International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Sebastian Ramacher

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
PKC
Updatable Signatures and Message Authentication Codes 📺
Cryptographic objects with updating capabilities have been proposed by Bellare, Goldreich and Goldwasser (CRYPTO'94) under the umbrella of incremental cryptography. They have recently seen increased interest, motivated by theoretical questions (Ananth et al., EC'17) as well as concrete practical motivations (Lehmann et al., EC'18; Groth et al. CRYPTO'18; Klooß et al., EC'19). In this work, the form of updatability we are particularly interested in is that primitives are key-updatable and allow to update ''old'' cryptographic objects, e.g., signatures or message authentication codes, from the ''old'' key to the updated key at the same time without requiring full access to the new key (i.e., only via a so-called update token). Inspired by the rigorous study of updatable encryption by Lehmann and Tackmann (EC'18) and Boyd et al. (CRYPTO'20), we introduce a definitional framework for updatable signatures (USs) and message authentication codes (UMACs). We discuss several applications demonstrating that such primitives can be useful in practical applications, especially around key rotation in various domains, as well as serve as building blocks in other cryptographic schemes. We then turn to constructions and our focus there is on ones that are secure and practically efficient. In particular, we provide generic constructions from key-homomorphic primitives (signatures and PRFs) as well as direct constructions. This allows us to instantiate these primitives from various assumptions such as DDH or CDH (latter in bilinear groups), or the (R)LWE and the SIS assumptions. As an example, we obtain highly practical US schemes from BLS signatures or UMAC schemes from the Naor-Pinkas-Reingold PRF.
2020
ASIACRYPT
CCA-Secure (Puncturable) KEMs from Encryption With Non-Negligible Decryption Errors 📺
Public-key encryption (PKE) schemes or key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) are fundamental cryptographic building blocks to realize secure communication protocols. There are several known transformations that generically turn weakly secure schemes into strongly (i.e., IND-CCA) secure ones. While most of these transformations require the weakly secure scheme to provide perfect correctness, Hofheinz, Hövelmanns, and Kiltz (HHK) (TCC 2017) have recently shown that variants of the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform can work with schemes that have negligible correctness error in the (quantum) random oracle model (QROM). Many recent schemes in the NIST post-quantum competition (PQC) use variants of these transformations. Some of their CPA-secure versions even have a non-negligible correctness error and so the techniques of HHK cannot be applied. In this work, we study the setting of generically transforming PKE schemes with potentially large, i.e., non-negligible, correctness error to ones having negligible correctness error. While there have been previous treatments in an asymptotic setting by Dwork et al. (EUROCRYPT 2004), our goal is to come up with practically efficient compilers in a concrete setting and apply them in two different contexts: firstly, we show how to generically transform weakly secure deterministic or randomized PKEs into CCA-secure KEMs in the (Q)ROM using variants of HHK. This applies to essentially all candidates to the NIST PQC based on lattices and codes with non-negligible error, for which we provide an extensive analysis. We thereby show that it improves some of the code-based candidates. Secondly, we study puncturable KEMs in terms of the Bloom Filter KEM (BFKEM) proposed by Derler et al. (EUROCRYPT 2018) which inherently have a non-negligible correctness error. BFKEMs are a building block to construct fully forward-secret zero round-trip time (0-RTT) key-exchange protocols. In particular, we show how to achieve the first post-quantum secure BFKEM generically from lattices and codes by applying our techniques to identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes with (non-)negligible correctness error.
2019
EUROCRYPT
Linear Equivalence of Block Ciphers with Partial Non-Linear Layers: Application to LowMC
$$\textsc {LowMC}$$LOWMC is a block cipher family designed in 2015 by Albrecht et al. It is optimized for practical instantiations of multi-party computation, fully homomorphic encryption, and zero-knowledge proofs. $$\textsc {LowMC}$$LOWMC is used in the $$\textsc {Picnic}$$PICNIC signature scheme, submitted to NIST’s post-quantum standardization project and is a substantial building block in other novel post-quantum cryptosystems. Many $$\textsc {LowMC}$$LOWMC instances use a relatively recent design strategy (initiated by Gérard et al. at CHES 2013) of applying the non-linear layer to only a part of the state in each round, where the shortage of non-linear operations is partially compensated by heavy linear algebra. Since the high linear algebra complexity has been a bottleneck in several applications, one of the open questions raised by the designers was to reduce it, without introducing additional non-linear operations (or compromising security).In this paper, we consider $$\textsc {LowMC}$$LOWMC instances with block size n, partial non-linear layers of size $$s \le n$$s≤n and r encryption rounds. We redesign LowMC’s linear components in a way that preserves its specification, yet improves LowMC’s performance in essentially every aspect. Most of our optimizations are applicable to all SP-networks with partial non-linear layers and shed new light on this relatively new design methodology.Our main result shows that when $$s < n$$s<n, each $$\textsc {LowMC}$$LOWMC instance belongs to a large class of equivalent instances that differ in their linear layers. We then select a representative instance from this class for which encryption (and decryption) can be implemented much more efficiently than for an arbitrary instance. This yields a new encryption algorithm that is equivalent to the standard one, but reduces the evaluation time and storage of the linear layers from $$r \cdot n^2$$r·n2 bits to about $$r \cdot n^2 - (r-1)(n-s)^2$$r·n2-(r-1)(n-s)2. Additionally, we reduce the size of LowMC’s round keys and constants and optimize its key schedule and instance generation algorithms. All of these optimizations give substantial improvements for small s and a reasonable choice of r. Finally, we formalize the notion of linear equivalence of block ciphers and prove the optimality of some of our results.Comprehensive benchmarking of our optimizations in various $$\textsc {LowMC}$$LOWMC applications (such as $$\textsc {Picnic}$$PICNIC) reveals improvements by factors that typically range between 2x and 40x in runtime and memory consumption.
2018
PKC
Revisiting Proxy Re-encryption: Forward Secrecy, Improved Security, and Applications
We revisit the notion of proxy re-encryption ($$\mathsf {PRE}$$PRE), an enhanced public-key encryption primitive envisioned by Blaze et al. (Eurocrypt’98) and formalized by Ateniese et al. (NDSS’05) for delegating decryption rights from a delegator to a delegatee using a semi-trusted proxy. $$\mathsf {PRE}$$PRE notably allows to craft re-encryption keys in order to equip the proxy with the power of transforming ciphertexts under a delegator’s public key to ciphertexts under a delegatee’s public key, while not learning anything about the underlying plaintexts.We study an attractive cryptographic property for $$\mathsf {PRE}$$PRE, namely that of forward secrecy. In our forward-secret $$\mathsf {PRE}$$PRE (fs-$$\mathsf {PRE}$$PRE) definition, the proxy periodically evolves the re-encryption keys and permanently erases old versions while he delegator’s public key is kept constant. As a consequence, ciphertexts for old periods are no longer re-encryptable and, in particular, cannot be decrypted anymore at the delegatee’s end. Moreover, delegators evolve their secret keys too, and, thus, not even they can decrypt old ciphertexts once their key material from past periods has been deleted. This, as we will discuss, directly has application in short-term data/message-sharing scenarios.Technically, we formalize fs-$$\mathsf {PRE}$$PRE. Thereby, we identify a subtle but significant gap in the well-established security model for conventional $$\mathsf {PRE}$$PRE and close it with our formalization (which we dub fs-$$\mathsf {PRE} ^+$$PRE+). We present the first provably secure and efficient constructions of fs-$$\mathsf {PRE}$$PRE as well as $$\mathsf {PRE}$$PRE (implied by the former) satisfying the strong fs-$$\mathsf {PRE} ^+$$PRE+ and $$\mathsf {PRE} ^+$$PRE+ notions, respectively. All our constructions are instantiable in the standard model under standard assumptions and our central building block are hierarchical identity-based encryption ($$\mathsf {HIBE}$$HIBE) schemes that only need to be selectively secure.