Philipp Merz (2)
- Tomoki Moriya (1)
- Travis Morrison (1)
- Lorenz Panny (3)
- Sikhar Patranabis (1)
- Christophe Petit (3)
- Javier Silva (1)
- Yan Bo Ti (1)
- Benjamin Wesolowski (3)