## CryptoDB

### Sebastian Faust

#### ORCID: 0000-0002-8625-4639

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2024

EUROCRYPT

Connecting Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing to Practice: Scaling Trends and Physical Dependencies of Prime Field Masking
Abstract

Symmetric ciphers operating in (small or mid-size) prime fields have been shown to be promising candidates to maintain security against low-noise (or even noise-free) side-channel leakage.
In order to design prime ciphers that best trade physical security and implementation efficiency, it is essential to understand how side-channel security evolves with the field size (i.e., scaling trends).
Unfortunately, it has also been shown that such a scaling trend depends on the leakage functions and cannot be explained by the standard metrics used to analyze Boolean masking with noise.
In this work, we therefore initiate a formal study of prime field masking for two canonical leakage functions: bit leakages and Hamming weight leakages. By leveraging theoretical results from the leakage-resilient secret sharing literature, we explain formally why (1) bit leakages correspond to a worst-case and do not encourage operating in larger fields, and (2) an opposite conclusion holds for
Hamming weight leakages, where increasing the prime field modulus p can contribute to a security amplification that is exponential in the number of shares,with log(p) seen as security parameter like the noise variance in Boolean masking. We combine these theoretical results with experimental ones
and show that the interest masking in larger prime fields can degrade gracefully when leakage functions slightly deviate from the Hamming weight abstraction, motivating further research towards characterizing (ideally wide) classes of leakage functions offering such guarantees.

2024

EUROCRYPT

From Random Probing to Noisy Leakages Without Field-Size Dependence
Abstract

Side channel attacks are devastating attacks targeting cryptographic implementations. To protect against these attacks, various countermeasures have been proposed -- in particular, the so-called masking scheme. Masking schemes work by hiding sensitive information via secret sharing all intermediate values that occur during the evaluation of a cryptographic implementation. Over the last decade, there has been broad interest in designing and formally analyzing such schemes. The random probing model considers leakage where the value on each wire leaks with some probability $\varepsilon$. This model is important as it implies security in the noisy leakage model via a reduction by Duc et al. (Eurocrypt 2014). Noisy leakages are considered the ``gold-standard'' for analyzing masking schemes as they accurately model many real-world physical leakages. Unfortunately, the reduction of Duc et al. is non-tight, and in particular requires that the amount of noise increases by a factor of $|\mathbb{F}|$ for circuits that operate over $\mathbb{F}$ (where $\mathbb{F}$ is a finite field). In this work, we give a generic transformation from $\varepsilon$-random probing to $\delta$-average probing, with $\delta \approx \varepsilon^2$, which avoids this loss of $|\mathbb{F}|$. Since the average probing is identical to the noisy leakage model (Eurocrypt 2014), this yields for the first time a security analysis of masked circuits where the noise parameter in the noisy leakage model is independent of $|\mathbb{F}|$. The latter is particularly important for cryptographic schemes operating over large fields, e.g., the AES or the recently standardized post-quantum schemes.

2023

CRYPTO

Combined Fault and Leakage Resilience: Composability, Constructions and Compiler
Abstract

Real-world cryptographic implementations nowadays are not only attacked via classical cryptanalysis but also via implementation attacks. Roughly, these attacks can be divided into passive attacks, where the adversary observed information about the internals of the computation; and active attacks where an adversary attempts to induce faults.
While there is a rich literature on countermeasures targeting either of these attacks, preventing \emph{combined} attacks only recently received wider attention by the research community. In order to protect against passive side-channel attacks the standard technique is to use masking. Here, all sensitive information is secret shared such that leakage from individual shares does not reveal relevant information. To further lift the masking countermeasure to protect against active attacks, two different approaches have been considered in the literature. First, we may run $\epsilon$ copies of the masked computation and verify the outputs in order to detect faulty computation in one of the copies. This, approach, however has the following shortcomings. Firstly, we either require a huge amount of randomness ($O(\epsilon)$ more than a single masked circuit consumes), or we re-use the randomness among all $\epsilon$ copies, which makes the computation highly vulnerable to so-called horizontal attacks.
Secondly, the number of shares is quadratic resulting in quadratic complexity even for affine computations.
An alternative approach is to use polynomial masking, where instead of using additive masking, we use a sharing based on Reed Solomon codes. This has the advantage that the encoding itself already provides some resilience against faults, which is not the case for the simple additive encoding. Unfortunately, however, current state of the art schemes either led to an overhead of $O(n^5)$ for non-linear gates (here $n$ is the number of masks), or only worked against very restricted faults.
In this work, we present a compiler based on polynomial masking that uses only $n=d+\epsilon+1$ shares and achieves linear computational complexity for affine computation (as previous polynomial approaches) and cubic complexity for non-linear gates (as previous approaches using the duplication method).
Hence, our compiler has the best-known asymptotic efficiency among all known approaches.
Furthermore, our compiler provides security against much stronger attackers that use region probes and adaptive faults and is thus secure against horizontal attacks.
To achieve our construction, we introduce the notion of fault-invariance that allows us to lift probing secure gadgets to also be secure against combined attacks without considering all possible fault combinations.
This technique improves previous approaches verifying probing security for all possible fault combinations and allows for much simpler constructions.

2023

CRYPTO

Individual Cryptography
Abstract

We initiate a formal study of \emph{individual cryptography}. Informally speaking, an algorithm $\mathsf{Alg}$ is \emph{individual} if, in every implementation of $\mathsf{Alg}$, there always exists an individual user with full knowledge of the cryptographic data $S$ used by $\mathsf{Alg}$. In particular, it should be infeasible to design implementations of this algorithm that would hide $S$ by distributing it between a group of parties using an MPC protocol or outsourcing it to a trusted execution environment.
We define and construct two primitives in this model. The first one, called \emph{proofs of individual knowledge}, is a tool for proving that a given message is fully known to a single (``individual'') machine on the Internet, i.e., it cannot be shared between a group of parties. The second one, dubbed \emph{individual secret sharing}, is a scheme for sharing a secret $S$ between a group of parties so that the parties have no knowledge of $S$ as long as they do not reconstruct it. The reconstruction ensures that if the shareholders attempt to collude, one of them will learn the secret entirely. Individual secret sharing has applications for preventing collusion in secret sharing. A central technique for constructing individual cryptographic primitives is the concept of MPC hardness. MPC hardness precludes an adversary from completing a cryptographic task in a distributed fashion within a specific time frame.

2023

TCHES

Provable Secure Parallel Gadgets
Abstract

Side-channel attacks are a fundamental threat to the security of cryptographic implementations. One of the most prominent countermeasures against side-channel attacks is masking, where each intermediate value of the computation is secret shared, thereby concealing the computation’s sensitive information. An important security model to study the security of masking schemes is the random probing model, in which the adversary obtains each intermediate value of the computation with some probability p. To construct secure masking schemes, an important building block is the refreshing gadget, which updates the randomness of the secret shared intermediate values. Recently, Dziembowski, Faust, and Zebrowski (ASIACRYPT’19) analyzed the security of a simple refreshing gadget by using a new technique called the leakage diagram. In this work, we follow the approach of Dziembowski et al. and significantly improve its methodology. Concretely, we refine the notion of a leakage diagram via so-called dependency graphs, and show how to use this technique for arbitrary complex circuits via composition results and approximation techniques. To illustrate the power of our new techniques, as a case study, we designed provably secure parallel gadgets for the random probing model, and adapted the ISW multiplication such that all gadgets can be parallelized. Finally, we evaluate concrete security levels, and show how our new methodology can further improve the concrete security level of masking schemes. This results in a compiler provable secure up to a noise level of O(1) for affine circuits and O(1/√n) in general.

2022

PKC

Financially Backed Covert Security
📺
Abstract

The security notion of covert security introduced by Aumann and Lindell (TCC'07) allows the adversary to successfully cheat and break security with a fixed probability 1-e, while with probability e, honest parties detect the cheating attempt. Asharov and Orlandi (ASIACRYPT'12) extend covert security to enable parties to create publicly verifiable evidence about misbehavior that can be transferred to any third party. This notion is called publicly verifiable covert security (PVC) and has been investigated by multiple works. While these two notions work well in settings with known identities in which parties care about their reputation, they fall short in Internet-like settings where there are only digital identities that can provide some form of anonymity.
In this work, we propose the notion of financially backed covert security (FBC), which ensures that the adversary is financially punished if cheating is detected. Next, we present three transformations that turn PVC protocols into FBC protocols. Our protocols provide highly efficient judging, thereby enabling practical judge implementations via smart contracts deployed on a blockchain. In particular, the judge only needs to non-interactively validate a single protocol message while previous PVC protocols required the judge to emulate the whole protocol. Furthermore, by allowing an interactive punishment procedure, we can reduce the amount of validation to a single program instruction, e.g., a gate in a circuit. An interactive punishment, additionally, enables us to create financially backed covert secure protocols without any form of common public transcript, a property that has not been achieved by prior PVC protocols.

2022

ASIACRYPT

Continuously Non-Malleable Codes against Bounded-Depth Tampering
📺
Abstract

Non-malleable codes (Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs, ICS 2010 & JACM 2018) allow protecting arbitrary cryptographic primitives against related-key attacks (RKAs). Even when using codes that are guaranteed to be non-malleable against a single tampering attempt, one obtains RKA security against poly-many tampering attacks at the price of assuming perfect memory erasures. In contrast, continuously non-malleable codes (Faust, Mukherjee, Nielsen and Venturi, TCC 2014) do not suffer from this limitation, as the non-malleability guarantee holds against poly-many tampering attempts.
Unfortunately, there are only a handful of constructions of continuously non-malleable codes, while standard non-malleable codes are known for a large variety of tampering families including, e.g., NC0 and decision-tree tampering, AC0, and recently even bounded polynomial-depth tampering. We change this state of affairs by providing the first constructions of continuously non-malleable codes in the following natural settings:
– Against decision-tree tampering, where, in each tampering attempt, every bit of the tampered codeword can be set arbitrarily after adaptively reading up to d locations within the input codeword. Our scheme is in the plain model, can be instantiated assuming the existence of one-way functions, and tolerates tampering by decision trees of depth d = O(n1/8), where n is the length of the codeword. Notably, this class includes NC0.
– Against bounded polynomial-depth tampering, where in each tampering attempt the adversary can select any tampering function that can be computed by a circuit of bounded polynomial depth (and unbounded polynomial size). Our scheme is in the common reference string model, and can be instantiated assuming the existence of time-lock puzzles and simulation-extractable (succinct) non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.

2021

EUROCRYPT

Generic Compiler for Publicly Verifiable Covert Multi-Party Computation
📺
Abstract

Covert security has been introduced as a compromise between semi-honest and malicious security. In a nutshell, covert security guarantees that malicious behavior can be detected by the honest parties with some probability, but in case detection fails all bets are off. While the security guarantee offered by covert security is weaker than full-fledged malicious security, it comes with significantly improved efficiency. An important extension of covert security introduced by Asharov and Orlandi (ASIACRYPT'12) is \emph{public verifiability}, which allows the honest parties to create a publicly verifiable certificate of malicious behavior. Public verifiability significantly strengthen covert security as the certificate allows punishment via an external party, e.g., a judge.
Most previous work on publicly verifiable covert (PVC) security focuses on the two-party case, and the multi-party case has mostly been neglected. In this work, we introduce a novel compiler for multi-party PVC secure protocols with no private inputs. The class of supported protocols includes the preprocessing of common multi-party computation protocols that are designed in the offline-online model. Our compiler leverages time-lock encryption to offer high probability of cheating detection (often also called deterrence factor) independent of the number of involved parties. Moreover, in contrast to the only earlier work that studies PVC in the multi-party setting (CRYPTO'20), we provide the first full formal security analysis.

2021

TOSC

MOE: Multiplication Operated Encryption with Trojan Resilience
📺
Abstract

In order to lower costs, the fabrication of Integrated Circuits (ICs) is increasingly delegated to offshore contract foundries, making them exposed to malicious modifications, known as hardware Trojans. Recent works have demonstrated that a strong form of Trojan-resilience can be obtained from untrusted chips by exploiting secret sharing and Multi-Party Computation (MPC), yet with significant cost overheads. In this paper, we study the possibility of building a symmetric cipher enabling similar guarantees in a more efficient manner. To reach this goal, we exploit a simple round structure mixing a modular multiplication and a multiplication with a binary matrix. Besides being motivated as a new block cipher design for Trojan resilience, our research also exposes the cryptographic properties of the modular multiplication, which is of independent interest.

2021

PKC

Two-Party Adaptor Signatures From Identification Schemes
📺
Abstract

Adaptor signatures are a novel cryptographic primitive with important applications for cryptocurrencies. They have been used to construct second layer solutions such as payment channels or cross-currency swaps. The basic idea of an adaptor signature scheme is to tie the signing process to the revelation of a secret value in the sense that, much like a regular signature scheme, an adaptor signature scheme can authenticate messages, but simultaneously leaks a secret to certain parties. Recently, Aumayr et al. provide the first formalization of adaptor signature schemes, and present provably secure constructions from ECDSA and Schnorr signatures. Unfortunately, the formalization and constructions given in this work have two limitations: (1) current schemes are limited to ECDSA and Schnorr signatures, and no generic transformation for constructing adaptor signatures is known; (2) they do not offer support for aggregated two-party signing, which can significantly reduce the blockchain footprint in applications of adaptor signatures.
In this work, we address these two shortcomings. First, we show that signature schemes that are constructed from identification (ID) schemes, which additionally satisfy certain homomorphic properties, can generically be transformed into adaptor signature schemes. We further provide an impossibility result which proves that unique signature schemes (e.g., the BLS scheme) cannot be transformed into an adaptor signature scheme. In addition, we define two-party adaptor signature schemes with aggregatable public keys and show how to instantiate them via a generic transformation from ID-based signature schemes. Finally, we give instantiations of our generic transformations for the Schnorr, Katz-Wang and Guillou-Quisquater signature schemes.

2021

CRYPTO

Towards Tight Random Probing Security
📺
Abstract

Proving the security of masked implementations in theoretical models that are relevant to practice and match the best known attacks of the side-channel literature is a notoriously hard problem. The random probing model is a good candidate to contribute to this challenge, due to its ability to capture the continuous nature of physical leakage (contrary to the threshold probing model), while also being convenient to manipulate in proofs and to automate with verification tools. Yet, despite recent progresses in the design of masked circuits with good asymptotic security guarantees in this model, existing results still fall short when it comes to analyze the security of concretely useful circuits under realistic noise levels and with low number of shares. In this paper, we contribute to this issue by introducing a new composability notion, the Probe Distribution Table (PDT), and a new tool (called STRAPS, for the Sampled Testing of the RAndom Probing Security). Their combination allows us to significantly improve the tightness of existing analyses in the most practical (low noise, low number of shares) region of the design space. We illustrate these improvements by quantifying the random probing security of an AES S-box circuit, masked with the popular multiplication gadget of Ishai, Sahai and Wagner from Crypto 2003, with up to six shares.

2021

ASIACRYPT

Generalized Channels from Limited Blockchain Scripts and Adaptor Signatures
📺
Abstract

Decentralized and permissionless ledgers offer an inherently low transaction rate, as a result of their consensus protocol demanding the storage of each transaction on-chain. A prominent proposal to tackle this scalability issue is to utilize off-chain protocols, where parties only need to post a limited number of transactions on-chain. Existing solutions can roughly be categorized into: (i) application-specific channels (e.g., payment channels), offering strictly weaker functionality than the underlying blockchain; and (ii) state channels, supporting arbitrary smart contracts at the cost of being compatible only with the few blockchains having Turing-complete scripting languages (e.g., Ethereum).
In this work, we introduce and formalize the notion of generalized channels allowing users to perform any operation supported by the underlying blockchain in an off-chain manner. Generalized channels thus extend the functionality of payment channels and relax the definition of state channels. We present a concrete construction compatible with any blockchain supporting transaction authorization, time-locks and constant number of Boolean and and or operations -- requirements fulfilled by many (non-Turing-complete) blockchains including the popular Bitcoin. To this end, we leverage adaptor signatures -- a cryptographic primitive already used in the cryptocurrency literature but formalized as a standalone primitive in this work for the first time. We formally prove the security of our generalized channel construction in the Universal Composability framework.
As an important practical contribution, our generalized channel construction outperforms the state-of-the-art payment channel construction, the Lightning Network, in efficiency. Concretely, it halves the off-chain communication complexity and reduces the on-chain footprint in case of disputes from linear to constant in the number of off-chain applications funded by the channel.
Finally, we evaluate the practicality of our construction via a prototype implementation and discuss various applications including financially secured fair two-party computation.

2020

JOFC

Continuously Non-malleable Codes in the Split-State Model
Abstract

Non-malleable codes (Dziembowski et al., ICS’10 and J. ACM’18) are a natural relaxation of error correcting/detecting codes with useful applications in cryptography. Informally, a code is non-malleable if an adversary trying to tamper with an encoding of a message can only leave it unchanged or modify it to the encoding of an unrelated value. This paper introduces continuous non-malleability, a generalization of standard non-malleability where the adversary is allowed to tamper continuously with the same encoding. This is in contrast to the standard definition of non-malleable codes, where the adversary can only tamper a single time. The only restriction is that after the first invalid codeword is ever generated, a special self-destruct mechanism is triggered and no further tampering is allowed; this restriction can easily be shown to be necessary. We focus on the split-state model, where an encoding consists of two parts and the tampering functions can be arbitrary as long as they act independently on each part. Our main contributions are outlined below. We show that continuous non-malleability in the split-state model is impossible without relying on computational assumptions. We construct a computationally secure split-state code satisfying continuous non-malleability in the common reference string (CRS) model. Our scheme can be instantiated assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions and (doubly enhanced) trapdoor permutations, but we also give concrete instantiations based on standard number-theoretic assumptions. We revisit the application of non-malleable codes to protecting arbitrary cryptographic primitives against related-key attacks. Previous applications of non-malleable codes in this setting required perfect erasures and the adversary to be restricted in memory. We show that continuously non-malleable codes allow to avoid these restrictions.

2019

EUROCRYPT

Multi-party Virtual State Channels
📺
Abstract

Smart contracts are self-executing agreements written in program code and are envisioned to be one of the main applications of blockchain technology. While they are supported by prominent cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum, their further adoption is hindered by fundamental scalability challenges. For instance, in Ethereum contract execution suffers from a latency of more than 15 s, and the total number of contracts that can be executed per second is very limited. State channel networks are one of the core primitives aiming to address these challenges. They form a second layer over the slow and expensive blockchain, thereby enabling instantaneous contract processing at negligible costs.In this work we present the first complete description of a state channel network that exhibits the following key features. First, it supports virtual multi-party state channels, i.e. state channels that can be created and closed without blockchain interaction and that allow contracts with any number of parties. Second, the worst case time complexity of our protocol is constant for arbitrary complex channels. This is in contrast to the existing virtual state channel construction that has worst case time complexity linear in the number of involved parties. In addition to our new construction, we provide a comprehensive model for the modular design and security analysis of our construction.

2019

ASIACRYPT

Simple Refreshing in the Noisy Leakage Model
Abstract

Masking schemes are a prominent countermeasure against power analysis and work by concealing the values that are produced during the computation through randomness. The randomness is typically injected into the masked algorithm using a so-called refreshing scheme, which is placed after each masked operation, and hence is one of the main bottlenecks for designing efficient masking schemes. The main contribution of our work is to investigate the security of a very simple and efficient refreshing scheme and prove its security in the noisy leakage model (EUROCRYPT’13). Compared to earlier constructions our refreshing is significantly more efficient and uses only n random values and $${<}2n$$ operations, where n is the security parameter. In addition we show how our refreshing can be used in more complex masked computation in the presence of noisy leakage. Our results are established using a new methodology for analyzing masking schemes in the noisy leakage model, which may be of independent interest.

2019

JOFC

Making Masking Security Proofs Concrete (Or How to Evaluate the Security of Any Leaking Device), Extended Version
Abstract

We investigate the relationship between theoretical studies of leaking cryptographic devices and concrete security evaluations with standard side-channel attacks. Our contributions are in four parts. First, we connect the formal analysis of the masking countermeasure proposed by Duc et al. (Eurocrypt 2014) with the Eurocrypt 2009 evaluation framework for side-channel key recovery attacks. In particular, we re-state their main proof for the masking countermeasure based on a mutual information metric, which is frequently used in concrete physical security evaluations. Second, we discuss the tightness of the Eurocrypt 2014 bounds based on experimental case studies. This allows us to conjecture a simplified link between the mutual information metric and the success rate of a side-channel adversary, ignoring technical parameters and proof artifacts. Third, we introduce heuristic (yet well-motivated) tools for the evaluation of the masking countermeasure when its independent leakage assumption is not perfectly fulfilled, as it is frequently encountered in practice. Thanks to these tools, we argue that masking with non-independent leakages may provide improved security levels in certain scenarios. Eventually, we consider the tradeoff between the measurement complexity and the key enumeration time complexity in divide-and-conquer side-channel attacks and show that these complexities can be lower bounded based on the mutual information metric, using simple and efficient algorithms. The combination of these observations enables significant reductions of the evaluation costs for certification bodies.

2019

JOFC

Unifying Leakage Models: From Probing Attacks to Noisy Leakage
Abstract

A recent trend in cryptography is to formally show the leakage resilience of cryptographic implementations in a given leakage model. One of the most prominent leakage model—the so-called bounded leakage model—assumes that the amount of leakage that an adversary receives is a-priori bounded. Unfortunately, it has been pointed out by several works that the assumption of bounded leakages is hard to verify in practice. A more realistic assumption is to consider that leakages are sufficiently noisy, following the engineering observation that real-world physical leakages are inherently perturbed by physical noise. While already the seminal work of Chari et al. (in: CRYPTO, pp 398–412, 1999 ) study security of side-channel countermeasures in the noisy model, only recently Prouff and Rivain (in: Johansson T, Nguyen PQ (eds) EUROCRYPT, volume 7881 of lecture notes in 931 computer science, pp 142–159, Springer, 2013 ) offer a full formal analysis of the masking countermeasure in a physically motivated noise model. In particular, the authors show that a block-cipher implementation that uses the Boolean masking scheme is secure against a very general class of noisy leakage functions. While this is an important step toward better understanding the security of masking schemes, the analysis of Prouff and Rivain has several shortcomings including in particular requiring leak-free gates. In this work, we provide an alternative security proof in the same noise model that overcomes these challenges. We achieve this goal by a new reduction from noisy leakage to the important model of probing adversaries (Ishai et al. in: CRYPTO, pp 463–481, 2003 ). This reduction is the main technical contribution of our work that significantly simplifies the formal security analysis of masking schemes against realistic side-channel leakages.

2018

TCHES

Composable Masking Schemes in the Presence of Physical Defaults & the Robust Probing Model
Abstract

Composability and robustness against physical defaults (e.g., glitches) are two highly desirable properties for secure implementations of masking schemes. While tools exist to guarantee them separately, no current formalism enables their joint investigation. In this paper, we solve this issue by introducing a new model, the robust probing model, that is naturally suited to capture the combination of these properties. We first motivate this formalism by analyzing the excellent robustness and low randomness requirements of first-order threshold implementations, and highlighting the difficulty to extend them to higher orders. Next, and most importantly, we use our theory to design and prove the first higher-order secure, robust and composable multiplication gadgets. While admittedly inspired by existing approaches to masking (e.g., Ishai-Sahai-Wagner-like, threshold, domain-oriented), these gadgets exhibit subtle implementation differences with these state-of-the-art solutions (none of which being provably composable and robust). Hence, our results illustrate how sound theoretical models can guide practically-relevant implementations.

2015

EUROCRYPT

#### Program Committees

- Crypto 2024
- Crypto 2023
- PKC 2022
- Eurocrypt 2022
- PKC 2020
- CHES 2019
- Eurocrypt 2018
- TCC 2018
- CHES 2018
- PKC 2017
- Eurocrypt 2016
- CHES 2016
- PKC 2015
- TCC 2015

#### Coauthors

- Marcin Andrychowicz (1)
- Lukas Aumayr (1)
- Josep Balasch (3)
- Gilles Barthe (1)
- Sebastian Berndt (1)
- Francesco Berti (1)
- Gianluca Brian (2)
- Joshua Brody (1)
- Olivier Bronchain (1)
- Gaëtan Cassiers (1)
- Ivan Damgård (3)
- Alexandre Duc (4)
- François Dupressoir (1)
- Stefan Dziembowski (14)
- Lisa Eckey (1)
- Thomas Eisenbarth (1)
- Oguzhan Ersoy (1)
- Andreas Erwig (2)
- Sebastian Faust (48)
- Benedikt Gierlichs (3)
- Marc Gourjon (1)
- Benjamin Grégoire (1)
- Vincent Grosso (2)
- Carmit Hazay (5)
- Gottfried Herold (1)
- Julia Hesse (1)
- Kristina Hostáková (4)
- Anthony Journault (1)
- Emilia Käsper (1)
- Eike Kiltz (1)
- Vladimir Kolmogorov (1)
- David Kretzler (2)
- Virginie Lallemand (1)
- Gregor Leander (1)
- Tomasz Lizurej (1)
- Stefan Lucks (1)
- Matteo Maffei (1)
- Monosij Maitra (1)
- Daniel Masny (2)
- Loïc Masure (1)
- Elena Micheli (2)
- Pedro Moreno-Sanchez (1)
- Pratyay Mukherjee (7)
- Jesper Buus Nielsen (5)
- Peter Sebastian Nordholt (2)
- Maximilian Orlt (4)
- Clara Paglialonga (3)
- Léo Perrin (1)
- Krzysztof Pietrzak (4)
- Santos Merino Del Pozo (1)
- Tal Rabin (1)
- Leonid Reyzin (1)
- Siavash Riahi (2)
- Guy N. Rothblum (1)
- Joachim Schipper (1)
- Alexander Schlösser (2)
- Tobias Schneider (1)
- Okan Seker (1)
- Maciej Skórski (2)
- François-Xavier Standaert (10)
- Pierre-Yves Strub (1)
- Eran Tromer (1)
- Vinod Vaikuntanathan (1)
- Daniele Venturi (9)
- Ingrid Verbauwhede (1)
- Daniel Wichs (1)
- Karol Zebrowski (1)
- Angela Zottarel (2)