International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Matthew J. B. Robshaw

Affiliation: Impinj

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2011
CHES
2010
CHES
2009
ASIACRYPT
2009
FSE
Looking back at the eSTREAM Project
Matthew J. B. Robshaw
2008
EUROCRYPT
2008
EPRINT
HB#: Increasing the Security and Efficiency of HB+
Henri Gilbert Matthew J.B. Robshaw Yannick Seurin
The innovative HB+ protocol of Juels and Weis [10] extends device authentication to low-cost RFID tags. However, despite the very simple on-tag computation there remain some practical problems with HB+ and despite an elegant proof of security against some limited active attacks, there is a simple man-in-the-middle attack due to Gilbert et al. [8]. In this paper we consider improvements to HB+ in terms of both security and practicality. We introduce a new protocol that we denote random-HB#. This proposal avoids many practical drawbacks of HB+, remains provably resistant to attacks in the model of Juels and Weis, and at the same time is provably resistant to a broader class of active attacks that includes the attack of [8]. We then describe an enhanced variant called HB# which offers practical advantages over HB+.
2008
CHES
2008
EUROCRYPT
2007
CHES
2006
ASIACRYPT
2006
FSE
2005
FSE
2005
PKC
2005
EPRINT
An Active Attack Against HB+ - A Provably Secure Lightweight Authentication Protocol
Much research has focused on providing RFID tags with lightweight cryptographic functionality. The HB+ authentication protocol was recently proposed and claimed to be secure against both passive and active attacks. In this note we propose a linear-time active attack against HB+.
2002
CRYPTO
1999
CRYPTO
1999
FSE
1998
FSE
1996
EUROCRYPT
1994
CRYPTO
1994
FSE
1993
FSE

Program Committees

Crypto 2017
Crypto 2016
CHES 2015
Crypto 2015
CHES 2014
FSE 2013
Eurocrypt 2013
CHES 2012
FSE 2012
CHES 2011
Crypto 2010
FSE 2010
Eurocrypt 2008
Crypto 2008
FSE 2007
FSE 2006
FSE 2004
FSE 2003
Eurocrypt 2003
Crypto 1999
Crypto 1998